Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

254. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 17, 1970, 7:32–8:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State—
• U. Alexis Johnson
• Joseph P. Sisco
• Rodger Davies
• Defense—
• David M. Packard
• G. Warren Nutter
• Robert Pranger
• JCS—
• Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
• General John Vogt
• General Melvin Zais
• CIA—
• Richard Helms
• NSC Staff—
• Harold Saunders
• Gen. Alexander Haig
• Col. Richard Kennedy
• Adm. R.C. Robinson
• Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed:

1. to wait to see how the situation develops and to take no special measures with the Egyptians or the Russians at the present time;

2. CIA will issue its Sit Reps every four hours;

3. to amend Ambassador Brown’s instructions to permit him to tell Hussein that, now that action has started, we would be sympathetic to a request for materiel assistance;²

4. to instruct our Chargé to get an Israeli assessment of the situation but not to ask what they intend to do;³

5. to instruct Ambassador MacArthur to see the Shah and to say that the President has asked him to give the Shah our thinking on the situation and get the benefit of his;⁴

6. to get the results of the Israeli reconnaissance flights and feed the information to the carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean;

7. Defense will prepare a package on what materiel Hussein might ask for;

8. Defense will identify planes for air shipment of materiel to Jordan;

9. we would not approach the Turks for overflight or base rights unless Egypt takes a public position in support of Hussein;

10. to explore the possibility of using Saudi Arabian C–130s for an Arab airlift of US materiel assistance from Iran;

11. to remove 5 of the 7 C–130s from Incirlik and position them in Europe or wherever seems best, and to increase the number of C–130’s in Europe, a few at a time;

12. Defense will provide the best arguments for the use of US air in Jordan, for inclusion in the package to the President;

13. if US air operations begin in Jordan, we should insist that the Israelis stop any bombing in the country;

14. we must make it clear that any US air activity in Jordan is directed against the Iraqis and Syrians, not the Fedayeen;

15. it is too early to brief the Congress;

16. we should not go to the UN at present;

17. State will coordinate the press handling.

Mr. Helms: I have distributed a Sit Rep as of 6:00 a.m. with an addendum.⁵ To summarize, the Jordanian Army has moved into Amman. There is some question as to who triggered the action. They have started off well, but the situation is unclear and it is difficult to know what one can do at the present time. The situation is still at issue.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there fighting anywhere else?

Mr. Helms: No—only in Amman and in little towns on the fringes of Amman. There is some lack of clarity as to what the Iraqis are up to. [11/2 lines not declassified]

Admiral Moorer: The Iraqi troops in the area are the worst they have. Can Iran help?

Mr. Davies: (using map) The Jordanian Army, with armor, is moving from three directions and is expanding its perimeter. They have secured a sizeable area of the city, including the major hotel section. The crunch will come when they secure the heights and begin moving into the heavily populated areas. These areas include a large refugee camp where the hostages might be.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we assume the Jordanians will continue to move?

Mr. Davies: Yes. We understand the Jordanian Government is willing to take heavy losses and will not be particularly concerned over the lives of Westerners. There is some fighting at Zarqa, which is 15 miles out, and at Salt. This involves the road to the airport. There are Iraqi troops in Zarqa and [less than 1 line not declassified] Jordanian tanks have entered some Iraqi-held areas. There are also some Iraqi troops in Irbid and Mafraq. Irbid is in the hands of the Palestinians. The King is at Hummar some 12 kilometers outside Amman.

Dr. Kissinger: If the King secures Amman, will this break the back of the Fedayeen for the time being?

Mr. Davies: If the leaders escape, Habbash will probably go to Iraq and Arafat to Syria. The Jordanian Army will have ringed the city, however, and their chances of escape are small.

Mr. Helms: They have the capability to keep going for some time in house-to-house fighting in those narrow streets. I have no idea how long, but it would not be over in a day.

Admiral Moorer: We would have to expect sporadic fighting for some time; this is guerrilla strategy—mining roads, a grenade now and then.

Mr. Johnson: The Jordanian Army has still not come to grips with the main elements of the Fedayeen.

Mr. Packard: It will take a while for the situation to shape up.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we agreed that victory for Hussein is essential from our point of view?

All agreed emphatically.

Mr. Johnson: Hussein hasn’t asked us for anything yet.

