255. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Among the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), and the Permanent Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office (Greenhill)1
G: Can we discuss the present situation in Amman for a moment?
K: Yes.
G: What is the latest report you have from the city?
K: That the army has secured the western hills and is moving on the road past the Intercontinental Hotel into the city. It has secured the southern hills but hasn’t yet gotten into the heart of the city.
G: Do you think the King’s claim that he will have the hostages by tonight is valid?
K: We can’t judge that. We do judge that the whole operation will take longer than a day. But it is also our judgment that he can defeat the Fedayeen by himself.
G: I don’t know whether you have seen the text of what we have proposed Bern Group should put out this afternoon.2
K: No, I haven’t seen it. I have Joe Sisco on the line also.
G: Have you seen it Joe?
S: No. I am up on all the wire traffic but haven’t seen that.
G: We have proposed that the Bern Group should put out the following communiqué: “The five governments are ready to open negotiations upon the proposal of the PFLP as soon as the PFLP provides the Bern Group with all the demands including the release of the people the PFLP wants. We have furnished [omission in the original] on this basis. Meanwhile, we will hold the PFLP responsible for the hostages in Jordan.”
S: Offhand my reaction is that sounds very good. It’s the precise position we discussed with you and the others in yesterday’s meeting.3 We will need to discuss it here with the others. We want to evaluate the impact [Page 715] of such an announcement on the evolving situation on the ground. My own reaction is quite sympathetic and we will let you know.
G: Okay, secondly, have you received any representations from the Germans?
K: No, to what effect?
G: You will be receiving one to the same effect as one they sent to us. What it amounts to is that they are thinking if we can’t keep the five-power basis, we could proceed by a four-power or a three-power one, or finally a two-power collective agreement for a unilateral agreement for each of us to do the best with our hostages.
K: If you have no other comments of a general nature I will return to the meeting I left for this conversation.4
G: Okay. Joe, we are of course very concerned with the hostages. There are three possible courses if you abandon the five-power approach: the four of us could say that the European prisoners would be exchanged for all the hostages except for the three Israelis.
S: But those there are also Americans.
G: They are not pure Israelis?
S: No, they are Americans.
G: Then that would only be feasible for you if all the hostages, period?
S: Right, this deal is not a deal for us. We’re satisfied that those two or three have an American connection here, they carry American passports. That’s the problem.
G: But theoretically it’s a possible deal for all the European prisoners if all the hostages?
S: But how does that differ from the announcement you were talking about? If this deal were available … we’ve been trying to get it. But the other side is insisting on this exchange.
G: But in view of this situation they might agree. There is another deal, that in view of the danger, Germany, the Swiss and ourselves would swap our prisoners for our hostages, leaving you unprovided for. Finally, we could agree among ourselves that no one would approach the other.
S: I can tell you we have difficulties with all three. Moreover, your government would want to weigh carefully the outcry in this country against your taking this action. It would be strong and you should be sure that your ministers understand that.
G: But there would also be an outcry in this country. If we don’t agree to bargain, our people get killed.
[Page 716]S: But who knows whether a separate deal is really feasible?
G: That’s true, but people would say “why didn’t you try?”
S: As soon as I’m out of this meeting we will consider the first proposal, the communiqué. But you should know that we have now gone to the Israelis directly.
G: Saying what?
S: Saying basically that we want to act together.
G: Have you gone as far as to say that they must pitch in?
S: Yes, for the first time we have gone to them for concrete and unilateral contributions.
G: Well, Israel is saying to us that they can’t agree to anything because they are waiting for you.
S: We’ve gone now, so let’s see what we get on that and also get back to you on the communiqué.
G: Okay, let me recapitulate our conversation. You will consider the text of the communiqué, you will continue saying to Israel that they must make a contribution. And you will consider our other proposals.
S: Yes, but our interim reaction to them is negative. Let’s not talk in terms of proposals—“Line of thought” is better.
G: Okay. The Bern meeting is at 2:30 this afternoon.
S: Okay, if we need an hour or two delay you’ll understand.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking. Kissinger and Sisco were in Washington and Greenhill was in London. The conversation was on the “secure phone.”↩
- See telegram 152282 to Bern, September 17, 0032Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US)↩
- Presumably the September 16 meeting of the Bern Group; see Document 250 and footnote 4 thereto.↩
- See Document 254.↩