The central problem is that it is easy to recognize the potential for
instability in the Gulf and increased Soviet and radical exploitation,
but it is difficult to determine how the U.S. can best help minimize the
consequences.
While the Persian Gulf is important to U.S. allies and friends, its
potential instability seems relatively unresponsive to U.S. power. The
main evolution will come through political intrigue or subversion in
politically unprogressive and often inaccessible areas. Because
[Page 2]
the main U.S. interest lies in
the interests of allies and in the area’s relationship to the global
strategic balance and because U.S. power may not have significant impact
on evolution within the area itself, the problem is more one of devising
the best possible international framework for that evolution than it is
figuring out how the U.S. can influence it. Within the limitation of
that framework, though, it is important to determine what kind of U.S.
presence can be most constructive.
The Review Group went through the exercise of considering five distinct
strategy options:
The first and the last were ruled out as impractical, and the middle
three options are not really alternatives. The logical course seems to
be to marry those middle three. Our course then would be:
A Saudi-Iranian confrontation would increase instability, and both at
present recognize the importance of their cooperation. If a radical
regime were to take over in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. would have little
choice but to move closer to Iran—and there is no reason now not to go
on preparing Iran for that contingency. But as long as those two major
[Page 3]
regional nations are
trying themselves to create the framework for political evolution, the
U.S. has every reason to support it.
As for an independent U.S. presence, the U.S. interest is two-fold:
It is important to note that the British—despite revision of their formal
relationships—intend to remain active in the Gulf’s political,
diplomatic and commercial affairs and in military supply and
training.
1. General U.S. strategy. While no precise
decision is required now, it would be helpful to have your general
reaction to the strategy that is now contemplated for the near term. I
am doing a further study to look at our longer term interests and
objectives in the Gulf area. The proposed short-term strategy will not
foreclose any options for the longer term.
2. The future U.S. naval presence. The small U.
S. naval force (2 destroyers and a converted seaplane tender) is
home-ported on Bahrain by agreement with the British. The Bahrainis
would like us to stay. The British have offered us first refusal on some
of their facilities (a dock and a few small communications and storage
shacks). They will need to know soon whether the U.S. wants them to work
out a transfer. We should also sound out the Shah. There would be an
argument against introducing new forces, and the present force may not
be welcome there for a long time. But while most of our friends regard
it as an important sign of U.S. interest, it seems untimely to remove
it.
3. U.S. diplomatic and aid presence. One of the
serious limitations on U.S. ability to contribute to orderly evolution
in the Gulf is that one of our usual instruments of policy is not
available. Capital assistance is not needed by these oil-rich states.
While they do need the technical assistance relationship that usually
goes with capital aid, we do not now have a well-developed program for
providing it to states with their own financial resources. When asked
for a plan for a U.S. presence in the lower Gulf, State came back with a
fairly conventional blueprint for diplomatic posts. While modestly
expanded diplomatic representation is desirable, our main interest is in
pressing the agencies to break new ground in a serious effort to adapt
our programs to meet the needs of an area like this. Your foreign policy
message to Congress last February identified this problem. Some staff
work has been done and the new technical assitance institute would help.
But a prod would be in order.
4. Arms sale policy. The British have been the
traditional supplier of arms and would like to remain a major supplier.
The U.S. has reason to want the British to remain in the business of
military training and supply. At the same time, Kuwait has approached us
to buy some transport aircraft, and there have been other feelers from
some of the states in the lower Gulf. The only logical way to deal with
this would seem to be to look at a few concrete cases to get a feel for
the political and legal problems involved rather than trying to make a
decision in the abstract.
The above decisions—if you—approve—would be recorded in the decision
memorandum at Tab A.
Tab B
Paper
Washington, October 19, 1970
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS TOWARD THE PERSIAN GULF
I. The Situation
After a century and a half of relative insulation from major
political conflict, the Persian Gulf today is vulnerable to internal
and external pressures. The instability of the several conservative
regimes, the disunity among them, the contagion of the ideological
conflict which infects the rest of the Middle East, and the new
possibility of great-power competition in the Gulf—these are all
potential sources of disruption which are exploitable by Arab
radicals and the Soviet Union. The question for U.S. policy is how
to deal with them.
The problem arises because it appears certain that Britain will
revise its defense commitments, protectorate responsibilities, and
virtually all its military forces by the end of 1971. Eleven small
Arab states in the lower Gulf—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the seven
Trucial States, and Muscat/Oman—will no longer enjoy this formal
British protection or tutelage, although the British intend to
maintain a substantial political presence.
