675. Paper prepared by the CIA, undated1

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ADDITIONAL ACTIONS AGAINST CUBA

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ACTION ITEM REMARKS
1. Create a government-wide task force consisting of representatives of State, Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury, CIA, Defense and any other agency which could contribute to a program designed to expand our present limited covert economic action effort and intensify efforts to discourage free world trade with Cuba. Actions under this program would include, among others, the following: 1. On the basis of CIA experience in targeting against a very limited, narrow objective, [less than 1 line not declassified] it is estimated that several hundred people, both here and abroad, have been devoting a good bit of their time to simply keeping track of and preventing the shipment of [less than 1 line not declassified] to Cuba. This has required close coordination by CIA with State and Commerce particularly, with CIA providing the basic clandestine [Typeset Page 1730] intelligence as well as supplying limited amounts of money for preclusive buying when necessary. Any new government-wide organization would need, first and foremost, funds and people plus a charter enabling it to move freely and quickly in order to deny vital goods to the enemy.
a. Reconsider the previously proposed tightening of regulations concerning free world shipping to Cuba with a view to issuing those regulations. a. This would have to be combined with additional new and tougher approaches to all our allies, fully realizing that efforts along those lines could adversely affect the economies of some of our allies which in turn might involve increased foreign aid to them.
b. Preclusive buying and commodity price manipulation as appropriate. b. Consideration must also be given that once it becomes known that the U.S. was involved in a [Facsimile Page 2] preclusive buying program our allies would and could take advantage of it, thereby increasing the cost of our operation, which is inherently expensive in any case.
c. Encourage labor groups and other [illegible in the original] obstruct in every way any trade with Cuba and in [illegible in the original] boycott of any kind of [illegible in the original] from their [illegible in the original] as well as [illegible in the original] of any [illegible in the original]. c. Boycott operations could adversely affect some labor groups as well as industries of our allies.
d. [illegible in the original] d. [illegible in the original] or consideration of biological and chemical warfare against agricultural commodities has been deliberately [illegible in the original]. There are, however, other means of attaining on a [illegible in the original] basis, various Cuban [illegible in the original] is at various Cuba ranges of the [illegible in the original]. Those would of course require additional policy approval.
e. [illegible in the original] e. [illegible in the original] this type of [illegible in the original] is feasible. It [illegible in the original] involve additional policy approval, [illegible in the original] as it would involve our allies and [illegible in the original] territories.
2. [illegible in the original] 2. This would have a [illegible in the original] on an [illegible in the original] basis. In every case including Castro’s [illegible in the original]; Castro’s [illegible in the original]. The aim of such operations would be to point out errors that Castro or his regime have made or are making, plus, of course, any contradictions between Castro’s claims and the final results.
3. Create a Radio Free Cuba [illegible in the original] the present Radio Free Europe effort. 3. CIA does not conceive this program is desirable unless it is part of a phased program to overthrow Castro. Not only is it expensive in both money and manpower, for example we estimate the initial cost would be
about $3,000,000, but we do not believe additional radio time is needed under existing policy. In addition to the extensive Voice of America broadcasting, CIA sponsors the following broadcast hours daily.
a. Medium wave—23 hours daily on ten frequencies.
b. Short wave—12½ hours daily on six frequencies.
CIA is now exploring the feasibility of increasing this [illegible in the original] using hours on medium wave as two hours on short wave daily. In addition, from a technical point of view, the diversification of frequencies that we use makes them less susceptable to jamming [illegible in the original] would one transmitter, no matter how [illegible in the original] which would be the case in a Radio Free Cuba effort. [illegible in the original].
4. Leaflet drops by both (a) balloons, and (b) aircraft. 4. (a) CIA believes that balloon operations are both feasible and desirable. However, CIA’s previous proposal for balloon leaflet drops was recently disapproved by higher authority.
(b) CIA does not believe that leaflet drops by aircraft are desirable although it is technically feasible. CIA believes the use of aircraft for this purpose not only exposes the aircraft to greater risks in terms of being shot down, but could also aggrevate the problems of the present reconnaissance overflight program.
