718. Memorandum for the record, November 141
SUBJECT
- Minutes of the Meeting to Review The Cuban Program
PRESENT
- The President
- Secretary of State Rusk
- Secretary of Defense McNamara
- Attorney General Kennedy
- Director of Central Intelligence McCone
- Mr. Roswell Gilpatric
- Mr. Cyrus Vance
- Mr. McGeorge Bundy
- General Maxwell Taylor
- Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
- Mr. Richard Helms
- Mr. Desmond FitzGerald
- Mr. Bruce B. Cheever
- Mr. Theodore Shackley
- Mr. Paul Eckel
The meeting convened in the Cabinet Room of the White House at 1040 on 12 November 1963.
1. The Director of Central Intelligence opened the meeting with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba. He highlighted the following points:
a. Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening.
b. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro with some evidences of dissension and dissidents which are being exploited by CIA.
c. The internal security forces and apparatus are effective and show evidence of increasing efficiency.
[Facsimile Page 2]d. The economy is bad and is deteriorating, causing increasing hardships to the civilian population. This is due to mismanagement, economic sanctions, and Flora.
e. The Soviets are continuing a gradual withdrawal. No organized Soviet units appear in Cuba although they apparently provide principal manning for the SAMs. There are recent evidences of considerable [Typeset Page 1834] rotation with between 1,000 and 2,000 new arrivals, but in balance there is a decrease.
f. Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet equipment including the SAMs. It is not clear whether the SAMs will be turned over to full Cuban control; however, it is clear the Cubans will supply the majority of the operating personnel.
g. The only equipment which has been withdrawn has been the advanced C-band radar for the SAMs and certain communication equipment. No military equipment has been withdrawn. There have been some recent new arrivals of military equipment, particularly between 25 and 50 tanks.
2. Mr. McCone then stated that the program which had been followed for the last several months, having been approved about the first of June, was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and not a number of independent actions.
3. Mr. FitzGerald presented a status report of the six-point integrated program against Cuba. Following is a summary of his presentation.
a. Covert collection of intelligence for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements.
This element of the program is progressing satisfactorily. At the present time we have 74 singleton agents reporting directly to us. In addition there are 79 identified sub-agents who are part of organized nets. All of these agents and sub-agents legally reside in Cuba. There is one Black (illegal) team successfully operating in the [Facsimile Page 3] Pinar del Rio area. It has 55 sub-agents in its net. The geographical distribution of agents throughout Cuba has continued to improve. In addition to the above resident agents, we have [1½ lines not declassified]. The Cuban counterintelligence efforts have intensified during the past months. Our losses have increased. This is particularly true with regard to the Black teams. The Cuban control system and ration system make the team’s continued existence more and more precarious. We have had to withdraw some teams and we have lost others. In view of this experience we expect to reduce the number of “Black-team” infiltration operations, but to continue to press forward with all other types of intelligence operations.
b. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance.
The program includes both mailing and radio operations. Approximately 30,000–40,000 pieces of propaganda are mailed into Cuba every month. There are 32 hours daily of radio programs using seven different radio stations. Radio America on Swan Island broadcasts 13 hours daily. Separate radio programs are keyed to all significant target groups within Cuba, i.e., students, teachers, labor, military leaders, etc. We [Typeset Page 1835] believe the propaganda effort aimed to stimulate simple sabotage has, when combined with the other parts of the integrated over-all program, stimulated sabotage and resistance. We have intelligence reports citing 109 instances of sabotage since 1 April 1963. These include such things as derailing locomotives, destroying high-tension poles, burning trucks and factories. Many have been similar to ideas included in our broadcasts and mailing. There appears to have been a slight upturn in instances of sabotage in recent weeks.
c. Economic denial actions on an increased basis.
This is a Government-wide program, one which has probably had a greater impact on Cuba than any of the others. A great deal has been learned regarding Cuban sources of supply. Some we have successfully closed down. The Cuban [Facsimile Page 4] merchant fleet is so badly managed that we are almost better off by leaving it alone. [text not declassified] The economic denial program should be strengthened wherever possible.
d. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and power centers.
