253. Telegram 9854 From the Embassy in Zaire to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- Mobutu Asks for High Level USG Rep to Attend Nov 24 Celebrations: Contact With Amin
Ref:
- [text not declassified]
1. I was called in by Mobutu’s senior advisor, Bisengimana, evening 11 Nov. his pitch [text not declassified]: Amin has asked Mobutu to arrange a meeting with a “high level” USG rep when Amin visits Kinshasa during the 10th anniversary celebrations on Nov 24.
2. Bisengimana made the following points in addition to those [text not declassified]
A. Amin told Mobutu that he had irrevocably broken with the Soviets, but now found himself without major power partners.
B. Amin wants to “explain himself” to the USG and to “arrange everything” between Uganda and the United States.
C. Amin complained to Mobutu that following the break with the Soviets he would have no source of military assistance. Mobutu promised to share with Amin “what little he had.”
3. I reminded Bisenginmana that he had told me previously that no special USG representative was expected on Nov 24 and that it would thus be very difficult, if not impossible, to crank up a high level delegate at this late date. I also recalled Amin’s unacceptable remarks at the UN and our strong criticism of him as [Page 2] a result. Again, it would be difficult, I said, to consider serious contacts in these circumstances. Bisengimana allowed as how the USG should take a “pragmatic” approach to Amin’s request and emphasized that Mobutu could assure that Amin would not subsequently publicize the fact that he had met with a USG rep.
4. The arguments against contact with Amin are obvious and powerful: he will ask for a re-establishment of relations, arms and econcomic assistance—each of which in present circumstances seems out of the question, and, it would be political dynamite if the meeting were to become known. Yet it is important in terms of our policy in Central Africa and our aims in Angola that we keep Amin on his present track. It is due mainly to Mobutu that Amin and the OAU has turned around on Angola and on Israeli expulsion. Now Mobutu’s prestige and effectiveness in influencing Amin are on the line.
5. On balance, I believe we should respond favorably to Mobutu’s request to send a high-level rep to the Nov 24 celebration. We should also agree to have our rep meet with Amin, but on certain conditions:
A. We count on Mobutu to assure that there are no leaks as to the fact or the substance of the contact.
B. We come to listen and have no intention of responding to requests for re-establishing relations or Mil/Econ assistance.
C. If, after this first contact, Amin wishes to pursue a quiet dialogue, we would expect a change in his public posture on issues of importance to us.
The Department, I am sure, can come up with more and even better pre-conditions in the event we agree to the contact.
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 7, Zaire-State Department Telegrams, SECSTATE Nodis, 11/1/75–12/31/75. Secret; Eyes Only; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Chargé Lannon Walker recommended acceding to Amin’s request for a meeting with a high-level U.S. representative in Kinshasa on November 24, so long as the meeting remained secret.↩