Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

71. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 29, 1976.

SUBJECT

• US-Bahraini Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • Assistant Secretary (NEA) Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.
  • Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary (NEA) Michael Sterner
  • Director for Arabian Peninsula Affairs Joseph Twinam (Notetaker)

• Bahrain

  • Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad bin Mubarak Al-Khalifa

Mr. Atherton thanked the Foreign Minister for Bahrain’s submission of written reservations to the recent Colombo Non-Aligned Conference resolutions on the issues of Puerto Rico and Korea. Shaikh Mohammad said he had argued with other delegations that, on Puerto Rico, there was no point in selecting an unjust cause to mount an “anti-American” campaign, pointing out the Puerto Ricans had voted by democratic procedure for a status now being criticized by governments which by and large were themselves not popularly elected. He expressed satisfaction that in the non-aligned world the Korean issue is beginning to come into proper perspective as the South Koreans finally begin to assert themselves in arguing their own case as diligently as the North Koreans long have pressed theirs. Shaikh Mohammad said Bahrain wants to keep in close communication with the U.S. on multinational issues in the hope of being supportive of the U.S. position whenever it is possible to do so within the realities of Bahrain’s own interests and situation.

LEBANON

Mr. Atherton raised the Lebanese situation, describing it as distressing and a diversion from the central task of pressing on with a Middle East peace settlement.

Shaikh Mohammad expressed concern that Syria has become bogged down in Lebanon, unable to pull out or press forward without painful cost. He stressed the conviction that only the Lebanese themselves could provide the essential first step to the solution to their problem by establishing an effective government under Sarkis. He said that Sarkis, while offering new hope, is presently powerless. Nevertheless he feels that amid the diverse groups on each side there are “responsible” leaders, among the Muslims and notably Gemayal among the Christians, who could rally around Sarkis to create a constructive Lebanese nucleus which other Arab states could support morally, politically, economically, and even militarily under proper circumstances. He said the problem of the Palestinians in Lebanon cannot be effectively addressed until the Lebanese form an effective government under Sarkis.

Mr. Atherton said the U.S. had hoped that the holding of a “mini-summit” might help the search for a solution. He said that the U.S., having good relations with both Egypt and Syria and respect for their leaders, is pained by the current breach between them. Noting that the U.S. agrees with Shaikh Mohammad on the need for all parties interested in peace in Lebanon to support Sarkis as much as possible, Mr. Atherton said for its part the U.S. would welcome receiving Lebanese representatives coming to talk with Secretary Kissinger. This would symbolize our support for a solution under Sarkis’ leadership. The U.S. is also willing to help with economic aid for reconstruction and politically by helping keep channels of communication among the various parties open.

GULF COOPERATION AND SECURITY

In response to Mr. Atherton’s query Shaikh Mohammad evaluated the prospects for stability as encouraging to date. He noted with satisfaction that Kuwait’s recent clamp down on press and parliament would have a stabilizing effect, checking the possible spread of political factionalism in the wake of the Lebanese problem. Shaikh Mohammad said democratic government is something to which Gulf states must aspire but that he is persuaded that at the present level of social development they are not yet ready for it. He assumed this view would be difficult for the U.S. Congress to accept.

Mr. Atherton replied that in his recent testimony before Congress on Human Rights in Iran he had found broad understanding that Middle Eastern countries address the issue of representative government in an historic context different from our own. He added that recent developments in Kuwait were not even raised in that hearing.

Shaikh Mohammad continued that there is more cooperation generally among Gulf states and that Saudi Arabia in particular is playing a more active role than in the past. Tensions between Iraq and Iran have relaxed and confidence is growing between the Gulf Arabs and Iran. But the idea of a security pact is drifting; the initiative here must come from the big states—Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran.

ARMS SALES

Shaikh Mohammad in this connection stressed the importance of US help in developing the Saudi defense capability to permit the appearance of something like a balance with Iran. He professed full confidence in the Shah’s intentions, but suggested that semblance of balance between Saudi Arabia and Iran creates an atmosphere in which confidence and cooperation in Gulf security matters can develop.

Mr. Atherton noted that U.S. policy is based precisely on such a concept of regional cooperation with the larger states, Saudi Arabia and Iran playing the leading role. He then explained the status of Congressional consideration of the sale of Mavericks to Saudi Arabia, stressing the active role the Administration had played in support of the sale. Shaikh Mohammad expressed delight that the sale apparently will go through, especially since the Saudis had apparently placed their own prestige on the line on this issue.

US-BAHRAINI RELATIONS

Mr. Atherton spoke of our satisfaction in the development of US-Bahraini relations over the last several years, suggesting that through resident diplomatic presence and AID and Peace Corps activities we had substantially broadened the base of our presence in and contact with Bahrain.

Shaikh Mohammad readily agreed.

MIDDLE EAST FORCE

Mr. Atherton asked if in the context of our expanded relationship it would not be possible for the U.S. Navy’s use of facilities in Bahrain to continue somewhat longer. The USG does not consider that the time has come to withdraw this longstanding symbol of U.S. interest in the Gulf/Indian Ocean area. Pointing out some worldwide concern about American constancy post-Viet Nam, he suggested the U.S. Navy’s withdrawal from Bahrain next summer might be misinterpreted as a symbol of lessened commitment to the Indian Ocean area. Hence Bahrain’s retaining Middle East Force could contribute to the overall interests of the Gulf states.

