Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

260. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 3:20–3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State—
• U. Alexis Johnson
• Joseph J. Sisco
• Rodger P. Davies
• Defense—
• David Packard
• Robert J. Pranger
• CIA—
• Gen. Robert Cushman
• David H. Blee
• JCS—
• Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
• Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
• NSC Staff—
• Gen. Alexander Haig
• Adm. R.C. Robinson
• Col. Richard Kennedy
• Harold H. Saunders
• Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. we would make no announcement of the departure of the Kennedy, and would consider whether or not to make any statement when the ship reaches Gibraltar;

2. the Guam will leave on its regular schedule (day after tomorrow) but once out of sight of land will advance its speed to make the crossing faster.

Gen. Cushman: Most of Amman is in Jordanian hands. There is some shooting between the hill on which our Embassy is located and the hill occupied by Jordanian Army troops. There is apparently still some activity in this no man’s land, but the Jordanians are now preparing to cross the valley. We have reports that Zarqa has been taken, but we don’t know about Irbid. We have no indication of Iraqi or Syrian movements.

Mr. Johnson: We have just received a message from a representative of Hussein that things are going well and they will have the situation under control by tomorrow morning. They have offered a cease-fire to the Fedayeen on the condition that the Fedayeen evacuate all towns and leave Jordan, and have offered to provide buses to take the Fedayeen to the frontier.²

Mr. Davies: Our latest Sit Rep reports that two Jordan tanks are now in the wadi between the two hills.³ This is significant.

Mr. Kissinger: Can they organize themselves in any other area of the country?

Gen. Cushman: Irbid is the only area in doubt. The Syrians have some troops nearby.

Mr. Kissinger: If Iraqi forces have to come from Iraq, how long would it take?

Gen. Cushman: Probably a day, particularly if there was any air activity against them. However, there are still 17,000 Iraqi troops inside Jordan. We think some of these have been attacked by the Jordanians, but we have no report from Mafraq or Irbid.

Mr. Kissinger: How about the town near the Syrian border?

Mr. Davies: Ramtha, two kilometers south of the Syrian border. The Syrians could move there, but we have no indication that they are doing so.

Mr. Saunders: We have one report that in one town the Iraqi forces moved out of the way and stood by while the Jordanian Army mopped up.

(Mr. Sisco arrived.)

Mr. Sisco: I have just talked with Rabin. He said he knew what we wanted him to say—“If Hussein can pull it off, we will announce within 24 hours that we will resume participation in the talks with Jarring.” Rabin has no more information than we do, but he thinks things look good. The quicker Hussein can finish it off the better since Nasser is temporizing. He obviously wants Hussein to win. Once he is sure of that, he will make some sort of mediating proposal. Daud⁴ has announced the Jordanian government is willing to have a cease-fire if the other side agrees, on the condition that the Palestinians get out of Jordan. He has offered buses to take them out. A representative of Hussein has told Brown that the situation is under control and Amman will be in Jordanian hands by tomorrow afternoon. Rabin also said that we no longer have to worry, because it is dark and he did not know any Arab who would fight at night. He did not have the report that Iraqi troops had stepped aside when the Jordanian Army moved in.

Mr. Kissinger: Secretary Rogers and I have talked to the President.⁵ He still has a bias for using U.S. planes rather than Israeli planes if Iraqi or Syrians move into Jordan, but he is more receptive to a counterargument than he was yesterday. I think Secretary Rogers supported our argument.

Mr. Johnson: I think so.

Mr. Sisco: He too wonders, however, why Americans are not better than Israelis. He has reached the same conclusion about the President’s bias in favor of American air.

Mr. Kissinger: It is not a question of who is better, the questions are: (1) who has the better reason for doing it—foreign intervention for the U.S. as opposed to a national security issue for the Israelis; (2) who can sustain it better there; (3) who has the deterrent force behind an initial strike? If things continue as they are, however, it may not be necessary.

On military actions, the President has ordered the Kennedy to the Mediterranean, on the understanding that the 3rd carrier would be rotated out in November if the situation quiets. He wants some beefing up of the Sixth Fleet, as well as a demonstration that we can do so.

Admiral Moorer: The Kennedy can leave in the morning.

Mr. Packard: Do we want high visibility by announcing that the Kennedy is leaving?

Mr. Sisco: I would rather not say anything. The situation on the ground is going well. Visibility will merely solidify the anti-Hussein forces.

Mr. Kissinger: We don’t have to say anything.

Mr. Johnson: The Russians will know when the ship goes through Gibraltar.

Mr. Kissinger: The President also wanted the Guam to move earlier to get visibility. Do we want visibility? Have these orders been issued or can we delay the departure?

Admiral Moorer: They have not started loading the troops yet. On the regular schedule they would be leaving day after tomorrow. They could leave tomorrow night on an accelerated schedule and we would have visibility.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s cancel the order for an accelerated departure and have them leave on the regular schedule (day after tomorrow). I will take the responsibility. If things blow up tomorrow, we can still get visibility.

Mr. Packard: This is a good example of the problems with operations of this kind. Things just don’t move quite that fast.

Admiral Moorer: We can let the Guam sail day after tomorrow with the other ships, but could give her a different speed of advance. Once she was out of sight of land, she could speed up and still get there faster.

Mr. Kissinger: That is a good solution. That achieves everything. Let’s do it.

Admiral Moorer: All right.

