252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan1

152449. Ref: Amman 4845.2

1.
We concur in your assessment that no real threat exists from Syria and, while Iraqi intervention seems more likely, our judgment [Page 698] continues to be that active Iraqi military intervention against King questionable.
2.
Obviously King wants and needs his hand held. What you propose telling him (para 3 reftel) is entirely appropriate. You should not rpt not altogether preclude the possibility of direct USG involvement in form of interdicting Syrians and Iraqis, and you can be encouraging about the prospects for material assistance. You may inform King that Jordan situation is subject of high-level USG attention.
3.
Re para 4 reftel, you should not discourage King from taking stern measures against fedayeen. This is course of action for him and him alone to decide. As you note, one cannot help but feel at this juncture that unless he asserts his authority more effectively the chances of his regime surviving are worse than if he were to continue to cater to fedayeen.
4.
We agree that you should urge King to enlist all possible support from other Arab states. We recall Nasser’s reported offer of assistance to King, made during latter’s last visit to Cairo, in event King faced with critical internal situation. We take Nasser’s assurances of material help with grain of salt but seems to us King should at this juncture at least test Nasser’s earlier undertaking. Saudis, Moroccans, Tunisians and Lebanese are unable to be of any tangible assistance to King in current situation and their moral support would be of marginal value. Soviets cannot be expected to play useful role although it is our guess Soviets probably would like to see King win out over fedayeen in any confrontation. Best we can look for in this respect is avoidance of Soviet involvement.
5.
We wish you the best of luck in your first meeting with King and believe your talk with him will be useful at this juncture. King, as you know, tends to be moody and at times somewhat headstrong. In recent months he has demonstrated lack of determination and consistency. Your advice and counsel could be important at this point.
Rogers
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARA–ISR. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Seelye; and cleared by Sisco, Atherton, and Kissinger.
  2. In telegram 4845 from Amman, September 16, 2315Z, Brown suggested that Hussein was overly concerned about possible Syrian intervention as Brown estimated Syria had only approximately 600 troops in Jordan and a Syrian-directed Palestinian force. In paragraph 3, Brown reported that he suspected Hussein wanted “his hand held.” Brown proposed telling Hussein that the United States wanted a strong, stable Jordan, and that it was a Jordanian decision on how to restore central authority. Brown suggested disabusing the King of the possibility of U.S. involvement in interdicting the Syrians or Iraqis. In paragraph 4, Brown hoped not to receive instructions to discourage Hussein from “taking stern measures against fedayeen.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)