Iraq 1972


295. Telegram 12737 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Iran, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, January 22, 1972, 0231Z

The Department recognized that the Soviets had augmented their military aid to Iraq, but it did not accept that this meant Moscow was launching an aggressive Gulf policy aimed at Iran.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 4 IRAQ-USSR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by James M. Ealum (INR/RSE); cleared by Benjamin M. Zook (INR/RSE); Philip H. Stoddard (INR/RNA); Miklos; Seelye; and Jack R. Perry (EUR/SOV); approved by Sisco.


296. Telegram 16061 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Belgium, January 28, 1972, 1659Z

The Department informed the Embassy that the United States planned to establish an Interests Section in Baghdad, as permitted by terms of diplomatic notes exchanged between the U.S. and Iraqi Governments, dated August 30 and September 14, 1967, after the break in relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Scotes; cleared by Seelye, Papendorp, Leamon R. Hunt (NEA/EX), Atherton, Victor H. Dikeos (A), William N. Dale (SCA), and Lawrence Koegel (SCA).


297. Airgram A-38 From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, February 2, 1972

The Embassy amplified its analysis of the current situation in Iraq in response to the conclusions of a Lebanese journalist whose articles the previous November had come to the Department’s attention.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 2 IRAQ. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, Cairo, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Paris, and Tehran. Drafted by Thomas J. Carolan, Jr. Cleared by Robert B. Oakley, Norman K. Pratt, and Robert B. Houghton. Approved by William B. Buffum. The enclosures were attached but are not published. In airgram A-125, May 3, the Embassy assessed the Iraqi government’s future prospects. (Ibid.)


298. Telegram 1501 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, February 18, 1972, 1351Z

The Embassy reported on the communiqué signed by the Iraqis and the Soviets following a visit to Moscow by Saddam Hussein and other Ba’ath officials.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Manama, Paris, Tel Aviv, Tehran, and USUN.


299. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division of the Central Intelligence Agency (Waller) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, March 9, 1972

Waller alerted Sisco that Kurdish Democratic Party Leader Barzani, under pressure from the Soviets to make peace with Baghdad, planned to send an emissary to the United States to request assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–3 IRAQ. Secret; Sensitive. Repeated to the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cline).


300. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable TDCS DB–315/02084–72, Washington, March 10, 1972

The CIA notified Assistant to the President fot National Security Affairs Kissinger, Director of Intelligence and Research Cline, and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Bennett that the Soviet Union had established four preconditions to a Soviet-Iraqi military, economic, and political agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 603, Country Files, Middle East, Iraq, TDCSDB 315/02084–72. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad.


301. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, March 27, 1972

Notifying Haig of the renewed SAVAK plea for assistance on behalf of Kurdish Democratic Party Leader Barzani, Saunders concurred with the Department and CIA that the United States should avoid involvement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 603, Country Files, Middle East, Iraq, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Haig sent thememorandum on to Kissinger, who approved the recommendation. On Kissinger’s behalf, Haig wrote on the memorandum “Tell CIA to do in least abrasive way possible—Note—Barzani emissary enroute to D.C.” Waller was informed of Kissinger’s response on March 29.


302. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Secretary Rogers, and Secretary Laird, Washington, March 29, 1972

Helms described the Kurdish effort, against a background of closer Soviet-Iraqi ties, to elicit international support for their resistance movement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 603, Country Files, Middle East, Iraq, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad.


303. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Secretary Rogers, and Secretary Laird, Washington, March 31, 1972

Helms passed along Kurdish views on growing Soviet-Iraqi cooperation, Soviet pressure on the Kurds to negotiate with Baghdad, and Kurdish reservations towards dealing with the Ba’ath.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 603, Country Files, Middle East, Iraq, Vol. I. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad.


