A fuller study of the Gulf and discussion of U.S. strategy—including this
question of how heavily we can depend on Iran—will be on its way to you
through the NSC process.
Attachment
Washington, undated
IRAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF
By the end of 1971 the British will have withdrawn militarily from
the Persian Gulf. Their departure ends a century and a half of
control in the lower Gulf sheikhdoms which excluded unfriendly major
powers, suppressed radical dissidents, and kept under control
long-standing intra-Arab and Arab/Persian antagonisms. The prospect
of the British departure has brought an air of uneasiness to the
Gulf. Some wish the British would remain, but most accept the
inevitability of their leaving.
With the exception of Iraq, which is already under its sway, radical
Arabism is the thing most feared by the Gulf states. Interrelated
with this fear is the fear of Soviet encroachment. All know the
Soviets favor radical Arabism and all know of the favorable position
the USSR has established in the
UAR, Syria and Iraq.
In looking to the future two movements have gotten underway. On the
Arab side of the Gulf cautious steps have been taken by the nine
sheikhdoms to band together in a Federation of Arab Amirates.*
Age-old jealousies and suspicions make it an uphill fight. On
theother side of the Gulf, Iran, the most powerful and stable nation
in the area, has made clear its intention to assume a leading role
in providing for the security of the Gulf in the future.
What Iran Can Do. Iran already has a
formidable military capability which it is rapidly augmenting
against [Page 4] the day the
British leave. It has the resources (over $1 billion yearly from
oil) and the manpower (28 million population) to sustain its armed
might and defend itself from any foreseeable attack short of direct
Soviet aggression. Iran’s goal is to develop a deterrent of such
credibility that no area nation or likely combination would dare
attack it or seriously challenge Iranian unrestricted use of the
Persian Gulf or access to the waters beyond.
Iran has sought US military sales credits to help it create this
deterrent. We have responded with credit of $100 million for each of
the last two years and plan to continue a program of this magnitude
for at least another 4–5 years, Congressional approval permitting.
Used wisely, as we hope and expect it will be, this military force
can be an important factor in preserving stability and security in
the Persian Gulf after 1971.
Iran recognizes the need, however, to supplement this force with a
skillfully contrived and executed program of diplomatic initiatives
aimed at securing trans-Gulf friendship and cooperation. Having
foregone its claim to Bahrain, it has begun assiduously to woo its
Gulf Arab neighbors by invitation to Tehran, the dispatch of special
envoys and good will missions, and the offer of financial and
technical aid. It has talked quietly with its largest Arab neighbor,
Saudi Arabia, about military cooperation and steps Iran might take
to come to Saudi aid in time of emergency.
The successful pursuit of this policy will require tact, patience,
time and doubtless some money. It faces formidable obstacles.
Fundamental is historic Arab/Persian antagonism. The Persians are
ethnically different, they rarely conceal their belief that Arabs
are inferior, and the Persians are of a branch of Islam which is
considered heretical by orthodox Muslims. [Page 5] Added to these historical differences is
Iran’s circumspect but nonetheless well-known relations with Israel.
The Arab/Israel conflict obviously makes it difficult for even
moderate Arabs overtly to get very close to Iran. Prolongation of
the Arab/Israeli confrontation or another outbreak of widespread
armed conflict could either end nascent friendships between Iran and
Arab states or force Iran to lean more heavily in the direction of
the Arabs. Indeed there are already signs that Iran would give
preference to improving its Arabic relations. Iran’s CENTO connection with the West is
also a liability in the context of developing closer relations with
the Arabs. The introduction of CENTO into the Persian Gulf would particularly alarm
Arabs.
What Iran Cannot Do. While Iran’s military
power and example of a stable, well-run nation doubtless stands for
much, it cannot prevent incipient subversion and revolution among
its neighbors. Nor can it do much to arbitrate the squabbles which
will inevitably arise among sheikhdoms and states on the Arab side
of the Gulf which are also rooted in age-old rivalries and
conflicting territorial claims. Iran itself is involved in two
disputes which concern several small islands (Abu Musa and the
Tunbs) which guard the entrance to the Persian Gulf. As often as not
these disputes are grievously complicated by the actual or suspected
presence of oil.
Iran’s ability to contain the growth of radical Arabism in the area
is also severely circumscribed. It can provide some money and moral
support for moderate regimes but in the end it is a matter that can
be dealt with decisively only by indigenous forces. Iran’s ability
to prevent the growth of Soviet influence in the Gulf area through
the ascendance of radical Arabism is also very limited. The Soviets
have reflected increasing interest in the Gulf. Whether they will
move cautiously in the interest of preserving good relations with
[Page 6] Iran, Turkey and
Pakistan is problematical. The Soviets maintained a position of
neutrality in the recent dispute between Iran and Iraq over the
Shatt al-Arab River. This position was assumed even though Soviet
influence in the Gulf area is concentrated mainly in Iraq.
Conclusion. There a substantial and
positive role Iran can play in providing for the security and
stability of the Persian Gulf after the British leave in 1971. There
are also real limits to what it can achieve. Its best chance of
achieving its purpose lies in its gaining the active cooperation of
its Islamic neighbors, particularly Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
