Iran 1969
1. National Intelligence Estimate 34–69
The estimate examined the implications of Iran’s claim to leadership in the Persian Gulf, and its thawing relations with Moscow.
Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A, Box 368, Folder 3, NIE 34–69-IRAN. Secret; Controlled Dissem.
2. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Read briefed Kissinger for his upcoming meeting with Iranian Ambassador Hushang Ansary, and attached a summary of U.S. relations with Iran.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17–5 IRAN-US. Confidential with Secret attachment. Drafted by Theodore L. Eliot Jr. (NEA/IRN) on January 29; cleared by Stuart W. Rockwell (NEA). No record of the conversation was found. The first enclosure to the memorandum, “Biography of the Ambassador of Iran,” is not published. The January 22 letter from the Shah is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 920, VIP Visits, Shah of Iran, Washington DC, October 21–23, 1969.
3. Telegram 416 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Prime Minister Hoveyda informed the U.S. Ambassador that if Tehran did not receive $1 billion in oil income, the Iranian Government would propose unilateral legislation to obtain the required revenue.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to London. In 1968, the consortium resorted to shifting the production year from the Gregorian calendar to the Iranian year, from March 21 to March 20. This allowed it to meet Iranian targets temporarily by counting the following year’s first quarter into the 1968 figures. By 1969, however, this device could not keep pace with Iranian demands.
4. Memorandum From the Country Director for Iran (Eliot) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)
Eliot recommended that Sisco inform Iranian Ambassador Ansary in their upcoming meeting that the United States could not intervene with the oil companies over the dispute with Iran.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17 IRAN-US. Secret. Drafted by Eliot; cleared by James E. Akins (E/ORF/FSE). In Telegram 35431, March 7, the Department advised the Embassy that Sisco had followed Eliot’s suggestions in his meeting with Ansary. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAN)
5. Letter from the Ambassador to Iran (Meyer) to the Country Director for Iran (Eliot)
Meyer shared with Eliot his attempt to use the Shah’s interest in a third and fourth squadron of F–4 aircraft as leverage to bring about a swift end to the oil dispute.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Confidential. A handwritten notation indicates that Eliot replied on March 26.
6. Memorandum of Conversation
In a meeting in Washington, the Shah enumerated for Secretary Laird his military requirements, including pilot training, air force technicians, and aircraft.
Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–75–089, Box 74, Iran 1969, 091.112. Secret. Drafted by Colonel Robert E. Pursley, and approved by Nutter on April 7. The Shah was in Washington, D.C. to attend the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
7. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
In his briefing, Saunders underscored the need to maintain U.S. influence over the Shah by demonstrating close relations with Iran, and suggested topics for Kissinger to discuss or avoid.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1236, Harold Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 1/20/69–9/30/69. Secret. The memorandum is a copy that is not initialed by Saunders. The report to which Saunders referred was telegram 2481, London, March 30, from Ambassador Meyer. Meyer advised that the Shah felt the United States could avoid future Vietnams by supporting “self-reliant and progressive friends like Iran so that such countries can exercise fruitful responsibility in their respective regions.” (Ibid, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 6–2 US/Eisenhower, Dwight D.)
8. Memorandum of Conversation
In conversation with the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Kissinger, the Shah warned of Soviet objectives in the Near East, and touched on Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and oil issues.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69–5/31/70. Secret. Drafted by Saunders on April 11. The meeting took place at the Iranian Embassy Residence. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the Shah met privately with Nixon from 2:37 to 3:20 p.m. on April 1. No other record of the meeting was found. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary.)
9. Memorandum of Conversation
In a tour d’horizon, Secretary Rogers and the Shah reviewed developments in Asia, the USSR, and the Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 Iran. Secret. Drafted by Eliot, and approved on April 3 by the Secretary’s office. The meeting took place at the Iranian Embassy. This memorandum is part I of III. In part II, the Shah and Rogers discussed the US-Iranian military relationship. (Ibid., DEF 1 IRAN-US.) In part III, the topic was the Shah’s hope of exporting more oil to the United States. (Ibid., PET 1 IRAN-US.)
