714. Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to McNamara, October 211
SUBJECT
- Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (S)
1. Reference is made to a memorandum by the Secretary of the Army, dated [illegible in the original] October 1963, subject as above.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirm their view, previously stated in JCSM–458–63, dated 15 June 1963, subject: US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (C), that, although a coup may be one of the most promising types of revolt in Cuba, it is unlikely to occur at this time. They also have serious reservations with regard to the probable effectiveness of the special team which is to be introduced into Cuba after the coup takes place. Within the short time frame contemplated, it is doubtful whether such a team will be able to add significantly to the broad, multiple-source intelligence assessment necessary for the [Typeset Page 1824] critical decision which would commit the United States to the employment of portions or all of the military forces required by CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 315. Further, in the case of a coup initiated by dissident leaders who have agreed to meet the criteria for US support and to whom prior approval had been given to commence the coup at the earliest practicable time, the United States would have some obligation to intervene, irrespective of the report of the special team. The introduction of small groups for intelligence, [illegible in the original], and communication purposes after the decision to intervene had been made, however, should prove very useful in providing information on which a subsequent military reconnaissance might be based for the incremental introduction of forces.
3. [illegible in the original] draft State-Defense paper relates probably to US actions following a coup, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made no comment on the statements of broad policy considerations [Facsimile Page 2] cited therein as affecting US support to a revolt in Cuba. These statements have been considered as assumptions for the purpose of the paper, rather than as approved national policy. Further, the draft has been interpreted as presenting a broad concept and, consequently, detailed suggestions for changes in wording have not been made. Appropriate comments can be made on detailed plans to be developed in accordance with the recommendations of the paper.
4. It is noted that the draft paper states, “Within approximately five days after the special team arrived on the island, the first incremental introduction of balanced forces (airborne divisions) could be effected if considered militarily desirable under the circumstances.” It should be emphasized that decision as to size and type of forces to be committed, as well as the advisability of incremental commitment, cannot be prejudged, but will be dependent upon the situation at the time.
5. It is also noted that the draft paper provides that the United States will commence to position forces to implement CINCLANT Operation Plans 312 and 315 as soon as the decision to introduce a “special team” into Cuba has been made. This provision is important in that it will reduce the reaction time required for overt military support after a Presidential decision to intervene and will provide forces for the suppression of Cuban air defenses as required in order to initiate overt logistical and air support to insurgents. It might also reduce the risk of incremental introduction of forces into Cuba if such were considered. For example, the early commitment of airborne or air-landed forces might entail less risk if the US Naval Base, Guantanamo, had been reinforced and a combat-loaded amphibious force were at sea.
[Typeset Page 1825]6. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while holding reservations as expressed in the comments above, have concluded that the plan envisaged in the State-Defense paper is militarily feasible.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
- Draft State-Defense contingency plan for a coup in Cuba. Top Secret. 2 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 69 A 0926, Cuba Sensitive 1963, 000.1—.↩