Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

721. Memorandum from Edwin M. Martin to Rusk, December 2¹

December 2, 1963

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with the President on Cuba

I am attaching a paper [illegible in the original] on which you may wish to [illegible in the original] Cuba with the President [illegible in the original] an expanded version of the paper [illegible in the original].

I understand that, [illegible in the original] approved the paper, you wish it to [illegible in the original] participants in the [illegible in the original]; Mr. McCone; Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bundy.

Attachment

Talking Points for Meeting with the President

CUBATALKING POINTS

I. The Ultimate U.S Objections

The replacement of the present government by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

II. Optimum Situation to [illegible in the original]

By exerting maximum pressure by all means available to the U.S. Government, short of military force, to bring about a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will predispose elements in the military and other power corners of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba.

III. Current Course of Action

An integrated, [illegible in the original] mutually dependent program [illegible in the original]:

A. [illegible in the original]

1. [illegible in the original] and sources of supplies.

2. Reduction of [illegible in the original].

3. Reduction of [illegible in the original] sources of Soviet [illegible in the original] air [illegible in the original] in Cuba.

4. Pressure, as opportunity offers, to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations or to prevent establishment of diplomatic relations.

5. Efforts (diplomatic, propaganda, covert) to undermine Castro [illegible in the original] and to [illegible in the original] Cuban attempts to [illegible in the original].

B. Defense [illegible in the original]

1. Multilateral:

Through [illegible in the original]

Through special arrangements with Central American countries and Panama

2. Bilateral:

[illegible in the original] security [illegible in the original] country

3. Unilateral:

A. [illegible in the original]

B. [illegible in the original]

C. Reduction [illegible in the original] Military [illegible in the original]

D. [illegible in the original]

E. Covert [illegible in the original]

1. Exploitation and [illegible in the original] of disaffection in the Cuban military [illegible in the original] power centers

2. General [illegible in the original]

a) [illegible in the original]

b) [illegible in the original] outside Cuban territorial limits

c) [illegible in the original]

d) [illegible in the original]

3. Support of [illegible in the original] groups in sabotage [illegible in the original] in Cuba

IV. Balance [illegible in the original]

A. General [illegible in the original]

Our present [illegible in the original] now, or [illegible in the original] in Castro’s demands [illegible in the original] with Cuban country [illegible in the original] of communist [illegible in the original] evidence of [illegible in the original] insignificant [illegible in the original]. Dissatisfaction of [illegible in the original] and doubts of [illegible in the original] increases area, [illegible in the original] evidences of [illegible in the original] had not a [illegible in the original] animated opposition. Should be emphasized, he said, that Castro still retains firm control and regime not now in danger of collapse or overthrow. Nevertheless, Castro’s [illegible in the original].

B. Isolation [illegible in the original]

The value of free-world trade with Cuba in 1968 will probably be [illegible in the original] which $[illegible in the original] million), [illegible in the original] billion figure for [illegible in the original]. Castro [illegible in the original] effort to increase trade with the free world and has made headway with Spain and Japan.

Free-world shipping in 1968 is [illegible in the original] at 30–40 percent of 1962 levels. [illegible in the original] for further reductions in free-world shipping in 1968 is [illegible in the original].

Scheduled free-world shipping to and from Cuba has been [illegible in the original] Pressures [illegible in the original].

Castro’s [illegible in the original] leader has been [illegible in the original].

C. Defense [illegible in the original]

Movement of [illegible in the original] 50 percent.

Increased [illegible in the original] and extent of [illegible in the original].

Gradual [illegible in the original] American Communists [illegible in the original] inspired subversion.

On the other hand, Castro is trying to step up subversive activities in [illegible in the original].

D. Soviet Military [illegible in the original]

Approximately 5,000–7,000 Soviet military personnel remain, with [illegible in the original].

Most of Soviets are [illegible in the original].

By mid-64, Cubans will probably be assigned to operate all remaining [illegible in the original] weapons, including the SAM’s.

E. Collection of [illegible in the original]

F. Covert [illegible in the original]

Although covert projects have not had sufficient time to demonstrate [illegible in the original] to exploit internal [illegible in the original] internal opposition [illegible in the original] positive on balance.

On other hand, [illegible in the original] and agents.

Guerilla activities [illegible in the original] and isolated.

Preparations by and [illegible in the original] continue for supply and [illegible in the original].

V. Possible Cuban Government Actions

A. General

Continuation and, [illegible in the original] political costs, progressive [illegible in the original] of current courses of action.

B. Specific Additional [illegible in the original] to Isolation

1. Amendment of [illegible in the original] 320 to permit arrangement with Mavreleen

C. Specific [illegible in the original] to Active [illegible in the original]

1. Seek to induce [illegible in the original] to join with us and [illegible in the original] in a system of cooperative air and sea surveillance.

D. Possibilities [illegible in the original] Action [illegible in the original] Rio Treaty on [illegible in the original]

1. General

Any decision to [illegible in the original] involves risk of [illegible in the original] Hemisphere on the [illegible in the original] be accessed [illegible in the original].

2. Measures which [illegible in the original] Short of the [illegible in the original].

a) breach in [illegible in the original]

b) partial or complete [illegible in the original] relations

c) partial or [illegible in the original]

d) Provision for cooperative surveillance by interested [illegible in the original] clandestine [illegible in the original] of arms and men.

3. [illegible in the original] involved in [illegible in the original] crisis:

a) Diplomatic [illegible in the original] evidence of [illegible in the original] subversive [illegible in the original] Latin America. [illegible in the original] and risk in [illegible in the original] majority; loss of possibly useful political [illegible in the original] into Cuba; loss of [illegible in the original].

b) Economic [illegible in the original] already has this [illegible in the original] resolution; [illegible in the original] until a [illegible in the original] of [illegible in the original].

c) Break in [illegible in the original] ability to [illegible in the original] action [illegible in the original] improving [illegible in the original] negative effect on Cuban [illegible in the original] morale (closing of [illegible in the original]); probable need to provide alternate means of concerns for diplomatic corps in Habana. (Note: More drastic step of stick in this [illegible in the original] held in reserve).

d) Cooperative surveillance by [illegible in the original]:

Advantage: [illegible in the original] Punta del [illegible in the original] and [illegible in the original] effectiveness of anti-sub[illegible in the original] effect [illegible in the original]; pressure directly related to [illegible in the original].

Disadvantage: [illegible in the original] to many governments, especially Venezuela and Colombia, of [illegible in the original]; of [illegible in the original] on their [illegible in the original] would fall on U.S.

1. Transmits talking points for Rusk’s December 2 meeting with President Johnson on Cuba. Top Secret. 9 pp. DOS, S/S Files; Lot 66 D 501, Cuba.