Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

625. Memorandum of discussion among McGeorge Bundy, Alexis Johnson and McCone, February 28¹

February 28, 1963

Following the Special Group meeting yesterday, I talked with Bundy and Alexis Johnson concerning our policy in Cuba. I stated that I had been repeatedly asked by Congressional Committees how we were going to deal with the Soviet presence in Cuba, how we were going to (. . .), how we were going to remove the Castro government or control it so that it will not be used effectively for subversion and guerrilla activities against other Latin American states. I pointed out that we have stated publicly the situation was intolerable, the President had done this and also the Secretary of State in a recent speech. However, what was lacking was an agreed, understood course of action to bring about corrections in a situation we had declared to be unacceptable. This discussion was inconclusive. There were no suggestions, or no answers to the questions raised by me.

I then spent a few minutes with Mr. Bundy in his office and raised the question again. I said I thought there was a serious gap in our policy, the Cottrell committee had put forth some papers which had not been accepted and that we were (dead in water) as far as our Cuban policy was concerned. I said this presented me and a great many others with difficulties in discussing Cuba on the Hill. Bundy seemed to feel that this gap was unimportant and seemed to think there was no reason for any problems and that I or others could very easily dismiss the whole subject by saying the matter was up to the Secretary of State and if the Committee wished to probe into our policy toward Cuba, they should call him up and talk with him. He felt it was beyond the scope of my competence as DCI or any representative of the intelligence community to deal with policy matters of this kind. I told Bundy I would be guided accordingly, but I again reminded him that irrespective of who says what we simply did not have a policy on repressive action this government could and would take to bring about the stated purpose.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

1. Situation in Cuba and U.S. long-range plans for dealing with Castro and the Soviet presence in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. CIA, DCI (McCone) Files: Job 80–B01285A, Box 2.