Local Weakness and Disunity
Paradoxically, the prospect of British withdrawal has simultaneously
provided an incentive for regional unity and yet at the same time
has opened up a number of local quarrels which have lain dormant
during the period of British dominance. The nine small states on the
threshold of independence (Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States)
have yet to determine whether they will join in a Federation of Arab
Amirates (FAA), or else go their
separate untried ways. A federation might help keep their intramural
disputes contained and enhance their ability to police their
internal security. But the sheikhs are divided by territorial
disputes (exacerbated by oil) and by personal jealousies and
mistrust. On their own, not all the Sheikhs would have the
competence to govern intelligently and maintain order at home, let
alone conduct a coherent foreign policy. Bahrain and some others are
quite vulnerable to radical pressures.
U.S. Interests
Our overall interest in the stability of the region embraces a number
of specific interests:
[Page 7]
- —Economic: Oil production and sales
by 20 U.S. companies yield a net balance of payments surplus of
$1.5 billion. The Gulf provides 55% of Western Europe’s oil, 90%
of Japan’s, and 89% of the oil used by U.S. forces in Southeast
Asia. Britain’s commercial involvement in the region (the
Sterling Area relation, and L200 million income from
investments) are crucial to the stability of the pound and
therefore of the international monetary system.
- —Political: The spread of radicalism
in the Gulf would alter the balance within the Arab world. It
might aggravate the Arab-Israeli conflict and would almost
certainly increase the prospect for tension between Iran and the
Arabs. Soviet political penetration would affect the East-West
geopolitical balance (e. g., by increasing Soviet pressure on
Iran and Turkey and—although there is debate over how this would
work out in practice—by increasing the potential for Soviet
control over disposition of Persian Gulf oil.
- —Military: The U.S. has
communications and intelligence facilities in Iran, and
overflight and landing privileges in Iran. and Saudi Arabia
which provide an air corridor to South and Southeast Asia. A
small U.S. naval force (MIDEASTFOR), home-ported on Bahrain, enjoys
refueling and port-call privileges in much of the region. The
intelligence facilities are judged to be extremely important now
[text not declassified] The longer range military significance
of a U.S. naval presence and overflight rights has two aspects:
(1) They are aspects of an overall U.S. presence, more important
now for political than for military reasons. (2) With increasing
naval and perhaps strategic Soviet interest in the Indian Ocean,
they are of possible military value as a base for a presence,
the precise nature of which it is difficult to foresee
now.
Soviet Involvement
Our main worry in the Gulf, as elsewhere in the Middle East, is the
danger of Soviet penetration. The Soviets have revived the
traditional Tsarist aspiration to influence in this region
immediately to the south of them; recent Soviet naval visits in the
Gulf are the first Russian visits in 60 years.
[Page 8]
But it remains to be seen what an increased “Soviet presence” in the
Gulf would consist of, and what the Soviets can plausibly expect to
accomplish:
- —On the one hand, the region must present a tempting target:
The British departure seems to suggest a power vacuum; the
significant Western interests in the Gulf look particularly
vulnerable to the tide of Arab radicalism.
- —On the other hand, greater Soviet involvement may magnify
certain contradictions in Soviet policy, e.g., supporting Arab
radicals even while cultivating the Shah (an avowed conservative
who has ties with Israel). A cutoff of oil to the West would not
be in the economic interest of producing states, whatever their
ideology. The USSR is likely to
develop a need for Gulf oil (especially for supplying Eastern
Europe), which will give it a stake in the stability of the oil
flow but will not be large enough to diminish the importance of
the West as a customer. The Soviets could not sustain a
significant naval force in the region (especially while the
Canal is closed), and the establishment of a naval base in the
Gulf is improbable.
- —On yet another hand, short-sightedness or opportunism might
draw the Soviets into mischief-making in the Gulf no matter how
clearly we can see that it would only complicate Soviet
policy.
II. The Problem
The central problem, therefore, is that it is easy to recognize the
clear potential for instability and increased Soviet and radical
exploitation, but it is difficult to determine how the U.S. can best
help minimize the consequences.
While the Persian Gulf is very important to U.S. allies and friends,
its potential instability seems relatively unresponsive to U.S.
power. The main evolution will come in the form of political
intrigue and subversion in politically unprogressive and often
inaccessible areas. Because the main U.S. interest lies in the
interests of allies and in the area’s relationship to the global
strategic balance and because U.S. power may not have significant
impact on evolution within the area itself, the problem is more one
of devising the best possible international framework for that
evolution than it is figuring out ways for the U.S. to involve
itself directly. Within the limitation of that framework, though, it
is important to determine what kind of U.S. presence can be most
constructive.
[Page 9]
III. The Strategy
Where Do We Want to Go?
