Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency
Washington, August 1970
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Student Unrest Abroad
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[Omitted here are portions unrelated to Iran.]
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IRAN
General Context
Overt student opposition to the government, as well as other
opposition elements, has been almost nonexistent in recent years.
The Shah is firmly in control of the government and the country, and
dissident activity has been suppressed firmly and quickly by his
security forces. In addition, programs for reforms and for rapid
economic development which he has pushed have pre-empted many of the
issues around which intellectual opposition to the Shah was able to
rally. As the economy has boomed and as job opportunities have
grown, most of the 40,000 university students have been increasingly
concerned with securing their place in the establishment rather than
fighting it and seem in most instances unwilling to risk their
futures by political activity.
Political activism among University of Tehran students was, until
recent years, endemic; there were few years between the early 1950s
and 1963 not marked by rioting and often bloody demonstrations.
Traditionally, the activists were nationalists, supporters of former
Prime Minister Mossadeq, of his National Front, or one of the
offshoots of the National Front. The Tudeh (Communist) Party was
also heavily involved; Tudeh Party cells were active on the campus
for 15 years. A few of the early Tudeh Party leaders were university
professors, who retain a shadow party-in-exile in Eastern
Europe.
In the past, student demonstrations were almost all antigovernment.
The Shah provided a natural target and the demonstrations were for
the most part unabashedly political, with little attempt to use
genuine student grievances as a pretext.
Present Student Attitudes
Most intellectuals and students apparently feel no sense of
identification with the regime
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and its development programs, which are
decided at the highest levels. Antiestablishment sentiment is
probably intensified by the lack of an effective political
opposition either in the universities or in the society as a whole.
No political organizations are permitted on university campuses, and
social organizations—primarily government-sponsored “Youth
Houses”—are closely watched by the security forces and their
informers. There is virtually no channel for effective communication
and no constructive outlet for student energies and talents.
Outspoken critics of the government have been expelled and
drafted.
A university education is today probably the most important
requirement for success in Iran. Despite their dissatisfaction with
the political system, therefore, most of Iran’s students are
unwilling to jeopardize future job security by a confrontation with
the police over political ideology. In the past, many university
graduates were unable to find jobs and therefore had less to lose.
Now, however, many of the brightest graduates are absorbed into a
burgeoning bureaucracy as participants in the reform program, and
the problem of an unemployed, disgruntled educated class is
beginning to fade.
Recent Unrest
In recent years, student demonstrations have been aimed at specific
educational and economic grievances and appear to have had few
political overtones. Student disorders broke out in Tehran in
February 1970 apparently as a spontaneous protest against an
increase in bus fares. Large-scale arrests were made, followed by
further demonstrations protesting the arrests. Most of the students
arrested were subsequently released. Some antigovernment leaflets
were distributed, but the disorders appear to have been apolitical
in nature. In May, a small group of students in Tehran attacked the
Iran-American Society student and academic centers, breaking
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windows. The group, which
seemed to be protesting US involvement in Iran rather than the
government of the Shah, was quickly dispersed.
The largest and most widespread disturbances in recent years broke
out in May and June of 1967 and again in January and February of
1968, affecting all eight of Iran’s institutions of higher learning.
These demonstrations were aimed primarily at pressing complaints
about the educational system; the students demanded, among other
things, abolition of newly instituted tuition fees, upgrading of
degrees, higher university budgets, and better facilities. Most of
these demonstrations were followed by others protesting police and
security forces’ over-reaction and arrests.
Problems in Higher Education
Iran’s eight universities are in transition, changing from a system
of memorization and learning by rote to a more flexible, creative
approach. Conservative, religious-oriented students find this
modernization threatening, as do older entrenched professors. Others
probably believe that change is not coming fast enough.
The universities have had difficulty in attracting competent and
dynamic faculties, despite government efforts to recruit better
qualified teachers. At Tabriz, for example, until a reorganization
in 1968, the university was dominated by conservative,
long-entrenched native Azerbaijanis with questionable
qualifications.
Although the apparent student-faculty ratios at Iranian universities
are not too bad, these figures are deceptive. At Tehran University,
for example, where the ratio was 28 to 1 in 1966, faculty members
have been only part-time teachers—medical professors with private
practices, economics professors with their own businesses, etc. Some
top professors reportedly have not shown up for classes in years.
There has been virtually no faculty-student relationship. Professors
traditionally deliver
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lectures and depart with little or no exchange with their students.
The government now has banned part-time teaching, but it is not
known to what extent its ruling has been enforced.
Outside Influences
There is little evidence of off-campus influence on student activism.
Security officials, and in some instances university officials,
charged that Communists were active in the 1967-68 demonstrations;
20 of the 100 students arrested in the Tehran area in February 1968
were alleged to be pro-Chinese Communist. This was not confirmed.