Mr. Sisco: We have had no communication from Hussein since the action began. We have instructed our people to conduct a hand-holding operation—to be sympathetic. This group should make a decision as to whether we should take any initiative with Hussein.

Dr. Kissinger: Have we any indication of Israeli moves?

Admiral Moorer: They have sent over 8 recce flights.

Mr. Helms: They are watching the situation.

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sisco: The fact of Israel recce will not be lost on the Iraqis. This is a good low-level signal.

Mr. Davies: [less than 1 line not declassified] Nasser is willing to support Hussein. This will have some influence in Damascus.

Mr. Kissinger: What about the diplomatic side?

Mr. Sisco: I agree with Mr. Helms’ fundamental assessment. We have to wait to see how the situation evolves. We should take no special initiative with Israel now. There is no need for special measures with the Russians with regard to Iraq and Syria at present. I see no diplomatic steps at the moment, although this may change in the next few hours.

Dr. Kissinger: I called John Freeman at the President’s request last night to give him what information we had.

Mr. Sisco: That was highly desirable. You recall that in the earlier situation Denis Greenhill had called the President at the Prime Minister’s request with some questions.⁶ The UK was obviously suspicious of collusion.

Mr. Johnson: Would it be useful to have Zurhellen talk to the Israelis to get their assessment of the situation?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but in a very careful way. He could say we are watching the situation carefully and ask for their assessment.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but don’t ask what they intend to do. That is a good idea to get their assessment. State should instruct Zurhellen to do so.

Mr. Helms: The JIC met yesterday and I’m sure you’ll have no trouble getting an assessment from them.

Mr. Sisco: We are in a hand-holding position with Hussein. Should we take the initiative and offer help? I think we should wait. He has enough, and there are various things in the pipeline.

Dr. Kissinger: We might look at Brown’s instructions. Should we let Brown say that, now that action has started, we would be sympathetic to a request for material assistance?

Mr. Packard: Yes; we should give Hussein some indication of moral support.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s amend Brown’s instructions accordingly.

Mr. Pranger: We will know this morning how much ammunition they have.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Pranger) Can Defense prepare a package on what Hussein might ask for?

Mr. Pranger: Yes, we have several options with various packages already.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you do it by early afternoon? Would we be able to move fast? (to Packard) Could we get stand-by planes for material shipments to Jordan, or at least locate planes or ear-mark them?

Col. Kennedy: What about the psychological effect of using US aircraft?

Dr. Kissinger: Good point. Let’s identify our choices. [1/2 line not declassified]

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Pranger: [1 line not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger: (to Admiral Moorer) What is our military situation?

Admiral Moorer: I spoke to General Goodpaster this morning. His assumptions are the same as ours: that we should maintain maximum readiness without any overt, alerting action. He understands this. Our forces are in the same state of readiness as they were earlier. The carrier Saratoga will join the Independence this afternoon south of Cyprus. It can commence air operations by noon if necessary. They will be accompanied by a cruiser and 12 destroyers.

Dr. Kissinger: How about the third carrier?

Admiral Moorer: There is no 3rd carrier. The Kennedy could get there in 9 days.

Dr. Kissinger: I thought a CVA was on its way to replace one of the carriers now there.

Admiral Moorer: No. The fleet south of Cyprus will soon be in launching position. In addition, there is an amphibious Task Force with one battalion embarked, but no helicopters, south of Crete which could reach the coast within 36 hours. Also, the Fleet flagship is getting underway from Gaeta and will join the force. That means the entire 6th Fleet will be in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Johnson: This will surface publicly. We can say it is a normal precautionary measure.

Admiral Moorer: The Saratoga was already scheduled to operate in this general area.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we should say as little as possible about military moves.

Admiral Moorer: We can say it is a routine training operation. The Soviets have a guided missile carrier, a guided missile frigate, two guided missile destroyers and an old-style heavy cruiser in the general area.

Dr. Kissinger: How many sorties does this give us?

Admiral Moorer: We have a capability of 200 strike sorties (100 per ship) on a sustained effort. We could surge to a higher level.

Mr. Packard: It would be a highly sensitive question as to who shoots first.

Dr. Kissinger: I doubt that the Russians will sink any US ships.