Our strategy must aim at building the Gulf into a self-regulating
regional system as capable as possible by itself of filling whatever
gap is created by revision of the British protectorate:
- —In such a system, stable relationships would exist at each
level—an equilibrium among the small sheikhdoms of the lower
Gulf, collaboration between the larger Gulf states (Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait), and mutual deterrence between the outside
powers in the background (U.S., U.K.,
and USSR).
- —At the same time, the larger states would help to keep order
among the smaller states, and also exert some counterweight
against troublemakers from inside or outside the system (e.g.,
Iraq, UAR).
- —Satisfactory political relations among all the Gulf states,
enhanced by mutual assistance for regional economic development,
would improve the chances of preserving stability within
each.
- —Soviet involvement would be discouraged first and foremost by
the active desire and capacity of the local states collectively
to manage their regional affairs. The need for active U.S.
involvement would be correspondingly reduced.
This is in fact the objective we have already been pursuing.
The Review Group went through the exercise of considering five
distinct strategy options: (a) assuming the U.K.’s role as protector
ourselves, (b) backing Iran as our “chosen instrument” and the key
to stability; (c) promoting Saudi-Iranian cooperation: (d) dealing
directly with the new states of the lower Gulf; and (e) actively
promoting a regional security pact.
The first and the last are impractical. The
logical and obvious strategy is to marry the middle three
options: to promote Saudi-Iranian cooperation as the mainstay of a
stable regional system, but to recognize Iran’s special importance
as the preponderant power in the Gulf, and to do what we can to
develop a working relationship with the new political entities in
the lower Gulf. There is no way to promote cooperation without
recognizing Iran’s
[Page 10]
preponderance (else we would lose our influence with Iran); there is
no reason to back Iran and not use our influence to encourage
Saudi-Iranian cooperation; there is no reason not to develop ties
with the sheikhdoms.
This strategy is upset, however, if we are ever forced to choose
between Iran and the Arabs. A crisis could result, for example, if
the Shah moves to seize the small Arab-held islands at the mouth of
the Gulf (the Tunbs and Abu Musa), that the Iranians claim as
rightfully theirs and crucial to their security. In the
circumstances like those, we would have to ask ourselves how much of
our political capital to expend with the Shah to restrain him. In
the short run, the most serious strains on Arab-Iranian
collaboration will indeed come from Iran’s behavior: Iran is
determined to step into Britain’s shoes as the dominating and
protecting power in the Gulf. The Arabs do not relish this concept,
and there may be a necessity for the U.S. to restrain the Shah.
In the longer run, the Arab-Israeli conflict is another threat to
Arab-Iranian collaboration, and anything we can do to mitigate this
conflict will benefit us indirectly in the Gulf. The Iranians and
Saudis are perfectly conscious that Arab radicalism is a menace to
them both; this provides an incentive for collaboration (as when the
Shah recently extended military aid to the Saudis when their
territory was raided by South Yemen). But this collaboration also
stigmatizes the
Saudis, since the Shah’s ties with Israel make him a pariah to Arab
radicals. Saudi Arabia will clearly be the weak link in the chain.
Its future stability is already somewhat problematical. The longer
and more intense the Arab-Israeli conflict, the greater the radical
pressure upon all the conservative Arab regimes from both outside
and inside.
Britain’s Role
We have to bear in mind in formulating our basic strategy that the
British will still be actively involved in Gulf diplomacy. This is
another reason why it is wrong to assume that a vacuum is in
prospect.
Heath’s victory in June has little to do with this. The Tories may
indeed stretch out the period of British military withdrawal
slightly beyond Wilson’s deadline (the end of 1971). But it is too
late to reverse the process of local political change that the
original U. K. withdrawal announcement of 1968 has set in motion.
(The Shah, the Saudis, and the Kuwaitis have
[Page 11]
all been emphatic on this score.)
Therefore, the Tories will likely proceed with the withdrawal of
most of their military forces from the Gulf proper, and with the
termination of formal defense treaties and protectorate
responsibilities.
But Britain nevertheless has some leeway in deciding what its
“disengagement” will actually amount to. Wilson never planned to
withdraw Britain’s political presence from
the Gulf. Its active and expert diplomacy, its commercial
involvement, its military supply and training in the Sheikhdoms, and
possibly even its military contingency planning will all continue,
and will likely outweigh that of any other outside power in the
lower Gulf. The RAF complement at
the staging base on Masirah Island (in the Arabian Sea off
Muscat/Oman) will also remain.
The new British Government has announced that it will decide the
question of its military deployment in accordance with two basic
political objectives: the “earliest possible settlement” through
negotiation of outstanding disputes in the Gulf, and the
determination “on a practical basis” of the political future of
Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States (in a single Federation,
ideally). These should be our diplomatic objectives as well. But we
should continue to allow the British to take the lead
diplomatically.
