256. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
K: Incidentally, that speech2 played very well in all the Eastern papers.
P: Oh really. Good.
K: That wasn’t what I was calling you about. During the night Jordan blew. The King moved troops into Amman; he has taken the [Page 717] western and southern suburbs and is advancing into the city. He seems to be gaining the upper hand. The Fedayeen is asking for Iraqi and Syrian help but there is no indication that they are responding. During the night I talked at length to Bob.3 We are saying you were wakened and informed of the situation, but in light of the fact that there is nothing you could do we (Haldeman and Kissinger) thought it best not to waken you.
P: That’s okay. I knew the King was planning it. We already had signed the paper.
K: Right. I talked to Bill, Sisco, Moorer and Packard—everyone is aboard.4 They all recognize that it is a crisis.
P: A crisis that’s good.
K: If the King wins, the peace offensive has a real chance.
P: We’ve got to help him. How about the fleet?
K: It’s up there. One thing, everyone agreed you must not come back. It would create a crisis atmosphere. We moved the second carrier into the Mediterranean. We’ve got almost the entire Sixth Fleet near Cyprus now. There’s another force with helicopter capability on the Guam. It was going to go to the Mediterranean anyway and we are moving into that area.
P: But this becomes necessary only if the Iraqis or Syrians move?
K: Exactly.
P: If they move, my strong feeling at this time is that we should use American air and knock the bejesus out of them.
K: That’s our feeling.
P: It would be a show of strength on our part.
K: Well, there are strong arguments on both sides but nothing on that will happen till you are back.
P: The fact that the Israelis move … has other effects. I think a move on our part shows guts, having to do with these hijackers also. I think the U.S. ought to do something if it’s air. If it requires men that’s another thing.
K: What we have done in this regard, we are acquiring the targets— getting information for these air strikes and feeding them to the [omission in the original] as fast as we can. We’ve got to know where to hit. Helms is putting maximum effort into finding where the Iraqi and Syrian forces are.
P: [less than 1 line not declassified] they are frantic?
K: That they are asking for help.
[Page 718]P: The King’s move is a result of our encouraging him, is it not? That’s the thing I’m thinking about. He ought to be backed up.
K: We sent out a cable to that effect last night.5 We think the cable we put out Monday stiffened his back, the one saying we can’t tolerate the taking of American hostages. We also authorized the Ambassador to tell the King that if he needs material support we will give it very sympathetic consideration.6
P: Where are the hostages?
K: We don’t know. So they are in danger. I have talked to the British—they are prepared to put out a five-power statement which is in effect the same thing as you said on Monday, that we hold the guerrillas responsible for the safety of the hostages.
P: Yes, can’t I say that now?
K: Yes, Ziegler can.
P: That we will hold the guerrillas responsible and have him quote the President directly.
K: Right. We also have a package of what we think the King needs.
P: On this one I am sure you are going to find Sisco would be all aboard and Bill will be because it’s the only chance for his peace offensive.
K: Exactly. If it fails the cease-fire and the peace offensive are dead.
P: It would be worse than before we started; the Fedayeen would have the upper hand.
K: It would push Nasser in a radical direction and would push the Soviets that way and would make the Israelis unwilling to accept compromises.
P: I want you to push through the bureaucracy my feelings, having a landing team ready for evacuation. As far as their going in and fighting, that’s another thing. This would get the Russians in, but that’s another side of it. This will show whether we have any stake at all left in the Mediterranean.
K: I have talked to Alex and Bill. Bill is all on board on doing the maximum possible to strengthen the King. On the Israeli versus U.S. question I haven’t talked to him in detail. I will get a reading on that.
P: I think U.S. air has a lot to say for itself. It would be good in the event they still have the hostages.
K: I think it would be a good idea if we told the Shah and gave him our approach. That would bring him into it and he could put troops on the Iraqi border.
[Page 719]P: And we will back him.
K: Right. These are the measures we have taken. We will meet again at 3:00.7 It was a worse situation last week. Then everything was festering and we couldn’t get a handle.
P: What this is is a civil war in Jordan with Iraq and Syria in on it. How about your calling Vorontsov and saying “lay off boys.”
K: I think we should be enigmatic and say nothing. They will pick this up.
P: Okay, this will worry them. But we want the Sixth Fleet stuff in the open.
K: They’ll catch it.
P: I want them to know we’re moving. I want everything that can be done to be done in the open. The wear and tear on the nerves between the Syrians and Iraqis is very important.
K: We can move it 12 hours early and get it picked up.
P: Tell Helms to get it picked up immediately.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. The President was in Chicago and Kissinger was in Washington.↩
- Apparently a reference to a speech made by President Nixon on September 16 at Kansas State University; see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 757–763.↩
- No record of this conversation was found, but see Document 249.↩
- See Document 254.↩
- Document 252.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 254.↩
- See Document 260.↩