676. Memorandum from General Taylor to McNamara, May 101
SUBJECT
- US Courses of Action in Case of a Revolt in Cuba (S)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that although a widespread effective revolt in Cuba is unlikely at this time, potential sources of a spontaneous uprising do exist. They have considered the alternatives open to the United States and have examined our capabilities to provide support in such an event.
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4. Cuban volunteers would be used in these military operations but only as individuals in US units. There is no current program which provides for developing all-Cuban military units, nor should they be created unless their employment is planned for a specific date as part of a larger operation. The formation and maintenance in being of such units against the contingency of spontaneous revolt are not justified.
[Typeset Page 1737]5. In addition to the problems of timing, amount of force to be applied, and the use of Cuban expatriates, we could be faced with a direct confrontation with Soviet troops. Plans for the rapid application of US military forces, therefore, must consider the neutralization or elimination of the Soviet forces in Cuba, and the attendant possibility of greatly increasing world tensions.
6. Further, US planning is incomplete for post-assault operations which we would have to fill the political, economic, and military vacuum which would be caused by the downfall of the Castro-communist regime. A concentrated effort is required to devise an acceptable [illegible in the original] regime.
7. [text not declassified]
8. There are also actions which require attention outside of the Department of Defense:
a. CIA in-country assets for collecting intelligence and supporting UW in Cuba should be augmented as feasible.
b. The Department of State should:
(1) Develop plans for a post-hostilities government in Cuba, in coordination with DOD. These plans should encompass operations in support of military government and the successor interim government in Cuba.
(2) Initiate action to coalesce the many Cuban factions in opposition to Castro.
(3) Devise a policy assigning to Cuban-exiled activist groups an appropriate role in both a revolt and its aftermath, within the framework of the CIA and CINCLANT plans.
(4) Initiate action now to mold public opinion concerning both the revolt and a successor government, and to provide policy guidance for the conduct of US psychological operations, to include objectives and themes.
9. [text not declassified] It is recommended that a memorandum, substantially the same as that in the Appendix hereto, be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army for use in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for Policy toward Cuba.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
- U.S. courses of action in case of a revolt in Cuba. Top Secret. 3 pp. WNRC, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 77–0131, Miscellaneous 63–65.↩