5. Deception broadcasts of regulating internal or [illegible in the original] resistance. 5. CIA has conducted such broadcasts from a U.S. submarine in the past and will do so again if CIA believes it to be worthwhile at any time in the future. Additional policy approval will be requested at that time. This type of broadcast is very perishable in terms of its impact, can only be done once or twice [illegible in the original] to design [illegible in the original] purpose in mind.
6. [illegible in the original] 6. [illegible in the original] and in the past with [illegible in the original] (L does not believe in a result justify the [illegible in the original] of [illegible in the original] time [illegible in the original] power diverted in such a program. In [illegible in the original] to [illegible in the original] approved by the Special Forces [illegible in the original] higher authority
7. Deception operation involving the laying down of arms caches containing Soviet, Czech and Chicom arms in selected areas of Latin America, ostensibly proving the arms were smuggled from Cuba. 7. The key consideration in such an operation is the possibility that the “discovery” of such arms caches might lead to embarrassment for the Administration since arms smuggling is one of the points most often stated for the U.S. possibly taking more aggressive action against Castro. This type of operation, while feasible, is an extremely difficult and dangerous one to undertake in terms of making the operation completely plausible and foolproof.
8. Deception operations simulating invasion forces entering Cuba at various areas around Cuba and in various [illegible in the original]. 8. CIA believes such operations are feasible and desirable. They would keep the Cuban forces and militia in a constant mobilized ready alert status, with the tendency to wear them down as a result, and most important would keep the Cuban labor force away from work. However, such a program could not be accomplished without a very high international “noise level” and accusations that the U.S. was threatening Cuba. Such deception operations would have to be accompanied by overt actions of U.S. military forces in terms of movement of ships, aircraft and men, as well as call in numerous maneuvers and test exercises in the general area. The economic advantages of keeping the Cuban labor force occupied in military [illegible in the original] would have to be [illegible in the original] the psychological impact on the international community.
9. Station refugee ships on the high seas outside Cuban territorial waters with the purpose of picking up Cuban refugees who are escaping from Cuba. An aggressive psychological warfare program to initiate and encourage the escape of the Cubans would be required. 9. CIA believes this is a desirable effort. However, any such program must consider the likelihood of Cuban counteraction which would require U.S. naval and air patrols to protect the refugee relief ships. Cuban patrol boats have recently picked up refugees attempting to escape by sea and have also harassed U.S. Coast Guard vessels attempting to pick up Cuban refugees on the high seas. The possible consequences of continued and repeated encounters of this type
between U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels and Cuban naval patrols must be considered.
10. Attack and/or stage [illegible in the original] free world and Soviet shipping in and out of Cuban waters. 10. While this has been proposed in the past, it has not been approved. The economic advantages of such a program are obvious. The political disadvantages involving our allies, we believe, are equally obvious. A similar but lesser proposal to stage surface attacks on Cuban ships in Cuban waters was disapproved by the Special Group recently.
11. [illegible in the original] 11. This would require additional policy approval and would require considerable lead time in order to create the necessary air capability. CIA does not favor this program since repeated operations of this type are bound to be attributed to the U.S. In addition such activities could have an adverse effect on our present reconnaissance overflight program.
12. Mining of Cuban waters particularly around major ports. 12. If this were done sporadically it would have the effect of raising insurance rates which would possibly scare off some foreign shipping lines while increasing the cost to the Soviets. Such an operation would be difficult to do covertly. These operations will sooner or later be attributed to the U.S. since some mines will break loose and get into international waters where they would probably be identified as U.S. mines. In addition to the complaints of our
allies who might lose some ships in the process, the U.S. Navy was strongly opposed to this proposal when it was suggested earlier. The Special Group supported the Navy and disapproved the idea.
  1. List of additional covert actions against Cuba. Secret. 7 pp. Kennedy Library, NSF, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63.