On this key part of the over-all program slow but encouraging progress is being made. Jointly with DIA we have just completed detailed biographic studies of 150 key military personnel. Further analysis of these indicate 45 are of particular interest to us and will warrant further close attention. We currently are in direct contact with three “Heroes of the Revolution” who are either in Cuba or who will soon return there. One basic problem is that individual military figures will talk with us but will not conspire with their fellow officers for fear of compromise. This must ultimately be overcome. The leaders with whom we are in touch have emphasized the need to be reassured that, should they overthrow Castro, they will not be considered in the same light as Castro himself by the U.S. In summary, we have made some progress but we have a long way to go before the ultimate goal can be attained. The effort must be continued and where possible expanded.
e. General sabotage and harassment.
Since the approval of the program four successful externally mounted sabotage operations have been mounted (Santa Lucia—Casilda—La Isabela—Cayo Guin). Three additional were ready to go, but at the last minute were recalled. A chart was shown identifying the proposed targets through January 1964. This included the Matanzas Electric Plant and the Santiago de Cuba Refinery. It was pointed out that with but few exceptions the economic results of any single sabotage operation were only significant for the cumulative economic effect plus the psychological effect in stimulating internal sabotage and resistance. Mention was again made of the [Facsimile Page 5] 109 internal sabotage acts previously cited. The favorable impact of the successful external raids on the Cuban people was noted. This has an important bearing on the ultimate [Typeset Page 1836] willingness of key military personnel to participate in a conspiracy and of other persons to engage in simple sabotage. [text not declassified] The continuation of the sabotage and general harassment was specifically recommended.
f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.
Substantial progress is being made in this part of the program. Manuel Artime and the MRR are being supported. He is developing bases in Costa Rica and in Nicaragua. He has his ships; his first groups of men are ready to start training. We have had to “prime the pump” and will have to give him a shipment of arms and ammunition. This will be done in a way in which even Artime will not know that it comes from the United States. Artime expects to mount his first operations in December.
Support to the extent of [less than 1 line not declassified] per month is being provided Manolo Ray; however, he has not progressed to the extent that Artime has. At present his major problem is to develop a foreign base of operations.
We may recommend support of one or more additional autonomous groups.
The activation of these groups will relieve some of the pressure on our operations which we believe will be most beneficial.
4. Throughout the presentation, a limited number of clarifying questions were asked and answered. At the conclusion H.A. asked what decisions were necessary at this time. The consensus was that the over-all program [Facsimile Page 6] should continue but there was some divergency of opinion regarding the sabotage program. H.A. raised the question of the sabotage program; whether it was worthwhile and whether it would accomplish our purpose. Mr. McCone stated that no one event will particularly affect the economy. However, a continuous program will have its effects on the economy and it will encourage internal sabotage by dissident people within Cuba. The previously mentioned 109 sabotage acts were again mentioned.
5. Secretary Rusk then spoke at considerable length. He stated the infiltration of Black teams for intelligence purposes gave him no problems. He strongly supported the Economic Denial Program. Internal sabotage should be continued, “the more of this, the better.” He opposed hit-and-run sabotage raids stating that he considered them to be unproductive in addition to complicating our foreign relations. Specifically, he stated that such raids could result in the Soviet failure to remove their troops from Cuba and could directly relate to Soviet harassment of Autobahn traffic. He said if we could mount sabotage raids as retaliation for specific identifiable Cuban acts in the Western [Typeset Page 1837] Hemisphere, he could go along with this. In this connection, he stated we should concentrate on securing information on what Castro was planning on doing in or against other countries, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere. Mr. McCone observed that infiltration was difficult, internal sabotage was extremely difficult to stimulate but that external hit-and-run sabotage had the effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.
6. Secretary McNamara stated he could see no real connection between Berlin Autobahn incidents and Cuban operations. He saw many advantages in going ahead with the program but agreed with the necessity of keeping a careful watch on it. He said that he does not believe that the program will result in the fall of Castro but that it serves to maintain pressures on him which would improve chances of either a change in regime or a change in Castro himself.
7. The Attorney General commented that he believed the program had produced a worthwhile impact on Cuba during the past five months and that it was useful in the United States as an indication that something was being done.
[Facsimile Page 7]8. Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that the proposed sabotage operations could be controlled but that when the autonomous groups started operations this might cause some problems due to the acknowledged lack of tight control. Mr. McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.
9. There was a brief general discussion of the need to expand naval and/or air coverage of shipping in the Caribbean area to identify possible Cuban arms shipments.
10. [text not declassified]
11. The meeting ended at approximately 1115.
- Minutes of the meeting to review the Cuban program. Secret. 7 pp. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July–30 November 1963.↩