157. Telegram 412 From the Embassy in Somalia to the Department of State1 2
Subj:
- Siad, Soviet Union and US Assistance
Ref:
- A) Mogadiscio 0379;
- B) Mogadiscio 0225;
- C) Mogadiscio 264.
1. Summary: It is now almost six months since I first informed President Siad of US intention to resume economic assistance to Somalia. During this period, regional and international developments have provided us with opportunity to appraise more realistically prospect that US aid renewal might encourage Siad to behave more responsibly towards US. On basis of Siad’s recent behavior, however, it is obvious that promise of US aid renewal has not rpt not affected in any way SDR policy, Siad hostility to US or changed by one iota his Soviet relationship. Future is equally bleak. I believe, moreover, that Siad’s recent actions towards US have been so irresponsible that we should consider quietly suspending for time being any implementation of US aid renewal. US emergency help at this time—even food aid—would probably achieve the opposite of our policy intention by easing Siad’s growing economic crisis deriving from food and foreign exchange shortages and thus strengthen his position and that of Soviet Union. This is manifestly not rpt not in our interests. End summary.
2. Siad’s speech at 25th CPSU Congress—where we understand he was only Arab or African head of state in attendance—is most recent example of his enthusiastic support for Soviet line (Mogadiscio 0379). It repeats much of cant found in his other speeches over the years. Unfortunately, however, not only does Siad falsify in usual Marxist sense events that are shaping world around us, but he distorts in more deliberate way Soviet role in Somali drought relief and by inference nature of US help. Despite fact that US emergency drought relief came to Somalia more quickly and in greater abundance than any other foodstuffs, Soviet relief alone is credited with saving Somali nation, while US is accused of attempting to sabotage Siad’s appeal for international aid, a charge which is as false as it is malicious. Although US not rpt not metnioned by name, inference is clear.
3. As badly as US fared at Siad’s hand in his public CPSU performance at Moscow, we have fared even worse in Siad’s recent confidential communications with Arab and African leaders, including OAU Chairman Amin (Mogadiscio 264). Siad has accused US of complicity with French in a planned invasion of Somalia and of assembling ships at Djibouti and in Indian Ocean to that end—an irresponsible accusation which was levelled in wake of February 3 kidnapping of 30 French schoolchildren at Djibouti by Somali Coast Liberation Front (FLCS), an instrument of SDR. Siad hinted at same complicity in his public comments in Mogadiscio following SDR allegations about French occupation of Loyada (Mogadiscio 225).
4. Siad’s performance on Angolan problem since October also clearly reminds us that there continues to be no rpt no difference between his policy and Moscow’s on all questions involving Soviet interests in Africa and elsewhere. Siad recognized MPLA’s Angolan government on day independence was granted and his statement on Angolan problem at Addis OAU summit in January was less a justification for recognition of MPLA government than a defense of Soviet Union in its Angolan policies (Mogadiscio 061).
5. While US has become more frequent target of Siad, we are also taking additional punishment in Somali media, which has accused US of taking part in abortive coup in Nigeria (Mogadiscio 0364). Scarcely day passes without anti-US vitriol in [garble] press.
6. With above in mind, we should perhaps again take a look at events which set in motion US decision last September to renew financial aid to Somalia. Our decision to renew aid was based primarily upon the hope that we might induce Siad to behave more responsibly towards the US, to become more truly non-aligned, to disengage in certain limited ways from the USSR and to limit certain military advantages—i.e., Berbera—that Soviet Union was obtaining in Somalia.
7. It is perhaps ironic that—as we understand it—much of the impetus for US assistance to Siad was provided by Senator Bartlett, who visited Somalia in July 1975 at Siad’s invitation to inspect Berbera and to establish Siad’s innocence regarding the Pentagon’s Soviet base accusations. Senator Bartlett nevertheless saw what US intelligence analysts told him he would see, as his subsequent report stated. At Siad’s insistence, however, Senator Bartlett also visited drought relief settlements. In urging US assistance to Somalia following his return to the US, the Senator was also encouraged to believe that US help for Siad might weaken Siad’s Soviet dependency and limit military advantages which Soviet Union was enjoying at Berbera.
8. I would wager that in view of Siad’s actions over past several months, Senator Bartlett—especially given his recent trip to Angola—would have as little [garble] assumptions about Siad. I believe that in view of events of past few months, Senator Bartlett would probably share our conclusion that prospect of resumption of US assistance program of from $3 to $5 million has not rpt not in any way moved Siad to behave more responsibly towards US. Moreover, if US contribution of US $10 million to Somali drought relief in 1974–75 can be so easily impugned, distorted or disregarded, then it is quite certain that an aid program of less than half that magnitude would be even less of a factor in achieving our objectives. Why then should we pursue a policy initiative whose premises, as Siad’s actions have demonstrated over these past few months, are already bankrupt?
9. While there may be humanitarian reasons for sticking with our decision for Title II relief for Somalia’s poor and dispossessed, even that argument loses considerable force when we reexamine closely the local sttuation. The sorghum which we would provide Somalia would not go to the southern regions where the resettled nomads who are the target of our aid are living. The SDR has asked that the shipments go north instead—to Berbera—and through a bookkeeping transfer release equivalent stocks from the central food reserves which would then be transferred in the south to the nomads. I need to remind the Department of situation in north—troops, foreign guerrilla advisors and, in Siad’s own words, “thousands of freedom fighters” waiting to cross [garble]. Would these rations find their way into those camps? In my view, the primary result of our humanitarian aid would be economic rather than social: it would relieve Siad’s foreign exchange problem and the acute economic crises which has resulted not only because of the drought but because of his economic and social priorities. Any US contribution—Title II or otherwise—which relieves the economic pressures on Siad—and political and social pressures as well—can only contribute to the status quo. Support for the status quo is clearly not rpt not in our interests at the present time. We should therefore quietly hold in abeyance for time being implementation of renewal of US assistance to Somalia.
10. Such a moratorium would be consistent with spirit of President Ford’s letter to Siad of February 25—a letter which is still undelivered pending Siad’s return from Moscow. The President tells Siad that he is pleased that Siad has qte reaffirmed Somalis’s policy of non-alignment unqte and goes on to say that qte implementation of such a policy will foster the better relations we both seek unqte. This puts emphasis squarely where it belongs—on future actions rather than past or present promises—and in present atmposphere I believe we are obliged to wait for better evidence of Siad’s intentions than we have at present before proceeding on our present course.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Policy File, 1976. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.↩
- Ambassador Loughran reported that Somali attitudes toward the United States had not improved since the announcement of resumption of economic assistance six months earlier. He recommended quietly suspending implementation of U.S. aid renewal.↩