Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath

558. Letter from Henry S. Rowen to Fred S. Hoffman, November 28¹

November 28, 1962

Dear Fred,

Many thanks for your quick response to my request for estimation of the threat posed by Soviet IRBMs if stationed in Cuba. We had assumed that they were inherently more accurate, and so it is good to know in some precise terms what this meant.

As you anticipated, the stationing of IRBM’s in Cuba was too tempting to the Soviets. In mid-September Albert asked me if I were sure the Soviets weren’t putting IRBM’s into Cuba. He had a hunch they might. My answer was sort of a non-sequitur. They’d be crazy to do it. We were both right.

These missiles added to the Soviet ICBM capability might have reduced by 30% the vehicles, and by 40% the weapons that the US could deliver against the Soviet Union. This assumes that SAC has dispersed.

Again, we appreciate yours and Mike Arnsten’s efforts to take a quick fix on the problem and send in the data.

Sincerely,

Henry S. Rowen

Deputy Assistant Secretary

1. Expresses appreciation for Rand Corporation’s quick response to DOD request for estimation of the threat posed by Soviet IRBMs if stationed in Cuba. Secret. 1 p. WNRC, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962.