Shaikh Mohammad replied at length: The U.S. and Bahrain have common interests in the stability of the Gulf, but he is at a loss to see how today Middle East Force can be considered helpful in the long term to those interests. Through the Navy presence the United States presents the wrong image in the Gulf. Middle East Force is of no strategic significance; it is at worst harmful, at best unhelpful. By withdrawing it the U.S. would improve its relations in the area. Shaikh Mohammad said the U.S. role in modernizing Saudi Arabia defense forces is the sort of constructive military contribution the United States can make in the area. By contrast the Middle East Force presence symbolizes a direct great power role working in opposition to the concept of Iranian/Arab cooperation in providing for area security. Moreover, the U.S. Navy presence in Bahrain tends to attract rather than counter Soviet naval presence in the Gulf.

Mr. Atherton questioned whether anyone really believes the withdrawal of Middle East Force from Bahrain would keep the Soviets out of the Gulf.

Shaikh Mohammad agreed it would not, but insisted that the U.S. Navy presence is further excuse for Soviet interest in navy visits to Iraq. He added that no one in the Gulf objects to U.S. Navy visits; quite the contrary. It is the permanent presence that is objectionable. With respect to Bahrain’s specific problem, Shaikh Mohammad emphasized that no significant practical problem had been caused by the presence of U.S. Navy personnel. Many Bahrainis recognize the specific advantages derived from the Navy presence. The problem is that Bahrainis, in reaction to a neo-colonial history in which Bahrain was Britain’s “base” in the Gulf, cannot accept psychologically the idea of a U.S. Navy presence. This is as true in the absence of a National Assembly as it was during the days of the Assembly. Reviewing the post-independence history of the Middle East Force issue, Shaikh Mohammad pointed out that the Government by trying to find a more palatable context in which to present the Navy presence had been able to extend use of the facilities from October 1973 until June 1977. But Bahrain has received no support from neighbors; it bears the burden alone. Now the time has come to end the presence, not to risk extending it for one more year or two.

Mr. Atherton asked if there were not some differences of opinion within the Bahraini Government on this issue.

Shaikh Mohammad said there are; he would not make the final decision, but he wanted the U.S. Government to understand clearly where he stands as Foreign Minister.

Mr. Atherton asked if some thought had not been given to what the U.S. might give Bahrain in return for extending the June 1977 deadline.

Shaikh Mohammad said that sort of approach, usable in 1974–75, had been overtaken by events. Saudi Arabia is giving Bahrain help in the hundred millions; increasing the Navy rent somewhat above $4 million a year would not meet the political issue.

Mr. Atherton said he understands there had been some thought of U.S. military assistance in return for continuing the Navy presence.

Shaikh Mohammad laughed and said that sort of reasoning might “appeal to our military people” just as it might appeal “to your Navy”.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE: CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES

Mr. Atherton explained the types of concern which appear to motivate Congressional criticism of arms sales on security assistance programs in the Gulf area.

Shaikh Mohammad replied that it is not only the U.S. Congress which is concerned about the flow of arms to the area. Realistically, however, the United States cannot discriminate among friends. “Country A” wants the same weapons “country B” gets. In the case of the Saudis, they are faced with the Soviet arming of Iraq and PDRY.

Mr. Atherton noted that Saudi Arabia must look at long range contingencies in its military modernization plans.

REGIONAL SCENE—MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Shaikh Mohammad agreed, expressing long term concern about the political stability of the Sub-continent and its eventual vulnerability to communist takeover from within.

Mr. Atherton commented briefly on certain hopeful trends in the Middle East and South Asian scene, ending by affirming the wide and growing recognition of the U.S. public that we must move on with the effort to secure an overall peace settlement in the Middle East.

BOYCOTT

At Shaikh Mohammad’s request Mr. Atherton in closing briefed him on the status of boycott issues in the Congress and courts and the Administration’s position on boycott legislation.

1. Summary: Assistant Secretary of State Atherton discussed relations and MIDEASTFOR with Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaikh Mohammad al-Khalifa.

   Source: National Archives, RG 84, Jidda Embassy Files: Lot 79F80, DEF 12–5, Bahrain. Confidential. Drafted by Twinam. The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers Hotel. Although Shaikh Mohammad and Atherton did not discuss the matter directly, Bahraini Minister of Defense Shaikh Hamad ibn Isa al-Khalifa had informed Chargé d’Affaires Albert Burleigh on September 18 that Bahrain was no longer interested in helicopters, but wanted the F–5B, E, or F instead. Burleigh proposed predicating MIDEASTFOR’s extension on the sale in telegram 1408 from Manama, September 19. (Ibid., Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, DEF 21–5, Arms Procurement and Sales) In telegram 1503 from Manama, October 3, Burleigh pointed out the inconsistency between the information he had received and the conversation between the Foreign Minister and Atherton, highlighting once again the differences and confusion among Bahraini policymakers. (Ibid., DEF 15, COMIDEASTFOR)