Iran 1970
104. Telegram 5332 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Shah asserted that communist elements hoping to discredit the Shah’s regime were responsible for the attack on the Ambassador.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis. In Telegram 5272 from Tehran, December 7, Hoveyda had speculated that the radical Iranian student groups abroad, and perhaps also the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), could have been involved in the attack. Since the attack had betrayed the weaknesses in the Iranian system, the Prime Minister also had requested U.S. assistance in putting Iranian security files into processed data form. (Ibid., POL IRAN-US)
105. Telegram 5334 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Following a discussion of regional issues, the Ambassador informed the Shah that the United States intended to maintain a naval presence, MIDEASTFOR, in the Persian Gulf after the British withdrawal.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait City, London, CINCSTRIKE, CINCMEAFSA, COMIDEASTFOR, and CINCUSNAVEUR.
106. Telegram 5335 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Citing the many regional threats, the Shah vehemently defended his air force requirements.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 33 PERSIAN GULF. Secret; Exdis. In Telegram 5193 from Tehran, December 2, the Embassy conveyed the Shah’s concern over information, allegedly from a Department source, that some State officials viewed selling the two extra squadrons of F–4s to the Iranians as “provocative.” MacArthur denied the rumors, but in a private comment blamed the Shah’s suspicions on the lack of a positive response on the squadrons. (Ibid., POL 15–1 IRAN). In Telegram 197768 to Tehran, December 4, the Department responded that the Shah’s suspicions were disappointing after all the U.S. efforts to ensure Iranian security, adding that the Department was trying to come up with an inter-agency response on the F–4s. (Ibid.)
107. Telegram 202975 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
The Department authorized the Embassy to notify the Shah that the Departments of State and Defense had approved in principle the sale of a seventh and eighth squadron of F–4s to Tehran.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret; Priority. Joint State/Defense Message. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, SECDEF, CSAF, ExIm Bank. Drafted by Robert L. Dowel Jr. (NEA/IRN); cleared by Miklos, Schiff, and in DOD/ISA, JCS, DOD/ISA/MA&S, PM/MAS, ACDA, PM/MC; and approved by Davies.
108. Telegram 5566 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Ambassador reported that another crisis between Iran, OPEC, and the consortium was brewing, due to the Shah’s insistence on raising oil prices.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, PET 6 IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to Beirut, Dhahran, Jidda, the Hague, Kuwait, London, Paris, and Caracas. In Telegram 206077 to London, Bonn, Brussels, the Hague, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo, December 18, the Department disseminated the resolutions from the recent OPEC conference in Caracas, which included increasing and standardizing prices, and authorizing Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to negotiate with the oil companies within 30 days (Ibid., PET 3 OPEC).