Iran 1970
74. Telegram 97664 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
Assistant Secretary Sisco sympathized with Ambassador MacArthur’s anxiety over the consequences of the delay in FMS legislation, but argued against Iran’s seeking alternative financing.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Miklos;cleared by DOD/ISA and Davies; and approved by Sisco. MacArthur had expressed his concern in telegram 2623 from Tehran, June 18. (Ibid.)
75. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger summarized the conclusions of Assistant Secretary Sisco’s report on the extent to which Iran could guarantee stability in the Persian Gulf.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70–12/70. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped note on the memorandum indicated that President Nixon read it. The report was in response to an attached, undated, handwritten instruction from Nixon, which read, “Give me a report (no priority) on the Shah’s idea of Iran (& Cento) playing a greater role in the Persian Gulf—Is it just too naive—”
76. Airgram 217 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Embassy apprised the Department of the struggle for the role “Pishva,” or leader, of Shi’ite Islam between exiled cleric Ayatollah Khomeini and two leaders backed by the Shah’s government.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 12 IRAN. Confidential. Drafted by Arnold L. Raphel and approved by Touissaint. Repeated for information to Beirut, Jidda, Rawalpindi, Tabriz, and Korramshahr.
77. Telegram 115967 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department advised the Embassy that the U.S. Government would examine whether military sales to Iran were in the U.S. national interest, whether they would affect area security, and whether they were a military imperative.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by DOD and Richard C. Matheron (PM/MA&S); and approved by Davies. Repeated for information to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.
78. Telegram 3144 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur asserted that if the United States refused to sell the Shah military equipment, such action would irreparably damage the vital relationship with Iran.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated for information to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA.
79. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the Director, Joint Staff (Vogt)
Nutter requested that the JCS prepare a plan to reduce the size of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in Iran.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, ISA Files, Box 19, FRC 330–73A, 1975, Iran 000.1—, 333, 1970, 320.2, Iran. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Aguilar. This document, a copy, has a stamp indicating that Nutter signed the original.
80. Letter From President Nixon to the Shah of Iran
Nixon responded to the Shah’s letter of June 15, addressing the questions of FMS credit and Gulf security, and regretting that the United States could not offer Iran a special oil import quota.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAN-US. Drafted and cleared in NEA on July 15. In Telegram 105171 July 1, the Department reported to the Embassy that its attempt to encourage American oil companies to replace reductions in Libyan production with Iranian oil had been unavailing to date, but that the Department would continue to pursue these efforts. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAN)
81. Telegram 124269 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
Acting Secretary U. Alexis Johnson responded to the Embassy’s concerns, maintaining that the United States was bound by the terms of the 1968 Accord to assess the impact of Iran’s military purchases on economic and social development.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Christian G. Chapman (PM), DOD, Melvyn Levitsky (S/S), Christopher Van Hollen (NEA), and Sisco; and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson. In Telegram 3387 from Tehran, August 7, MacArthur relayed the unanimous recommendation of the country team that a “fundamental US policy review with respect to Iran be considered ASAP by highest level of USG in the broad context of the over-all RPT over-all role of Iran in terms of Nixon Doctrine and our national interests in this vitally important part of world where Iran is the solid and only dependable eastern anchor of our over-all Mid-east position.” (Ibid.)
82. Memorandum From [name not declassified] of the Near East and South Asia Division of the Directorate for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director’s Executive Assistant ([name not declassified])
In preparation for the visit of an Iranian general, the CIA forwarded information on the Iranian military requests supplied by ARMISH/MAAG, Tehran.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01086A, Box 1, Folder Executive Registry Subject Files, I-13, Iran. Secret. The memorandum and attachment are copies with indications that the originals were signed.
83. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Eliot sent Kissinger the Department’s urgent recommendation that the Export-Import Bank be asked to provide Iran with credit to replace the delayed FMS appropriation.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Schnee, Chapman, and Davies, and in Treasury, and Defense,. According to Telegram 3760 from Tehran, August 31, Iran was able to reach agreement with the Export-Import bank on financing for military aircraft. (Ibid.)
84. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Helms forwarded Kissinger a copy of an August 1970 CIA study entitled “Student Unrest Abroad,” which featured a chapter on Iranian students.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1325, NSC Unfiled Material, Unfiled Material, 1970. Secret. The full study is in ibid., Box 1323. A note on the attached routing slip reads, “There seems no reason for HAK to read or reply to this. It is much like the Time and Newsweek cover stories. No action required.”
85. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders passed along to Kissinger a memorandum from Helms, in which Helms reinforced MacArthur’s concern that bureaucratic wrangling in Washington would imperil the Shah’s aircraft purchases and thus put U.S. intelligence facilities in Iran at risk.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/17/70–12/70. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote on the memo, “Make sure this is followed.”
86. Special National Intelligence Estimate 34–70
The report examined Iranian policy towards its neighbors and its implications for U.S. interests.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 387, Folder 3, SNIE–34–70, Iran’s International Position. Secret; Controlled Dissem.
87. Telegram 144737 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department agreed with the Ambassador that any attempt by the Shah to rally nationalist feeling against the oil companies would only produce a backlash.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Miklos, cleared by Davies, Clark, Murphy, and Robert C. Brewster, and in S/S; approved by Samuels. Repeated to London.
88. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs (Noyes) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter)
Noyes recommended that the Department of Defense not concur with the Export-Import Bank’s decision to loan Iran $120 million in FY 71 instead of the $100 million to which it had agreed originally.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, ISA Files, Box 19, FRC 330–73A–1975, Iran 000.1–333, 1970, 121 Iran. Secret. Prepared by Peyer. This document was a copy with an indication that Nutter signed the original on October 2. The Export-Import Bank was reacting to Iranian concern that the original agreement only covered $100 million per year for three years, rather than the credit of $100 million per year for four years remaining under the 1968 US-Iran military agreement.
89. Extract from the President’s Daily Security Brief
The report discussed the Shah’s feud with the oil companies, and his assertion that he might be forced to seek a “legislative solution” based on the UN principle that mineral resources belonged to countries rather than exploiting foreign companies.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, President’s Office Files, Presidential Handwriting, Box 7, Folder Presidential Handwriting, October 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. Contains Codeword. The president wrote on the memorandum, “PETER—tell these oil barons—American security is vitally involved-keep Henry advised of your progress.” Tab A was not found. The full report of the Shah’s remarks is in Telegram 4335 from Tehran, October 3 (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 6 IRAN).
90. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird
Nutter recommended that Laird attempt to dissuade the Shah from buying a last increment of F–4s but approve an Export-Import bank proposal to offer Iran $120 million in credit.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, ISA Files, FRC 330–73A, 1975, Iran, 334—1970, 400 Iran. Secret. Laird approved both recommendations on October 15. Tab A is published as Document 86. The other attachments are not published.
91. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger described to Nixon the options presented by the NSC Review Group for the security of the Persian Gulf following the British departure.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–315, NSC Files, National Security Memoranda, NSDMS 11/70–9/71. Secret. Sent for action. Tab A, the draft decision memorandum, is not published, but the final version is published as Document 97.
92. Telegram 174651 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department sent the Embassy a list of items approved in principle under the FY 71 military credit for Iran, which excluded the seventh and eighth squadrons of F–4s the Shah had requested.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret. Joint State/Defense Message. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr.(NEA/IRN); cleared by Chapman, John M. Bowie (PM/MC), Johnson, Eliot, Philip J. Farley, and in Ex-Im Bank, DOD/ISA, and ACDA for information; approved by Davies. In telegram 4665 from Tehran, October 24, the Embassy responded that the status of the seventh and eighth squadrons had to be clarified, since the Shah had assumed from his October 1969 talks with the President that Iran already had U.S. approval. A U.S. Government refusal to endorse the sale at this stage, the Embassy observed, would run the “serious risk of being interpreted by Shah as unilateral modification of high-level policy decision” with serious consequences. (Ibid.)
93. Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers
Anxious that unwarranted Iranian armament not destabilize the Gulf, Laird informed Rogers that he was prepared to sell only two squadrons of F–4Es to the Shah.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD Files, ISA Files, FRC 330–73A, 1975, Iran, 334–1970, 470 Iran. Secret. In Telegram 4760 from Tehran, October 31, the Embassy advised that the Shah had urgently demanded clarification of the news from F–4 manufacturer McDonnell Douglas that the U.S. Government had not approved the seventh and eighth squadrons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN.) In Telegram 4772 from Tehran, November 2, the country team recommended that the U.S. Government assert better control over Iran’s contract negotiations with private companies, and avoid manufacturer pressure to sign contracts in advance of funding, by channeling them into FMS procedures. (Ibid.)
94. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders presented Kissinger with the conflicting opinions of the State and Defense Departments on the Shah’s demand for a seventh and eighth squadron of F–4 aircraft to Iran.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70–12/70. Secret. Sent for information. This document was a copy that was not initialed.
95. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders summarized the contents of a proposed State-Defense telegram which suggested that the Iranians could wait until the joint US-Iranian study of their forces was completed to determine their purchases.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70–12/70. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger initialed his approval. The attached telegram is not published.
96. Telegram 183657 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department recommended that Tehran base its decision on how many F–4s to buy on factors such as Iranian resources to absorb the aircraft, as well as maintaining a regional arms balance.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Priority. Joint State/Defense message. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Chapman, in DOD, and JCS; and approved by Davies. Repeated to Brussels, CINCSTRIKE, CINCMEAFSA, and CSAF.
97. National Security Decision Memorandum 92
Kissinger forwarded the President’s approved strategy for “Future U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf” to appropriate Cabinet and Agency officers.
Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL–315, NSC Files, National Security Memoranda, NSDMS 11/70–9/71. Secret.
98. Telegram 187449 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Kingdom, and Iran
The Department announced the President’s decision in principle not to reduce the U.S. naval presence in the Persian Gulf, unless it proved unwelcome to U.S. allies in the region, particularly Iran.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis. Joint State/Defense message. Repeated to Dharan, COMIDEASTFOR, CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, CINCUSNAVEUR, Vienna. Drafted by Joseph W. Twinam (NEA/ARP); cleared by Davies, Atherton, Murphy, Philip H. Stoddard (PM), Stanley D. Schiff (NEA/RA), Miklos, Robert T. Curran (S/S), Robert T. Burns (EUR/BMI), DOD/ISA, and in Navy, Joint Staff/J5, DOD/Gen. Counsel, DOD/I & L, DOD/ISA; and approved by Sisco.
99. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird
Replying to Laird’s October 27 letter, Rogers emphasized that the joint study of Iranian forces would be the best means of moderating the Shah’s ambitions for further costly aircraft.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Miklos; and cleared by Chapman, Davies, and Sisco.
100. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders informed Kissinger that Ambassador MacArthur had requested permission to offer the U.S. Government’s agreement in principle to the sale of the seventh and eighth squadrons of F–4s.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II, 6/1/70–12/70. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Tehran 5021 is not published. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “There is nothing to resolve. Pres. wants to go ahead. Al—take up with [Laird’s aide, Assistant Brigadier General Robert E.] Pursley.”
101. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for International Economic Affairs (Flanigan) to President Nixon
Flanigan assessed the significance of the Iranian-consortium agreement.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. II 6/1/70–12/70. No classification marking. Sent for information.
102. Telegram 5142 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Ambassador MacArthur notified the Department that the previous evening, he and his wife had been the victims of an abduction or assassination attempt that would not be publicized.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis. In Telegram 196031 to Tehran, December 2, the Department agreed that the official story should be that the Ambassador’s car had been struck by a hit-and-run driver. (Ibid.)
103. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird
Nutter advised Laird that since attempts to dissuade the Shah from buying two more squadrons of F–4s had failed, the Department of Defense should withdraw its objections to the sale.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–76–067, Iran 1970, Iran 452. Secret. Approved by Laird on December 9. Tab A is not published.