158. Telegram 3228 From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State1 2
For Asst Secy Schaufele only
Subj:
- Secretary’s Trip to Africa
Ref:
- State 63171
1. Herewith answers to your specific questions, as well as some additional comments:
2. If Secretary includes Addis in his Africa itinerary, local reactions will be generally favorable. EPMG will see visit as earnest of continuing USG interest and support. EPMG will likely be glad to have opportunity to balance its presently cosmetically-tilted orientation toward communist world (via spate of delegations both ways), without necessity of sending delegation to Washington. Reception here would be at appropriately high levels of EPMG. Conversations will be blunt and frank; EPMG will air its dissatisfactions on military assistance deliveries; will ask direct questions about USG support in event of war with Somalia. EPMG will expect and tolerate equally blunt responses on these and other topics, including USG dissatisfactions with EPMG policies and actions (political settlement in Eritrea, sometimes anti-US domestic press; need for restraint over TFAI and Somalia, etc.). While we cannot rule out entirely that hostile Ethiopian factions might try to inject sour notes into visit (critical press story, or minor demonstration), we believe above factors will cause EPMG to ensure smooth visit.
3. If Secretary does not visit Addis, EPMG would read omission as ominous sign of impending change in USG policy of patience and support. Result more likely would be turning away from USG than effort to refurbish relations with USG. EPMG would worry that potential enemies (read EDU, ELF/PLF and Somalia) would be emboldened by omission. Some in EPMG would see (or profess to see) omission as sign that USG has secret ties with EDU, ELF/PLF, and has made private deal with Soviets involving Somali ambitions. Other countries might see omission as proof of USG disinclination to have good relationship with Ethiopia because it is a socialist state.
4. If Secretary does not come to Addis, some in OAU (and to minor extent ECA) would assert that decision is sign of USG disinterest in or hostility toward leading African regional organizations, and might say so publicly. Content of conversations with OAU officials would produce sharp disagreements with past USG policies and attitudes, in line with highly politicized nature of OAU secretariat. However, as with EPMG, OAU officials are thoroughly accustomed to hearing sharp and frank ripostes from moderate African leaders, and would expect them from Secretary; net result probably would be positive in private, although OAU might engage in some post-visit posturing in public.
5. More generally, insofar as we have a policy toward Ethiopia, it is founded on need for USG steadiness during revolutionary changes that are likely to go on for some time. Corollary to this is need for USG to be seen by other countries of being capable of such steadiness. These factors are further arguments for secretarial visit.