Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976

61. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 29, 1975.

SUBJECT

• US-Bahraini Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Shaikh Muhammad bin Mubarak al-Khalifa
• Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain
• Ambassador Salman Mohammed al-Saffar
• Bahrain Permanent Representative to the UN
• Alfred L. Atherton, Assistant Secretary, NEA
• Francois M. Dickman, Director, NEA/ARP

SUMMARY: During a discussion of US-Bahraini bilateral relations, agreement was reached on what public position the US would take in response to press queries that the GOB had asked the US Navy to leave its facilities in Bahrain in June 1977. Mr. Atherton reviewed potential problems we saw in obtaining Congressional approval for the much higher rent for the Navy’s use of the facilities and for our request to establish a technical assistance program in Bahrain in view of MIDEASTFOR’s short tenure. In response to the Foreign Minister’s questions, Mr. Atherton reviewed US intentions regarding the use of Masirah Island, the significance of the Sinai agreement for the peacemaking process in the Middle East, and Israel’s request to the US to buy Pershing missiles. The meeting ended with Mr. Atherton asking for GOB support for our resolution on Korea at the UNGA. End summary.

MIDEASTFOR

Shaikh Muhammad said he first wanted to discuss US-Bahraini bilateral relations. He thanked Mr. Atherton for Ambassador Twinam’s help in completing the series of understandings on MIDEASTFOR, which we believed would be in the best interests of both countries. Bahrain’s relations with the US were older than with any other country except for the UK. The GOB wanted to maintain its good relations with the US and have American presence in Bahrain on the same basis as it is in neighboring Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran. He realized the problems which the announcement ending MIDEASTFOR in mid-1977 posed for the Navy and he hoped that some new arrangement could be worked out that would suit both countries.

Mr. Atherton said bilateral relations were very good and the whole MIDEASTFOR negotiations had been carried out in an excellent atmosphere. However, we saw two problems, each had a different order of magnitude. The first was our official response to the GOB’s August 12 note setting a June 1977 deadline for MIDEASTFOR. The USG was still trying to sort out its position and we hoped there would be a reply soon. We saw several choices: formally acknowledging the GOB’s note, issuing a joint statement announcing the decision to leave, or issuing an oral statement unilaterally. Mr. Atherton said he would welcome having the Foreign Minister’s views, and what the GOB might most hope for.

Shaikh Muhammad said that a low key joint announcement would be best. He thought that a continued US presence in the Gulf was very important but he did not want Bahrain to be singled out. Periodic visits by the Navy to Bahrain would be fine and the US and Bahrain should give some thought to this. After Mr. Atherton pointed out that there is the practical problem that the fleet must have a home port, Shaikh Muhammad suggested that thought should be given to another arrangement (but offered no suggestion).

Mr. Atherton said the other problem we had, and it was more immediate, was how we respond to the Al Anwar article that the Bahrainis had asked us to withdraw MIDEASTFOR. We had put off answering questions since the article had appeared last Thursday to have this opportunity to consult on a reply. Here too we had several choices. We could state that the agreement provides for termination and that the GOB had told us that we should look to removing MIDEASTFOR by mid-1977. Or we could be less forthcoming and say simply that we are in consultation with the GOB about the future presence of MIDEASTFOR. The US would be prepared to be specific if the GOB wished.

Shaikh Muhammad said he would prefer not to be too specific. After some discussion, it was agreed that we could respond to a question from the press by stating that: “The 1971 Stationing Agreement provides that either party may terminate the agreement. The Bahrain Government has told the United States that it would like to phase out the US Navy’s Middle East Force during 1977. The United States Government is in consultation with the Bahrain Government on this matter in the spirit of the close and friendly relations which have existed between the two countries over many years.”

Mr. Atherton said there was one other matter he wanted to raise which affected MIDEASTFOR. This was Congress’ attitude toward the rent and our request for a topping off technical assistance program. The Administration intended to go through with both commitments. For the rent, it was explaining that a higher figure was justified in view of the higher real estate values of the land now occupied by MIDEASTFOR and for the use of the commercial pier and other facilities. But taken in conjunction with the short period of time that MIDEASTFOR would remain, Congress might well react negatively and ask if we are getting out, why should we pay this very high rent. Mr. Atherton added the Administration would take the position that this is a reasonable arrangement without regard to the number of years that the Navy might remain and try to keep the two questions from being connected. We had also taken the position of not linking our request for technical assistance with continued MIDEASTFOR presence but there was considerable risk that Congress would make the link and refuse to approve our technical assistance program for Bahrain.

Shaikh Muhammad said he could understand Congress’ reaction about the rent but it would be a great mistake if Congress should use this excuse to stop technical assistance. The latter was more effective than anything else. This is what the man in the street understands. There were many areas where US technical assistance was needed—water supply, agriculture, housing—and Bahrain was sorry that the US had not done more in this field. In response, Mr. Atherton reviewed the recent activities of the Joint Commission in Saudi Arabia and reimbursable technical assistance programs in other Peninsula states.

Other Bilateral Issues

Asked if there were any other bilateral issues he wanted to raise, Shaikh Muhammad said only one—Secretary Kissinger had promised to visit Bahrain and he must keep that promise.

The Foreign Minister then asked what US intentions were toward Masirah. In reply, Mr. Atherton said that the US never had any intention of a build-up on the island. We had asked Sultan Qaboos when he was in Washington if we could work out with the UK an arrangement for the occasional use of Masirah when we had naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and if aircraft connected with the fleet visit could use Masirah on an emergency basis or for practice exercises. We were not interested in basing any personnel, equipment or aircraft at Masirah.

[Omitted here are sections dealing with the Arab-Israeli dispute.]

1. Summary: Bahraini Minister of Foreign Affairs Shaikh Mohammad al-Khalifa met with Assistant Secretary of State Alfred Atherton to discuss MIDEASTFOR.

   Source: National Archives, RG 84, Manama Embassy Files: Lot 79F118, POL 15, Bahrain Government. Secret. Drafted by Dickman. The meeting took place at the Waldorf Towers Hotel.