188. Telegram 6885 From the Embassy in Kenya to the Department of State 1 2
Subj:
- Meeting With Kenyatta
Ref:
- (A) Secto 18002,
- (B) Nairobi 6881
1. Summary. As I informed Asst. Secretary Schaufele in July 4 telcon, I had telephoned President Kenyatta and set meeting time for morning July 5 at State House Nakuru. We met alone at 0855 for 55-minute talk. Initially we discussed subject reftel, then other subjects (reported septel). While not qualifying our representation to Kenyatta made July 4, I dissected it and feel I have been successful in identifying USG support as diplomatic, while at the same time not destroying effect of our earlier pledge to “cooperate fully.” I had separate five-minute meeting alone with Minister of State Koinange prior to Kenyatta meeting which proved sufficient to make same point with him. End summary
2. I found I had misinterpreted (Nairobi 6881) Kenyatta’s physical condition on July 4, believing he was in possible ill health. He had simply been exhausted. At July 5 meeting he was cheerful, lively, more agile, talkative, and his eyes had regained their magnetism. He explained that prior to seeing me July 4 he had been up since 0230, talking to many people and greatly concerned. I said I was pleased to see him recovered; he replied, “one must [Page 2] face those things,” which could have referred to his recent “stroke.” On July 6 he was in fine form.
3. I informed Kenyatta that I had reported our previous day meeting to Department, and had received a reply. I made Secretary’s point: “The United States would look with great disfavor on any attack on the sovereignty of Kenya.” I alluded to my July 4 personal response to Kenyatta’s query, and stated that it was diplomatic support that Secretary Kissinger wished to emphasize as the support which USG would be willing to proved Kenya. I did not elaborate. Kenyatta replied, “however you can help us we are grateful, particularly in our time of need.” He did not repeat not mention any request for military hardware or assistance.
4. Kenyatta then asked whether I was informed on Uganda, to which I replied affirmatively. Kenyatta reemphasized that “he” (he never mentions Amin by name) is capable of anything. However, an action by the Uganda “from within” might well be possible. I asked whether he believed Uganda and Somalia might collaborate in an attack on Kenya; he replied, “Their religions are the same, but not their politics. I think not.” He added, perhaps not 100 percent of the Kenyans would fight, but 90 percent would, against any invasion of Kenya—with all they had the Kenyans, he stated, “are confident.”
5. President Kenyatta, in parting, asked me to convey his warmest regards to Secretary Kissinger and President Ford.
6. Meeting with Koinange: As stated above, I emphasized that USG willing give Kenya diplomatic support. Koinange, however, said Kenyatta would undoubtedly ask that USG provide aircraft and “perhaps people as well,” until the new aircraft arrived. I said I believed this would be most difficult if not impossible, but would convey Kenyatta’s message to Department. Kenyatta did not repeat not raise subject with me. Koinange informed me [text not declassifed] that the Kenyan Army had intercepted a [Page 3] message indicating plans to attack a town at midnight “last night” (July 4–5). Action against Kenya by Amin is quite possible, Koinange believes. Kenyan VP Moi appealed to the OAU July 4 for support. There are no plans to bring matter to SC. Koinange added that Somali Ambassador to Uganda had returned to Mogadiscio over weekend and was to have returned to Kampala July 5 with instructions on Somali advice regarding Ugandan attitudes toward Kenya.
7. Comment: Regarding the future: If threatened by Uganda, Kenya is likely to turn to USG for some form of active military support, in spite of explanation that U.S. only intends diplomatic support. They will base this on untimely, uncleared, fact-packed press coverage provided by member of SecDef’s party during June visit, which they believe gives incentive to enemies to act sooner rather than later against Kenya.
- Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Africa, Box 3, Kenya, State Department Telegrams to SECSTATE. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis↩
- Ambassador Marshall reported on meetings with President Kenyatta and Foreign Minister Koinange, concluding that Kenya would likely turn to the United States for active military support if it were threatened.↩