Admiral Moorer: Also, the Guam and her Task Group has departed Norfolk to participate in an exercise in the Mediterranean. They will pick up their load of Marines at Camp LeJeune and sail in the next day or two. They have 15 helicopters, and were planning to go the area.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we get them there faster?

Admiral Moorer: They could probably sail tomorrow night—12 hours earlier then scheduled.

Dr. Kissinger: Tell them to sail as soon as possible.

(Dr. Kissinger left the room)⁷

Admiral Moorer: If we tell the Guam to sail earlier this will undoubtedly be a news item. I also want to talk about target identification. We need more information on the situation to give our pilots their targets. We should find out from the Israelis what they have learned from their recce.

Mr. Packard: We can’t send any recce over.

Admiral Moorer: We will have to send recce in when we send our planes in.

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified]

Admiral Moorer: (to Mr. Helms) Also, can you issue your Sit Reps every four hours instead of every six hours?

Mr. Helms: All right.

Admiral Moorer: The British have two frigates, a mine sweeper and a tanker in the vicinity of Malta. They would not be too much help but they could symbolically provide a joint force.

Mr. Johnson: And we have the U–2s there.

Mr. Helms: They could fly over in no time.

General Vogt: You don’t get much tactical intelligence from U–2s.

Mr. Helms: They could sort out where the Iraqi and Syrian units are.

Admiral Moorer: We already know that. You can’t identify Jordanian or Iraqi tanks from the air.

Also, in any military operation, we would have to think of overflight rights and bases. If we could stage out of Turkey, it would facilitate operations by letting us move in closer and cut down our response time. If we fly in direct from Europe to Jordan, we would have to overfly Austria and Israel. The longest way, overflying Iran and Saudi Arabia, would require refueling and would take time.

Mr. Johnson: (to Mr. Davies) Have we excluded the possibility of over-flying France? Is Austria likely to be sticky?

Mr. Davies: If Egypt should support Hussein, the Italians and French might cooperate. We could also possibly get rights in Greece and Turkey if Hussein appeals to them.

Admiral Moorer: Incirlik and Cyprus would be the best, with Athens as a fall-back.

Mr. Davies: I will see what Radio Cairo is saying about the action.

Mr. Pranger: Would the Turks let us use Incirlik for arms shipment?

Mr. Davies: There would be a real chance if Nasser supports Hussein. I think it is time now to begin to go to governments to see how our speculation as to their attitude stands up.

Mr. Packard: How about Cyprus for arms shipments.

Mr. Pranger: We would prefer Incirlik.

Mr. Davies: It might also be possible to gear up the Saudi Arabian C–130s and have them pick up our shipments from Iran in an Arab airlift.

Mr. Pranger: We could at least ask about Turkish airspace.

Mr. Davies: I recommend we go to the Turks.

Mr. Pranger: On both airspace and Incirlik.

Mr. Johnson: I agree (to Mr. Davies) let’s do it.

Admiral Moorer: We can put it on the basis of an action to save Hussein, at his request. Let’s be sure to ask our Embassy in Amman to keep us currently informed.

Mr. Pranger: We might get in touch with the Jordanian Army and see if we could use H–5 (an airfield) to land shipments.

(Dr. Kissinger returned)

Admiral Moorer: (to Dr. Kissinger) I think it is necessary to get as much information as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: Have we identified all the readiness measures we can take? What about the 82nd Airborne. Can we do anything to speed their readiness?

Admiral Moorer: Not without being obvious.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Johnson) Do you agree?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: So do I.

Mr. Packard: (to Dr. Kissinger) While you were gone we discussed the desirability of moving up the Guam sailing 12 hours and decided it was not worth the publicity it would bring.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Admiral Moorer: I have also recommended to Mr. Helms that we tighten up the Sit Rep timing and that the Embassy give us a status report on the airport.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s pull the readiness situation together for the President. Is there anything we can do with the 82nd Airborne to cut down their alert time?

Admiral Moorer: The officers at Fort Bragg are doing everything they can do without tipping their hand. They have formed a staff group which is watching the situation and have prepared a check-list. It would be 22 hours before they are flying and 18 hours flight time.

Dr. Kissinger: And we could get the German brigade in during this 40 hours.