10. Record of National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia Meeting
Reviewing Iran’s 1969 military credit sales program, the group agreed to recommend the sale of two F–4 squadrons for delivery by 1971, with payment of $80 million in 1969 and the balance the following year.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1236, Harold Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 1/20/69–9/30/69. NSCIG/NEA 69–11. Secret. Drafted by Sober.
11. Telegram 1371 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The telegram reported on the Shah’s concern at the Ambassador’s private suggestion that Iranian and Iraqi tension over the Shatt al-Arab might have a deleterious effect on US-Iranian relations.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33 IRAN-IRAQ/Shatt al-Arab. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Jidda, and CINCSTRIKE.
12. Intelligence Note No. 295 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers
The report, “Iran-Iraq: Dispute Over the Shatt al-Arab Disturbs Relations Peridocally,” outlined the history and recent developments in the Shatt al-Arab crisis.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–1 IRAN-IRAQ/Shatt Al-Arab. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.
13. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
With his concurrence, Kissinger forwarded to Nixon Secretary Rogers’ recommendation to approve the 1969 Iranian Military Sales Program.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1236, Harold Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran Military, 1/20/69–12/31/69. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. Tab A, a Budget Bureau memorandum, is not published. Nixon initialed his approval.
14. Intelligence Note 361 from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers
Hughes summarized the negotiations between the Iranian Government and the oil consortium in the lead-up to a second round of talks on May 10.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Limdis. In Telegram 73790 to Tehran, May 10, the Department authorized Mayer to make representations to the Iranian Government in support of the consortium’s compromise position. (Ibid., PET 6 IRAN.)
15. Telegram 76751 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Jidda, Beirut, and Dhahran
The Department explained the terms of the agreement between the consortium and the Iranian Government, in which the consortium members had held firm against Iranian demands.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret. Repeated to London, Tehran and Tripoli. Drafted by Clark (E/ORF/FSE); cleared by Eliot and William D. Brewer, Country Director (NEA/ARP); and approved by Akins.
16. Telegram 1904 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
Thacher, the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, reported that the Shah was somewhat disappointed with the outcome of the oil negotiations, and suggested that the United States urge the consortium members to meet the Shah’s needs for the following year.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, PET 6 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Beirut, Dhahran, Jidda, Kuwait, London, and Tripoli.
17. Telegram 1925 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Embassy analyzed Iranian motivations and objectives in the Shatt al-Arab crisis.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–1 Iran-Iraq/Shatt al-Arab. Confidential. Repeated for information to Ankara, Bangkok, Jidda, Kuwait, London, Moscow, Rawalpindi, and USUN.
18. Letter from the Charge d’Affaires ad interim at the Embassy in Iran (Thacher) to the Acting Country Director for Iran (McClelland)
Thacher emphasized the Embassy’s belief that Washington should show readiness to supply Iran with different types of air defense, while still presenting F–4s as the primary defense against air attack.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 IRAN. Secret. In paragraph four of Telegram 107964 to Tehran, June 30, the Department, concerned at increasing Iranian military expenditures, had promised information on appropriate US weapons for the Shah’s needs. (Ibid.)
19. Telegram 116791 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
In discussions with Secretary Rogers, Ambassador Ansary requested an increase in pilot training slots, and also conveyed the Shah’s displeasure that U.S. technicians had not been allowed to go to western Iranian airfields during the recent Shatt al-Arab crisis with Iraq.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE. Drafted by McClelland and approved by Eliot.
20. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Saunders advised Kissinger to respond noncommittally to the Iranian proposal that Iran receive a special import quota on oil sales to the United States.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69–5/31/70. Confidential. Sent for information. The attachment is not published. In a September 15 letter, Kissinger promised Fallah that he would receive a definitive reply on his oil proposal after the Cabinet Task Force had completed its oil import policy review.(lbid.)