IV. The Operational Plan
The British have discouraged us in the past from involving ourselves
in Gulf diplomacy. For this reason, the USG has had no diplomatic presence in the lower Gulf,
but has kept watch on things from our Consulate General in Dhahran,
Saudi Arabia (and also through our MIDEASTFOR command on Bahrain). When the British
announced their disengagement decision (in January 1968), they
invited us to come in once their withdrawal was completed.
One of the major purposes of our policy review exercise, therefore,
was to begin to determine the nature of our future presence in the
Gulf.
There are two serious issues: (a) our diplomatic and aid presence,
and (b) the future of MIDEASTFOR.
Diplomatic and Aid Presence
One of the serious limitations on our ability to act effectively in
the Gulf is that one of our important instrumentalities of
influence—capital
[Page 12]
assistance—cannot be effectively used. Many of the small sheikhdoms
are capital-surplus countries because of their oil wealth, and would
not qualify for U.S. capital aid. But all the Gulf states, large and
small—and other countries in the Arab world—badly need technical and
educational assistance, which the U.S. should be able to
provide.
This kind of aid, plus private commercial involvement, will probably
be the extent of the U.S. presence in the Arab world for the
foreseeable future. It should not cost us much money—since much of
it can come from private U.S. sources, and the sheikhs will pay for
it in any case. It will be politically acceptable to the Arabs both
because it will be relatively low-key and because they want the
help.
But the USG does not now have the
programs or appropriations geared to this kind of U.S. role. We need
a mechanism for marrying and channeling the various USG and private skills and
resources—technical assistance, investment promotion, cultural and
educational assistance and exchanges—where they are wanted. Your
foreign Policy Report of February 18, in the chapter on the
Middle
East, alluded to this need. The Persian Gulf is the classic case, and
we should make it a proving for an imaginative new approach.
The Review Group has prepared a rough blueprint of a minimum U.S.
presence of this type, for possible use in planning the FY 1972 budget. It is a good start. It
is more complete, however, in spelling out the requirements of a
conventional diplomatic presence—diplomatic and consular services,
commercial attaches, AID
scholarships, USIA [less than 1 line not declassified]
activities—than it is in breaking new ground in a serious effort at
an imaginative new approach. What you can do now to move things in
the right direction is to (1) authorize the bureaucracy to continue
and complete the planning for our diplomatic mission, and to (2)
instruct the bureaucracy to integrate into our diplomatic presence a
comprehensive new program for technical and educational assistance
and cultural exchange. This new program should tie together such
requirements as: new criteria of eligibility for technical
assistance; a new organizational structure for AID (e.g., the role of the new
technical assistance institute envisioned in the Peterson
[Page 13]
Report); new ways of
marrying U.S. private technical and managerial skills with local
needs; and new demands on State’s educational and cultural affairs
budget.
The Future of MIDEASTFOR
Our small naval force (two destroyers and a converted seaplane
tender) is presently home-ported on Bahrain by agreement with the
British. The Bahrainis would like us to stay. The British have
offered us first refusal on some of their own facilities once they
leave. The question is, do we want to stay?
A decision is needed now, so that arrangements can be worked out with
the Bahrainis and the British before the British go. More
importantly perhaps, we will have to sound out the Shah to see how
strenuously he will object to the continuation of an outside
military presence: He will be skeptical, but the problem may be less
complicated now that he has relinquished Iran’s claim to
Bahrain.
The force is of little military value, and its presence could
increase the vulnerability of the already-unstable Bahraini regime.
On the other hand, a U.S. withdrawal at the same time as the British
withdrawal could have a harmful psychological effect: It would seem
to signify that the West is abandoning its interests.
On balance, I think that even though we cannot count on its being
welcome or useful for very long in the future, this is probably the
wrong time to remove MIDEASTFOR. The decision required is a decision in
principle not to reduce our presence at this time. This would
trigger necessary feelers (with the Shah, the Bahrainis, and the
British) to determine the political feasibility. If the political
cost of staying on looks as if it will outweigh the psychological
utility of maintaining this form of “presence,” then we should
remove it.
Arms Sale Policy
The British—in connection with their military responsibilities—have
been the predominant arms suppliers to the area. Now, however, the
Kuwaitis have approached us on the sale of C–130 aircraft.
[Page 14]
The argument for agreeing in principle would be to enhance the U.S.
political position.
The arguments against are that the U.S. wants to encourage maximum
continuing British political and military involvement in the Gulf
and that the U.S. has no interest in encouraging these nations to
become overly involved in building their inventories of
sophisticated arms.