There is some Communist activity, consisting primarily of the
circulation of a limited amount of Soviet and Chinese propaganda,
but generally its effectiveness has been undercut by rapid economic
and social development. A few Tudeh Party cells continue to exist at
the University of Tehran, but there is no overt manifestation of
their presence, and their covert activities are directed mostly at
staying alive.
In universities such as Pahlavi, which are in less urban areas,
Muslim religious leaders still have an influence over youth. About
50 religiously conservative Shirazi citizens were arrested following
disturbances at Pahlavi in February 1968 on charges of fomenting the
strikes.
There is no evidence that student revolts in the US, France, and
other countries have influenced the Iranian students, or that
Iranian dissidents abroad have had an impact on the local scene.
Government Approach to Student Problems
Iranian officials, from the Shah on down, are aware that the regime
has not been accepted by many intellectuals. They are anxious to
keep youth satisfied and to encourage students to support and
participate in the government. There is no visible
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effort to train youth for political
responsibility, however; in fact, the government attempts to keep
students from engaging in any political activity.
In the wake of the 1968 demonstrations, the Shah launched a program
of reform for higher education. University chancellors were replaced
wholesale; an awareness of the need for change was instilled in
educators; plans were set forth for producing more graduates in
development fields and for increasing technical training; and
students were promised a greater voice “within reasonable limits” in
university affairs. The government is also attempting to improve and
enlarge enrollment, university facilities, and faculties and to
establish a more creative and relevant method of instruction.
Progress is slow, however, particularly when change is still fought
by conservative elements within the academic community.
Political and social pull—being a descendant of one of Iran’s “1,000
families”—is still important in the rise to success, but less so
than before. More middle-class youth are attending universities, and
with the government’s increasing emphasis on skill and technical
competence, more of them without political connections are now able
to get jobs. Of greatest impact, however, has been the increasing
availability of government jobs. Both high school and university
graduates are employed in large numbers in the Literacy, Health, and
Development Corps.
Although the widely publicized educational reform program
demonstrates the government’s willingness to use the carrot to quiet
students, there is little doubt that the stick would be employed
without hesitation should student unrest take political shape. There
is some evidence, in fact, of a dispute over how to handle restive
students between the soft liners in the Education Ministry and hard
liners in the security forces.
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Iranian Students Abroad
Iranian officials estimate that some 25,000 to 37,000 Iranians are
studying abroad, including 5,000 to 12,000 in the US. Surveys have
shown that many of the best do not return home because of better
opportunities abroad, while average students are likely to come
back. Most of the sizable number of dropouts and failures (only 50
percent of the Iranian “students” in the US are thought to be
actually enrolled in schools) get nonprofessional jobs with good pay
abroad and do not return to Iran.
A degree from a US or European university is considered far more
prestigious than one from an Iranian university, and many youths go
to fantastic lengths to study abroad. For example, private
enterprises in Iran sell admissions to small, often unaccredited
universities in the US to students who are unable to gain admission
to better US schools. Poorer students often seek education abroad
because they are unable to gain entrance to Iran’s universities.
A small but vocal segment of Iranian students abroad (an estimated
500 of those in the US), engage in active anti-Shah activities. They
hold meetings, issue sporadic publications, and make grandiose
plans, but their major activity is to harass the Shah when he
travels. Anti-Shah demonstrations, joined by radical students in the
US, Germany, Austria, and England, among other places, have been a
major irritant to the Shah. They have strained relations with host
governments and have often led to supersecrecy and extremely tight
security measures during his trips.
The largest organizations of Iranian students abroad—the Iranian
Students Association in the US and the Confederation of Iranian
Students in Europe—appear to be a conglomeration of Communist
sympathizers, National Front-oriented leftists,
middle-ofthe-roaders, and religiously oriented rightists.
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They have no ideological
cohesiveness; only opposition to the Shah unites them. The leftists,
who tend to be more active, almost always assume control but do not
necessarily reflect the attitudes of the majority. Most of the funds
apparently come from membership dues. Those who are in the forefront
of anti-Shah activities are well known to Iranian authorities and
most of them find it impossible to return to Iran.
The government is also concerned by the so-called “brain drain”
problem. During the past few years, it has initiated a number of
steps calculated to lure overseas residents back—draft exemptions,
the promise of good jobs in government and private industry, and
active recruiting or teaching jobs at Iranian universities. The
regime may also be making it more difficult Iranians to go abroad in
the first place.
The Long View
There will probably be no dramatic changes in student attitudes over
the next ten years, assuming that the Shah’s economic development
programs continue to provide challenging employment to increasing
numbers of university graduates. It is also unlikely that many
Iranian students will risk political activism while economic and
social advancement appears possible. Nevertheless, as long as
political activity is proscribed—and it is likely to be for as long
as the Shah is in power—the regime will probably not win
wholehearted student support, and resentment of its
authoritarianism, however benevolent, will pervade university
life.
