254. Telegram 10163 From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State1 2
From Mulcahy
Subject:
- Mulcahy Mission: Meeting With Amin
1. I met with Amin on 24 November. He was accompanied by Col. Sabunt, Minister of Industry and head of the “defense council.” Zairian Foreign Minister Bula was there too. Amin had two basic things on his mind: the need for improvement in US-Ugandan relations and the importance of continued and even more urgent US help for FNLA/UNITA. On the Angolan problem it is very clear that Mobutu (through Bula) has brought Amin around to his way of thinking and the chances seem good for an OAU summit on this issue by early/mid-December. On the bilateral side, Amin did not fail to request arms, but his main interest seemed to be in getting some American experts to help him assess/develop cobalt, gold and other mineral deposits.
2. US-Ugandan relations: Amin referred to the “mis-understanding” between our two countries and said he was sure that things could be sorted out. He hoped that I or other US rep could visit Kampala soon when he could have the time to discuss the question at length. Amin said he was ready to send a “senior man” to the US and he alluded to the Zionism question by pointing out that he [Page 02] was not personlly anti-Israeli. He said he had been talking to the Egyptians and to Arafat and thought that an “acceptable solution” to the Israeli problem would be worked out. Amin then insisted that he was not committed to the Soviets. “They wanted me to become a socialist in return for two squadrons of MIGs, but I refused,” he said.
3. In sum, Amin admitted that there was a series of issues which stood in the way of close Ugandan-American relations, but insisted that these could be overcome and that he wanted very much to do so. I went through my talking points as amended by the Secretary and allowed as how the problems which separated the US and Uganda were not of a bilateral nature and were capable of solution. I said that I knew President Ford had expressed his pleasure at Amin’s message of thanks for our support to the OAU position on the Angolan problem. I also said we too would like to get back into a more normal posture with Uganda and that with both sides working conscientiously toward this end I was sure real progress could be made. I made no promises, but Amin seemed pleased.
4. After again assuring me that Africa in general and Uganda in particular are not communist, that the US now had an excellent opportunity to improve its position in Africa, Amin made a pitch for arms, mentioning specifically only C–130s. Before he could get into the subject too deeply, I rehearsed the problems associated with military assistance programs, and underlined the long lead time associated with FMS. Amin then passed on to what he defined as his need for American “experts”. It could appear that Uganda had recently discovered large gold, cobalt and other mineral desposits and Amin wouid like a mission of American experts to come and help him assess/develop this potential. He also asked if the ERTS system which Zaire is participating in could be extended to Uganda. I tried to keep my resonse to this latter point, saying that I would have to check the technical aspects—but Bula brought me back to the “mission of experts.” I responded by saying that I knew several consulting firms expert in the mining field and this seemed to satisfy Amin. “Tell them to come to [Page 3] Uganda,” he said.
5. Angola: Amin began this subject by saying that he wanted me to report to my government his and the OAU’s pleasure with the stand the USG had taken on Angolan recognition. Unlike the Russians and Cubans, he said, the Americans were not directly involved in Angola and this greatly helped the US image in Africa. At the same time, Amin insisted that we should continue to aid the Angolan people—and “confidentially, I want you to continue to help the FNLA/UNITA, because they are not communist.” He stressed that more US help was needed urgently in view of the recent and ever more ominious infusion of Soviet arms into Angola and Cabinda. He said members of his conciliation commission had been advisers using the sophisticated weaponry in MPLA possession.
4. Amin said he supported Mobutu on Angola, that the USG should contnue to help Zaire so Zaire could help FNLA/UNITA, and that Uganda itself had agreed to come to Zaire’s aid in the event of attack. I assured him and Bula who had made similar plea in some detail that we would not abandon our Angolan friends.
5. I then moved the conversation to the diplomatic aspects of the Angolan problem. I said that Angola was Africa’s most serious problem, recalled the US position, and wondered what Amin thought the OAU might be able to accomplish toward a peaceful solution. Amin replied that 27 African countries were now in favor of a summit on Angola and that six Ministers’ favored a Foreign Ministers’ meeting. He intimated that a summit would be held in early/mid December. I encouraged him on this and then, since he had said that the MPLA had to be expelled from Cabinda, I asked what the OAU’s reaction would be to a FLEC invasion/victory. Amin said that FLEC was a liberation movement and thus acceptable. In the same vein, Zaire could help FLEC as a liberation movement and that would be acceptable. Amin seems to have decided to follow Mobutu down the line.
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 7, Zaire-State Department Telegrams, SECSTATE Nodis, 11/1/75–12/31/75. Secret; Eyes Only; Niact Immediate; Nodis; Cherokee.↩
- Chargé Walker transmitted a report of Acting Assistant Secretary Mulcahy’s meeting with General Amin, in which they discussed problems in U.S.-Uganda relations and Angola. Mulcahy deflected a request for U.S. arms, but offered tentative help in identifying mining experts.↩