74. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
7801. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Middle East Force. Ref (A) State 283435, (B) Manama 1941.
1. I have been giving much thought to your message concerning MIDEASTFOR and your instruction that this problem be raised with Saudi leaders at the earliest opportune moment. I shall of course seek that moment and in fact have commenced preparation for demarche by recalling to Crown Prince our concern about Soviet activity in East Africa and Indian Ocean. I believe, however, that your chance of enlisting Saudi assistance will be enhanced if there is first some progress in Bahrain itself, perhaps the response promised Amb. Cluverius by the Prime Minister (ref B). It is quite unlikely that Saudis would move along lines we favor while the results of the Clements pitch on October 24 remain most recent indication Saudis have of Bahrain attitude. We can feel quite sure they are well informed about content of that meeting.
2. If you feel our national interests require that we incur relatively greater risks of early approach to Saudis regardless of attitudes in Bahrain, I will make demarche as soon as I can get an appointment. I must and do recommend, however, against latter course.
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Summary: Porter advised the Department that the Saudi Government would probably not publicly support the retention of MIDEASTFOR unless progress were made with Bahrain.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760445–0089. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Manama. Repeated as telegram Tosec 310379/292927, December 1. (Ibid., D760445–0532). Telegram 1941 from Manama, November 21 is ibid., D760433–0567. In telegram 283435 to Jidda, November 18, the Department said that only Saudi Arabia could convince Bahrain to allow the retention of MIDEASTFOR, and instructed Porter to raise the issue with the Saudi leadership. (Ibid., D760430–0677) Clements’ October 24 meeting in Bahrain is Document 72.
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