Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

715. Memorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group, October 21¹

October 21, 1963

SUBJECT

• Proposal for Air Strikes Against Cuban Targets

REFERENCE

• Memorandum for the Standing Group of the NSC, Subject: Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Progress of Action Towards Cuba, dated 8 June 1963

1. As approved, referenced program authorized general sabotage and harassment (paragraph 4 E of reference) and support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of this and other courses of action approved in reference paper (paragraph 4 F of reference). Also envisaged in referenced program is the concept that, barring unforseen international developments, progressively increasing economic, political, psychological and sabotage pressures would be brought to bear against the Castro regime.

2. A variety of reports from diplomatic and intelligence sources in Cuba indicate that the maritime/commando sabotage operations conducted to date have had a limited economic effect and a psychological impact on the regime and population of Cuba exceeding our expectations. There are, however, only a limited number of targets of major economic significance, such as oil refineries and key electric power plants. Many of these strategic targets are not susceptible to maritime/commando raids because of their relative inaccessibility and the stringent security precautions taken to protect these installations against sabotage.

3. The Santiago oil refinery has been selected as a prime target. It is a major oil refinery accounting for approximately 30% of refined oil products in Cuba. Although heavily guarded on the ground and ringed by anti-aircraft batteries, it is vulnerable to attack. It is located on an isolated projection of land so that residential areas are not likely to be affected; nor will the incapacitation of the refinery inflict any direct additional suffering on those Cubans displaced or otherwise adversely affected by the hurricane. The loss of the Santiago oil refinery plant would further upset Cuban economic planning and force the Soviet Bloc, already straining under commitments made to Castro, to make even greater economic sacrifices for a most unappreciative recipient.

4. We propose to attack the refinery in December with a commando group firing 4.2 mortars. To permit a reasonable change of withdrawal of the commandos to the coast, the range will be approximately 4700 yards. This will be a most difficult operation although the chances of success appear acceptable provided the commando team can reach the firing position without discovery.

5. In recognition of past sensitivity to air strikes as compared to maritime/commando raids, we will first attempt to immobilize the Santiago oil refinery by means of a maritime/commando operation now in the planning stage. A formal request for authorization of this operation will be submitted at a later date. Should it be determined that a maritime raid against the Santiago refinery confronts us with unacceptable risks or should the operation fail, we consider the importance of this target to be of such magnitude as to warrant an air strike against it.

6. The operational concept for this air strike follows:

The air strike against the oil refinery at Santiago de Cuba will be conducted under the auspices of the Manuel Artime Group. The strike will be launched from an air field in Nicaragua utilizing a U.S. sterile combat type aircraft, with foreign commercial markings, flying at minimum safe altitude and manned by an experienced Cuban aircrew employed by the Artime Group but unwitting of U.S. interest. Upon completion of the operation, the aircraft will be ditched at sea and the crew picked up by maritime assets of the Artime Group. As additional cover to mark the origin of the flight and the aircraft employed, the Artime Group will have been operating an “alibi” plane—a commercial version of the combat craft throughout the Caribbean on logistical support missions. This alibi plane will have the same commercial markings as the bomber and will be noted in a friendly country at the same time that the target is being attacked.

The tactical aspects of the air strike are considered technically feasible and will depend almost entirely on the capability of the Cuban aircrew which can only be determined after the aircraft has been procured, the mission profile developed and observation of the performance of the Cubans during the familiarization and training period. If in the judgment of CIA the aircrew capabilities are not considered adequate, or if any security or operational factors arise which raise doubts as to the effectiveness and security of the operation, or its absolute deniability by the U.S. Government, the operation will be cancelled.

7. With regard to the risks and security considerations inherent in this air strike, the operational concept confines the risks to acceptable limits and satisfies the requirement for plausible denial for:

a. The United States;

b. The Caribbean and South American countries which could have been used as a staging area for the operation; and

c. Manuel Artime’s autonomous group.

Since the plan also offers a high probability of denying to Castro a means of identifying the base from which the operation was launched, he will have no rational pretext for retaliatory action against the United States or any of the Caribbean countries. For additional United States security, the operation will be staged and controlled by the autonomous Cuban resistance group headed by Manuel Artime and no known Americans will have been exposed to any Cubans participating in the operation.

8. In view of the costly nature of this undertaking in terms of funds, logistic support and manpower, it is requested that the Special Group approve:

a. The development of an air strike capability within the Artime Group and

b. An air strike operation against the Santiago refinery in the event that a maritime/commando raid against this target is cancelled or fails.

This approval is considered to be necessary before CIA funds are committed to purchase the aircraft and other costly equipment. Should it subsequently develop that appropriate security standards cannot be maintained, the Special Group will be notified and plans for an air strike operation will be cancelled.

1. Proposal for air strikes against Cuban targets. Secret. 5 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0131, Sabotage/Destruction.