304. Memorandum From Andrew Killgore of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, April 3, 1972

Killgore passed along a memorandum of conversation from the meeting between Iraqi Desk Officer Thomas J. Scotes and Zyd Uthman, Barzani emissary, who appealed for US financial and military assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 13–3 Iraq. Secret.


305. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), April 13, 1972

Eliot compared the new Soviet-Iraqi treaty with the one that Moscow had signed earlier with Egypt.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAQ-USSR. Secret. Drafted by Seelye and Killgore; cleared by Atherton, Miklos, Perry, and Philip H. Stoddard (INR).


306. Telegram 69032 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France, April 20, 1972, 2359Z

Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies provided the French with the U.S. estimate of the significance of the Iraqi-Soviet treaty and the fundamentals of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL IRAQ-USSR. Confidential. Repeated to Tehran, Amman, Ankara, Brussels, Cairo, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Moscow


307. Intelligence Memorandum No. 0865/72, Washington, May 12, 1972

The memorandum analyzed Soviet policies in the Persian Gulf, with a focus on Moscow’s relations with Iraq and Iran.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OCI Files, Job 79T00832A, Box 8, Folder 8, Moscow and the Persian Gulf, No. 0865-72. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence. This memorandum was included in the Presidential Briefing materials for Nixon’s May 1972 trip to Iran.


308. Briefing Paper Prepared for President Nixon, May 18, 1972

The briefing paper provided a summary of Iraqi history and current politics prior to the President’s trip to the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 479, Presidential Trip Files, Briefing Book, Visit of Nixon to Iran, May 1972. Secret.


309. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Deputy Under Secretary for Management (Macomber), Washington, May 25, 1972

Sisco advised Macomber of the actions necessary to establish a U.S. Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy in Baghdad.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Secret. The attached memorandum from Sisco to Rogers is not published. Macomber approved all three recommendations on June 19.


310. Research Study RNAS–10, Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, May 31, 1972

The INR report explored whether Iraqi Kurds were likely to renew their insurgency against Baghdad.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 IRAQ. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Drafted by Charlotte M. Morehouse (INR/Near East and South Asia); approved by Curtis F. Jones (INR/Near East and South Asia).


311. Intelligence Memorandum ER IM 72–92, Washington, June 1972

The CIA report assessed the implications of Iraq’s oil nationalization, estimating that the Iraqis were negotiating from a position of weakness, and that marketing difficulties would cause a drop in Iraqi oil revenues.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, ORR Files, (OTI), Job 79T00935A, Box 70, Project 36.6427, CIA/ER IM 72–92. Confidential. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence.


312. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources and Food Policy (Katz) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Armstrong), Washington, June 5, 1972

Katz recommended that the United States prepare to support boycott measures to prevent the Iraqi nationalization of IPC from undermining OPEC negotiations over participation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 15–2 IRAQ. Confidential. Drafted by Gordon S. Brown (E); approved by Moorhead C. Kennedy, Jr. (E/IFD). Copies were sent to Davies, Seelye, Francois M. Dickman (NEA/ARP); John J. Kadilis (EUR/SOV), Biegel, EUR/FBX; and Saunders.


313. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 7, 1972

Saunders sent Kissinger a message via DCI Helms that the Shah hoped Kissinger would meet with two Barzani representatives soon to arrive in Washington, and outlined the advantages and disadvantages of possible U.S. support for the Kurds.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Kissinger Office Files, Kissinger Country Files, Middle East, Kurdish Problem Vol. I, June ‘72–Oct. ‘73. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote on the memorandum, “I thought we arranged.” An unsigned copy of Tab A was found in Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01086A, Box 1, Executive Registry Subject Files, I–13, Iran. Tab B is published as Document 310.


314. Telegram 103059 From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands, June 9, 1972, 2217Z

The Department advised the posts that U.S. policy regarding the Iraqi nationalization was to isolate it from Middle East and OPEC politics while supporting the principle of prompt and adequate compensation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 15–2 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Algiers, Beirut, Tehran, Jidda, Dhahran, Manama, Moscow, Kuwait, OECD Paris, Tripoli, and Rome.