Admiral Moorer: Yes, the first part. We should begin to explore with the Turks and others the availability of overflight rights and bases. We can get a reading from the Egyptians.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s go easy with the Egyptians.

Mr. Johnson: Only on what they are saying publicly.

Mr. Pranger: Would you go to the Turks on rights for intervention as well as for supply?

Mr. Johnson: No, only on supply.

Dr. Kissinger: Why go to the Turks on anything? Why not Cyprus? I am leery about the Turks.

Admiral Moorer: Turkey would be easiest, with Greece next.

Dr. Kissinger: Wouldn’t it be politically less dangerous in Greece or Cyprus than in Turkey?

Mr. Davies: If Egypt supports Hussein, our problems with our allies will be reduced.

Dr. Kissinger: If that happens, then we can go to the Turks. But only if Egypt takes a public position in support of Hussein. We should not go to the Turks unless Egypt publicly supports Hussein. Cyprus and Greece could be alternatives.

Mr. Davies: It if is thought inadvisable to use US aircraft, we might get the Saudis to use their C–130s for an Arab airlift from Iran.

Dr. Kissinger: Good idea. Let’s explore it.

Mr. Pranger: This would still require the use of Turkish airspace.

Adm. Moorer: It would also be helpful to move a few more C–130s into Europe, a few at a time.

Mr. Johnson: That would be no problem. You have moved some out of Incirlik, haven’t you?

Adm. Moorer: There are still 7 in Incirlik. We didn’t take any out since it was thought this might indicate a pull-back. If we took five of these back to Germany it would facilitate any evacuation.

Dr. Kissinger: We didn’t want to indicate any lessening of our posture as long as the hostages were there. We can take them out now that our general posture is being strengthened. Keep two there and take the other five out.

Adm. Moorer: We will put those five in the best position for the purpose.

Dr. Kissinger: How quickly can the carrier planes begin to operate?

Adm. Moorer: After the execute, in 2 or 21/2 hours. The problem is to get the targets.

Mr. Packard: We may have to send in recce to get the targets.

Mr. Johnson: [1 line not declassified]

Adm. Moore: And I will feed it to the ships.

Mr. Packard: Can’t we get some information from the Jordanians?

Adm. Moorer: It depends on where the targets are.

Mr. Johnson: Do we have the technical capability for direct communication between the carriers and the Jordanians and the aircraft and the Jordanians?

Adm. Moorer: We have the technical capability but no people on the ground.

Dr. Kissinger: To return to the problem of US vs. Israel air operations and our capabilities. Assuming the Iraqis move, I believe all agree that one day’s operation may not do it. What are we getting into once we start bombing?

Adm. Moorer: This depends on the success of the Jordanian Army in pushing back the Iraqis.

Mr. Packard: That’s stretching out interdiction strategy a long way.

Mr. Pranger: Israel is already striking Fedayeen targets.

Dr. Kissinger: To recap, on a pure readiness basis, we can be ready in 21/2 hours. Our shortage is intelligence. We can get the recce information from the Israelis and feed it to the ships. But we have to think in terms of continued operations.

Adm. Moorer: The carriers can stay several days.

Dr. Kissinger: Once we start bombing, won’t we be in a situation of several days’ duration?

Adm. Moorer: I think the Jordanians can handle the Iraqis with air assistance from either the US or Israel—possibly without it. I think we should watch the situation develop since we can act quickly. The duration of any action is tied to the success of the Jordanian Army in disposing of the Iraqis.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we in good shape to watch Iraqi movements?

General Vogt: The Israelis are doing a good job of this.

Dr. Kissinger: The question won’t arise for several hours, will it?

Adm. Moorer: No, it will be dark soon.

General Vogt: These 19,000 Iraqi troops are a ragged bunch.

Adm. Moorer: They are the worst of the Iraqi forces. Many of the officers were sent there as a form of political exile.

Dr. Kissinger: Would there be a possibility of sending them on suicide missions?

General Vogt: I don’t think they will be very responsive to orders.

Mr. Packard: Where are the Saladin?

General Vogt: Around Zarqa.

Dr. Kissinger: Are the Syrians any good?

General Vogt: They’re not much better.

Mr. Helms: I have a report on the Cairo radio. They have made no statements on the Egyptian position. They are just saying that the US has said it has no plans to intervene.

