70. Telegram From the Embassy in Qatar to the Department of State1
968. Subj: Qatari Interest in Information on F–5s; US Arms Policy in Lower Gulf. Ref: State 220256, Doha 0862, Doha 0863.
1. I accept Dept’s judgment that it better to cut off discussion of F–5s with Qataris at this point since eventual sale cannot rpt cannot be considered under present policy guidelines, and since there appears no justification for any change in policy. I hope we can get some mileage out of this with congressional critics of massive U.S. sales in area—not only do we refuse to sell to Qatar, but we even deny it opportunity to window shop.
2. I intend to delay conveying this word to Shaykh Hamad until after Ramadan, although I wonder whether it any more desirable on full than empty stomach. I will also take early opportunity after it to explain this whole matter to the Amir. With both the Amir and Shaykh Hamad, I plan to reiterate in detail our lower Gulf arms policy and, unless Dept has objection, to illustrate by telling them without naming specific recipient countries about our current military activities in lower Gulf states, e.g. helicopter survey with possible follow on sales, supply of M–16s but denial of TOWs, etc. I think we owe Qataris this much, but it is not my intention to whet their appetites for other military goodies. I’d be perfectly content if we never sold Qataris as much as one bullet. We have avoided taking any initiatives in military supply field here, and will continue to do so.
3. Although I do not expect Amir or Shaykh Hamad to say so directly, I know they will be disappointed by our refusal to provide info re F–5s. All explanations of our lower Gulf arms policy and examples of its implementation notwithstanding, they will see picture elementally, i.e. billions of dollars in military hardware for Saudi Arabia and Iran, hundreds of millions for Kuwait, and not even a catalog for Qatar. They will simply not understand our refusal not even to provide information on what may amount to a sale of a “few planes for a few millions.” They will see this, not specifically as U.S. lack of interest in [Page 279] Qatar’s security, but as confirmation of what they already believe is U.S. lack of interest in Qatar in general. We and Qataris have lived with this since establishment of the Embassy, and can continue to do so, although what GOQ regards as our benign neglect of Qatar is a problem in our relations.
4. On broader question of U.S. taking initiative to regionalize arms supply relationships with lower Gulf states within context of our already established military relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran, I appreciate addressees’ comments, and rationale of their negative consensus. I suppose we’re too far along with Saudi Arabia and Iran and not far enough along with lower Gulf states to establish framework of this kind. However, if we wait for indigenous initiative for regional security arrangements that will include coordinated arms supply, this may come about day after Shah recognizes Gulf as Arab. I continue to believe that present leverage available to USG as primary arms supplier to area and desired military partner gives us the influence to catalyze regional security arrangements which may enable us to reduce magnitude of our arms sales in region. There is no question that pressures to reduce our overall arms sales in area and world will intensify, and there should be some way of our getting ahead of this game in this area of our largest sales.
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Summary: Ambassador Paganelli responded to the Department’s refusal to offer the F–5 to Qatar.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760348–0747. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Abu Dhabi, Baghdad, Jidda, Kuwait City, London, Muscat, Manama, Sana’a, and Tehran. For telegrams 862 and 863 from Doha, August 17, see footnote 1, Document 69. Telegram 220256 to Doha, August 17, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760336–1107. For the Department’s refusal to fulfill Doha’s request, see Document 69.
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