315. Memorandum From the Chief of the Near East and South Asia Division, Central Intelligence Agency (Waller) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, June 12, 1972

Waller provided background information for Helms’ and Haig’s upcoming meeting with representatives of Kurdish Democratic Party Leader Barzani, including a summary of other recent approaches by the Kurds.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80B01086A, Box 1, Executive Registry Subject Files, I–13, Iran. Secret; Sensitive. The attached biographies are not published. A record of the conversation is published as Document 319.


316. Memorandum From the Country Director for Lebanon, Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Iraq (Seelye) to the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), June 13, 1972

Seelye argued that while the immediate effects of the Iraqi nationalization of the IPC were insignificant, the longer-rang consequences were substantial.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq Affairs, Lot file 75D44, Box 13, IRAQ PET 6, Petroleum Companies, 1972. Secret.


317. Telegram 5798 From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, June 16, 1972, 1653Z

The Embassy reported that the Soviet-Iraqi treaty had been ratified, and that Moscow had expressed strong support for the IPC nationalization.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jidda, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, USUN, Tehran, Kuwait, and Manama.


318. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, June 23, 1972

Saunders forwarded a briefing memorandum from DCI Helms to prepare Haig for their joint talk with the Kurdish emissaries.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 603, Country Files, Middle East, Iraq, Vol. I. Secret; Sensitive. The unedited form of the attached background memorandum is published as Document 315. Haig ultimately seems not to have participated in the talks.


319. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 5, 1972

The memorandum reported on the June 30 conversation between Barzani’s representatives and DCI Helms, Richard Kennedy of the White House, and a CIA officer.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Kissinger Office Files, Kissinger Country Files, Middle East, Kurdish Problem Vol. I, June ‘72–Oct. ‘73. Secret; Sensitive. Attachments B, C, and D are not published.


320. Telegram 7605 From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, July 13, 1972, 1020Z

The Embassy reported recent clashes in northern Iraq between Barzani forces and the Ba’thist regime, noting that tensions were at their highest since the March 1970 Kurdish-Iraqi agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Ankara, and Tehran.


321. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, July 28, 1972

Haig forwarded a memorandum from Helms which outlined the outcome of his talks with Barzani representatives and a proposal for covert assistance to the Kurds.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Kissinger Office Files, Kissinger Country Files, Middle East, Kurdish Problem Vol. I, June ‘72–Oct. ‘73. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger approved Haig’s recommendation to inform 40 Committee principals but to avoid paperwork on the subject. Kissinger’s handwritten note on the memorandum reads “Get it done next week by handing my memo to principals. HK” Attachment A to Helms’ memorandum is not published.


322. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Kissinger advised the 40 Committee principles that the President had authorized funds and supplies to assist Barzani’s resistance movement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Kissinger Office Files, Kissinger Country Files, Middle East, Kurdish Problem Vol. I, June ′72–Oct. ′73. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger approved the idea that Rob Roy Ratliffe would handle the matter henceforth, adding a note that “he should see me.” This document was Tab B to a July 31 memorandum from Tom Latimer of the National Security Council Staff to Haig. (Ibid.)


323. Telegram 2879 From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State, August 3, 1972, 1624Z

The Iraqi Foreign Ministry reacted to the announcement by the Department of State that two diplomats would be appointed to the U.S. Interests Section in the Belgian Embassy in Baghdad.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 US-IRAQ. Unclassified. The U.S. Interests Section was opened on October 1, 1972.


324. Memorandum From David A. Korn, NEA/IRN, to the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), September 20, 1972

Analyzing the recent Soviet-Iraqi communiqué, Korn judged that the ties between Moscow and Baghdad were continuing but had not been extended.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/ARN, Office of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq Affairs, Lot 75D442, Box 14, POL REL, IRAQ/USSR, 1972. Confidential.