Dr. Kissinger: Is it helpful for them to say that?

Mr. Helms: I think so.

Dr. Kissinger: What about diplomatic actions? Are we agreed we should not approach any other capital now, except possibly for Iran? We should not go to Cairo?

Mr. Sisco: No.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. How about Moscow?

Mr. Sisco: It is premature.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. I think we have said too much to the Russians recently. Let them come to us.

Mr. Sisco: The Russians did intervene last week by talking to the Iraqis in a generally cautionary way over the hostage situation. As a result the Iraqis pulled back a little. The Russians will take a look at the situation on the ground and will probably be in to see us today and will ask us to restrain the Israelis.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. What will our posture be?

Mr. Sisco: We should say “thank you very much; we will look at the situation.” I have given them no satisfaction in our recent talks. We must handle it very carefully, though, so they can’t accuse us of collusion. We should take the line that we have no interest in broadening the conflict. The presence of Iraqi and Syrian forces in Jordan is the problem. If Iraq should intervene, this would be the complicating factor.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s not nail ourselves to a position that we will not intervene. Don’t preclude US intervention.

General Vogt: The Soviet Military Attaché in Amman has been talking about a possible US–UK–Israel intervention.

Mr. Helms: This is the kind of thing they invent and float all the time.

Dr. Kissinger: How about Iran?

Mr. Sisco: If we see that the Iraqis are about to move, we might talk to the Iranians. We should be very careful though. There are ways in which they could help lift the pressure, but if it is done at the behest of the US, it takes on the aspect of a US strategy rather than a move by Hussein. We should take the greatest possible care in any approach.

Dr. Kissinger: How would anyone know it was done at US behest? Also, wouldn’t everyone claim that it was done at US behest, whether it was true or not?

Mr. Sisco: Iran has no interest in giving the impression that the US is running the show. We would have the Shah’s cooperation on this. Our Ambassador could go in on the basis of getting his assessment of the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: We could inform the Shah of our assessment and ask him for his. The Shah values his relationship with the President. This would also give us a basis for going back to him if we should need to.

Mr. Helms and Mr. Packard: I agree.

Mr. Saunders: Or we might ask Hussein to approach him.

Dr. Kissinger: Hussein has his hands full. MacArthur could say the President has asked him to give the Shah our thinking and get the benefit of his.

Mr. Sisco: My instinct tells me this is a few hours too early for that.

Mr. Helms: By the time our Ambassador has been instructed and he has been given the appointment, it may be time.

Dr. Kissinger: It is late afternoon. He wouldn’t see him until tomorrow.

Mr. Sisco: The Shah is shrewd enough to see what we are doing.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s exactly it. How about the United Nations?

Mr. Johnson: Forget it!

Mr. Sisco: If there should be substantial Iraqi or Syrian involvement we should preempt a possible move into the UN.

Dr. Kissinger: But no one will drag us into the UN. Should we talk to Congress?

Mr. Helms: I think Rodger Davies’ appearance yesterday was enough for the time.

Mr. Davies: Senator Fulbright⁸ thought the Administration was doing the right thing. The Committee was badly split. Three Senators were very skeptical of the Soviet attitude—thought we were being led down the garden path. We took the position that, since the Soviets had taken the public attitude they had, we had to test their sincerity.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it’s too early to brief the Congress. We’re not really doing anything.

Mr. Helms: We’re not doing anything and we don’t know enough.

Dr. Kissinger: (to General Haig) Would you write down the readiness measures so I can take them to the President?

Can we reassess the relative preference for use of Israeli as against US air? I should tell you that the President leans toward use of US rather than Israeli air, although he hasn’t precluded further discussion. I was persuaded in the other direction by our discussion the other day, but we should take another look at it in the light of the President’s feeling. I have listed the pro-US and pro-Israel arguments,⁹ although we may not have a choice. Are we all agreed that if it appears Hussein is going under, an Israeli move is highly probable? Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Sisco: An Israeli movement in the air is highly probable. What is their situation on the ground to deal with the Iraqis on the ground?

Mr. Helms: Israel can take them on any day. They can mobilize in 24 hours.

Mr. Sisco: Would they have to augment their present dispositions?

Mr. Helms: It depends on whether they think Egypt would take some move against them.