Mr. Kissinger: We could still speed up her departure tomorrow, if we need some psychological movement.

Admiral Moorer: I am going to Norfolk right after this meeting and I will be sure that they understand.

Mr. Kissinger: About the Kennedy the President wants it to leave tomorrow morning.

Admiral Moorer: It was originally scheduled to leave in November. We have a few civilian technicians on board that we will have to take off.

Mr. Packard: This will have visibility.

Admiral Moorer: This will give us 3 carriers in the Mediterranean until November, when one is rotated out.

Mr. Kissinger: This will be good for NATO. We have wanted an opportunity to demonstrate our ability to move in this area.

Mr. Johnson: I heartily approve of this action. It speaks for itself and requires no noise.

Mr. Kissinger: The President wants the Kennedy there when he is there.

Admiral Moorer: If we keep the 3 carriers in the Mediterranean, I suggest we hold the Kennedy around Crete.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree—the Kennedy around Crete, a second carrier closer, and the third for the President.

Mr. Johnson: If these were nuclear powered they would not need refueling.

Mr. Kissinger: Which of these are nuclear powered?

Admiral Moorer: The Kennedy is not—none of them are.

Mr. Kissinger: Has Dean Brown talked with Hussein yet?

Mr. Sisco: No; our only contact is by ham radio.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we getting the Israeli assessment?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, regularly. Our best information is coming from them.⁶

Mr. Kissinger: Are we feeding it to the ships?

Admiral Moorer: Yes, we have worked out a procedure.

Mr. Kissinger: Has MacArthur been instructed to see the Shah?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.⁷

Mr. Kissinger: We have the Defense package on the materiel that Hussein might ask for.

(This was passed out at the table)⁸

Mr. Pranger: We are getting six hour updates on all MAC aircraft. They could be ready in 48–72 hours. We could have two C–171’s reloaded in 22 hours. We would hope to have overflight permission by that time.

Mr. Kissinger: Overflight of what?

Mr. Davies: Austria, Greece.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we exploring the possibility of using the Saudi C–130’s?

Mr. Davies: Not until Nasser takes some position.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) You are moving the five C–130’s from Turkey?

Admiral Moorer: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: And we are getting the check list of arguments in favor of the use of U.S. planes?

Mr. Pranger: Yes, it is done and being cleared.

Mr. Kissinger: I want to list all the arguments for the use of American air and all the arguments for the use of Israeli air to short-cut the time needed to prepare such a paper if it should be needed. The Israelis, of course, may move whatever we decide to do. We are also agreed that if U.S. planes are used, the Israelis should not bomb concurrently. Our targets would be the Iraqi and Syrians, not the Fedayeen. We are agreed we need not go the Congress now and should not go to the UN. The press coordination is in hand and so far there have been no snafus. I suggest that this group meet again tomorrow morning.

(It was agreed to meet at 8:00 a.m., but this was subsequently changed to 8:30 a.m. at the request of Mr. Packard)⁹

Mr. Packard: I would like to suggest a small modification in our support tactics. We could probably use two C–5’s for the supply mission.

Mr. Kissinger: We do not have to decide now whether to move openly or covertly on transportation for the material. We can face this when it happens.

Mr. Packard: We have the new aircraft and it would be a nice demonstration of their capabilities.

Mr. Pranger: They could land at H–5.

Admiral Moorer: To review the ship movements:

… The Guam will leave on schedule but will speed up once it is out of sight of land. There will be no public announcement since it was supposed to leave anyhow for the NATO exercise.

… The Kennedy will leave tomorrow morning after the discharge of the civilian technicians; we can think about a public announcement when it goes through Gibraltar.

Mr. Johnson: Are these civilian technicians going to come back and talk about having been booted off the ship?

Admiral Moorer: It is possible. There are 8 or 10 of them, all with security clearances.

Mr. Johnson: Why don’t we just tell them to keep quiet?

Mr. Kissinger: When the ship goes through Gibraltar, we can make a straight-faced announcement—part of normal rotation, etc.

Mr. Packard: Let’s wait and see on the announcement.

Mr. Kissinger: When will it get to Gibraltar?

Admiral Moorer: In about a week.

Mr. Kissinger: We may want to play it up or play it down at that time. We don’t have to explain the operations of our carriers in the Atlantic.

Admiral Moorer: We don’t have to explain our carrier operations anywhere.

Mr. Kissinger: We can discuss it again as it nears Gibraltar. It will be in the Mediterranean when the President gets there?¹⁰

Admiral Moorer: Yes, it will.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Telegram 4887 from Amman, September 17, 1824Z. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)
3. Apparently a reference to Intelligence Memorandum SC No. 02437/70, September 17, 1200 EDT. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–T00830A, Box 8)
4. Brigadier General Mohammed Daud of the Jordanian Arab Army. On September 16, King Hussein declared martial law and appointed Daud to lead a cabinet comprised of army officers.
5. See Document 256. Rogers also talked to Nixon from 8:40 to 8:50 a.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No other record of the conversation has been found.
6. According to Intelligence Memorandum OCI No. 0099/70, September 17, Iraqi forces in Jordan were making “administrative and logistical preparation for movement,” but there was no indication of any intervention in the fighting between the JAA and the fedayeen. (Ibid., NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–077, Washington Special Action Group Meetings, WSAG Meeting Middle East)
7. See Document 259.
8. Not attached and not found.
9. See Document 264.
10. Nixon arrived in Rome on September 27. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)