81. Telegram 124269 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran 1 2

Joint State/Defense Message

Ref:

  • Tehran 3144
1.
Very much appreciate your comments and concerns about difficult issues which would arise should we turn down certain Iranian requests purchase additional military aircraft which Shah believes essential for his security. Unquestionably a decision of this nature would be made only at highest USG levels.
2.
We feel it important, however, that we and GOI not overlook caveats set forth in our 1968 undertaking to Shah. We take seriously and believe GOI does as well our annual military-economic review which, among other things, calls for examination of impact of Iran’s military expenditures on other pressing economic development and social needs. [Page 2] Fact that Iran might acquire heretofore unanticipated resources through some special arrangement with Occidental US Oil Co. does not in our view lessen the need for both US and the GOI to assess carefully the broad policy implications as well as narrower financial and manpower effects of major new purchases. Such assessments are not intended and should not be interpreted as a sign of our lack of confidence in the Shah or a signal that some basic USG policy change is in the offing. Rather they are intended to insure, however, that rational, conscious decisions are made only after all relevant factors have been taken into account.
3.
In this connection we understand from McDonnell-Douglas here that the Shah has requested the McDonnell Douglas representative in Tehran to change its letter of intent to indicate that Iran intends to purchase 73 rpt 73 F–4’s. If this is correct it would indicate an expenditure of approximately $300 million, not including spares and support equipment. While we have [Page 3] no reason to believe that the GOI is not well aware of the condition that any such purchase contract is dependent on final USG approval, we believe it desirable to explicitly draw this fact to its attention at whatever level you deem most appropriate and effective. In doing so you should make it clear that a purchase of this magnitude will require most careful consideration and will take some time. You may draw on the views expressed in para 2 if there appears a need to elaborate on this point.

END

Johnson
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA. Drafted by Miklos; cleared by Christian G. Chapman (PM), DOD, Melvyn Levitsky (S/S), Christopher Van Hollen (NEA), and Sisco; and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson. In Telegram 3387 from Tehran, August 7, MacArthur relayed the unanimous recommendation of the country team that a “fundamental US policy review with respect to Iran be considered ASAP by highest level of USG in the broad context of the over-all RPT over-all role of Iran in terms of Nixon Doctrine and our national interests in this vitally important part of world where Iran is the solid and only dependable eastern anchor of our over-all Mid-east position.” (Ibid.)
  2. Acting Secretary U. Alexis Johnson responded to the Embassy’s concerns, maintaining that the United States was bound by the terms of the 1968 Accord to assess the impact of Iran’s military purchases on economic and social development.