General Vogt: They wouldn’t have to fight their way in. There is no Fedayeen opposition between the Israeli border and Amman. They have armored units already there that they could send in.

Mr. Helms: They would first undertake such a massive aerial bombing of the Iraqi troops that there wouldn’t be much left when the tanks arrived. [11/2 lines not declassified]

Dr. Kissinger: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Helms: [1 line not declassified]

Mr. Sisco: I am seeing Yariv today.

Mr. Helms: We’ll hit them both.

Adm. Moorer: It is important that we don’t use both US and Israeli air. If the President should decide to use US air, we shouldn’t also use Israeli air.

Dr. Kissinger: If US aircraft go in and, for some reason, can’t hack it in a sustained operation, and the Israelis come in, we are then in maximum danger of a charge of collusion.

Mr. Packard: And it would make the US look silly.

Dr. Kissinger: One of the arguments for using US air is that maybe the time has come to show US strength in the area, even in the context of our peace initiative. A US show of force might even fuel the peace initiative when things settle down. On the other hand, Israeli involvement has the danger of a reopening of general hostilities and the end of the cease-fire.

Mr. Sisco: Any Israeli show of force or a successful Israeli operation will be played as a US show of force, though not to the same degree.

Dr. Kissinger: The counter-argument is that once US forces intervene in support of Hussein and succeed, the King becomes a Western lackey and his long-term position will be weakened. An Israeli move would be more easily understood.

Mr. Sisco: An Israeli move would be taken as being in the Israeli national interest—not just as support of Hussein.

Dr. Kissinger: If a US effort should fail and the Israelis would have to bail us out, this would be a bitter pill.

Mr. Pranger: If the President decided to use US air, we could sustain the operation from the carriers. We wouldn’t have to stop after 200 strikes.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand we could sustain the 200 sorties for a fairly indefinite period, but we must disabuse people of the idea that one strike would do it. The US would be bombing in Jordan for some period.

Adm. Moorer: We should bomb until we get a satisfactory result.

Mr. Helms: We should make it clear that we are striking against the Iraqis or the Syrians, not against the Fedayeen.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Pranger) If you favor the use of US air, give me your arguments.

Mr. Pranger: I don’t want the US to appear to be a paper tiger.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Packard and Mr. Pranger) Give me your strongest arguments for the use of US air. I promise they will go to the President.

Mr. Helms: Let me repeat: if the US intervenes, we must make it crystal clear that it is against Iraq and Syria, not the Fedayeen. The Fedayeen are the darlings of the Arab world. If we put ourselves in the position of defending Hussein against the Fedayeen, that would tear it.

Dr. Kissinger: That is another argument for using the Israelis. They are in a better position to bomb the Fedayeen than we are. I would be extremely uncomfortable if the US and Israel were both bombing in Jordan simultaneously. If we go in, we must insist that Israel stop its bombing. We can’t have a joint military operation with the Israelis.

All agreed.

Mr. Helms: We would lose the peace initiative.

Mr. Packard: I think the arguments lean strongly against the US going in.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us meet again at 3:00 p.m. today.¹⁰ The President is in Chicago, and I have recommended that he not come back until there is need for a decision.

All agreed.

Dr. Kissinger: On press guidance, Ziegler is on the road with the President. (to Mr. Johnson) Could you take the lead to see that we are all singing the same tune and that no one is talking?

Mr. Sisco: Bob McCloskey should be the only one saying anything. We will brief him.

Mr. Johnson: McCloskey will be in touch with Ziegler.

Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely. Should we say that we have had this meeting?

Mr. Helms: Yes, that is desirable. We are watching the situation but are not discussing US intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: Agreed. I understand Joe (Sisco) has had some exchange with the British on tactics for handling the noon meeting on the hostages, and we can discuss this later.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–114, Washington Special Actions Group, WSAG Minutes (Originals) 1969 and 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. Transmitted in telegram 152501 to Amman, September 17, 1458Z. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V)
3. Transmitted in telegram 152502 to Tel Aviv, September 17, 1459Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN)
4. See Document 259.
5. Not found.
6. See Document 249.
7. Kissinger took a telephone call from Greenhill. See Document 255.
8. Senator J. William Fulbright (D–AR), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
9. See Document 247.
10. See Document 260.