21. Telegram 159738 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran
Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson tried to allay the anxiety of the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s Director General, Manouchehr Zelli, over anticipated student demonstrations against the Shah during his visit to the United States.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1245, Harold Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Visit of Shah of Iran, Oct. 21–23, 1969. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Drafted in by William H. Hallman (NEA/IRN); cleared by Miklosand in S/CPR, O/SY, and SCA/VO; and approved by Rockwell. In Telegram 3704 from Tehran, September 15, the Embassy reported Zelli’s belief that radical U.S. student groups would combine with Iranian students to mount a large protest, and his request that the FBI keep demonstrations under control. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IRAN) In Telegram 3974 from Tehran, October 1, the Embassy anticipated a high level of student protest against the Shah in the United States. (Ibid.)
22. Telegram 4054 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Chargé offered suggestions for the Shah’s upcoming U.S. visit, including positions on Iran’s role, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, COMIDEASTFOR, and oil.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IRAN. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Jidda.
23. Telegram 4183 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Shah expressed concern to incoming Ambassador Douglas MacArthur at growing Soviet influence in Iraq, which the Shah felt underscored Iran’s need to build up its military.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1236, Harold Saunders Files, Middle East Negotiations, Iran 10/1/69–12/31/69. Confidential; Immediate. A handwritten note on the document reads, “Att to Saunders-Kissinger memo 10/14/69. Subj: President’s Wednesday Briefing.” The document was also found in Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 17–1 US-IRAN.
24. Telegram 4185 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State
The Shah announced his intention to discuss with Nixon Iran’s interest in selling more oil to the United States in exchange for purchases of U.S. military and civilian equipment.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 601, Country Files, Middle East, Iran, Vol. I, 1/20/69–5/31/70. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis.
25. Intelligence Note No. 743 from Deputy Director George C. Denney, Jr. of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to Secretary of State Rogers
Denney summed up the Shah’s priorities of Iranian defense and oil revenue, citing the problems which the Shah’s military designs posed for the United States, Iran’s neighbors, and Iran itself.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 IRAN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.; Limdis.
26. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon
Rogers provided Nixon with recommended positions and talking points for the Shah’s forthcoming visit.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 920, VIP Visits, Shah of Iran, Washington DC, 10/21–10/23/69. Secret. Scope, objective paper, and talking points were enclosed but are not published.
27. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Prior to the Shah’s visit, Saunders reviewed the debate between the Departments of State and Defense over whether to accommodate Iranian military demands.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 920, VIP Visits, Shah, Washington, 10/21–10/23/69. Tab A is Document 28. Tab B is not published. A handwritten notation on the source text reads: “Back from HAK, October 22, 1969.”
28. Letter from Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird
Rogers impressed upon Laird the importance of indicating to the Shah a willingness to meet Iran’s defense needs.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 7 IRAN. Secret. The letter is a true copy of the original in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–75–089, Box 74, Iran 1969, 091.112.
29. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon
Kissinger briefed Nixon on the significance of the Shah’s visit, and on points to avoid in their conversation, including specific commitments on the Shah’s oil import proposals or military credits.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 920, VIP Visits, Shah of Iran. Secret. The attachments are not published.
30. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), to President Nixon
Kissinger advised Nixon about the Shah’s plan to sell oil to the United States, and attached a memorandum from CLARK MOLLENHOFF explaining the background to the proposal.
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 920, VIP Visits Shah, Washington, DC, 10/21–10/23/69. No classification marking. Sent for information. Nixon wrote on the memo, “Get this done by the companies if possible—not by a change of quota.” Saunders indicated on an attached covering memorandum that Mollenhoff’s views on the proposal were “consistent with our own.” The covering memorandum is not published.