557. Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 281
Dept pass to White House. Eyes Only for Secretary. Cuba.
Part I of II.
Stevenson, McCloy and Yost met for three hours this morning with Mikoyan, Zorin, Kuznetsov and Mendelevich. There was considerable clarification and clearing away of underbrush on both sides but no further points were agreed. Sovs principal objections to US draft declaration were (1) extensive conditions applying to assurances against invasion and (2) paragraph on overflights. They also repeatedly urged dropping all reference to Rio Pact as not being pertinent to this declaration.
Mikoyan started off referring to fact that Sov protocol presented 10 days ago, SOV Govt anxious terminate Cuban matter, has impression US wishes delay but hopes is mistaken. Believes protocol is best form for termination but since US doesn’t like it are prepared adopt declarations which will be presented to SC for approval. However US draft declaration is “a bad one” for following reasons: (1) Some important points in exchange of letters are omitted or not presented fully. (2) New conditions are attached to insurance against invasion. (3) Effort is made to legalize one-sided violation of Cuba air space and to obtain UN sanction. This cannot be done. (4) Proposals submitted jointly by USSR and Cuba are avoided. Though these proposals were not included in exchange of correspondence they follow spirit of that exchange.
[Facsimile Page 2]In further explanation these points Mikoyan argued that according to US draft, if Cuba takes any act which US considers jeopardizes security of Caribbean, US obligation against invasion would lapse. This is direct retreat from statement in President’s letter. There is no word in declaration about subversive activity against Cuba though Castro supported by Sov Union proposes that subversive activity be stopped by all countries.
As to inspection, should be divided into two parts; inspection of dismantling of missiles and IL–28’s has already been taken care of by alternative method acceptable to both sides. US has right to ask for inspection in relation to non-introduction of weapons but Cubans also have right of inspection against invasion preparations. Sovs support reasonable suggestions set forth in Castro’s Nov 26 letter, that is, multilateral inspection by UN observers. Whole of US would not be inspected [Typeset Page 1493] but only certain parts, including Puerto Rico, where camps of invasion bands are located. Whole territory of Cuba would be subject to inspection as well as certain neighboring countries. One-sided inspection is impossible and Sov Union would not support. Mikoyan then read five points as set forth in Castro’s letter of Nov 26 and attempted to justify them. He argued inter alia US need not at once abandon Guantanamo but should enter into negotiations with Cubans about its disposition. This was justified under international law and very moderate proposal. In general Mikoyan argued that if US not prepared to normalize relations with Cuba at present we at least say that we are prepared to negotiate later. Finally he said wording in US declaration about withdrawal Sov weapons is not correct and should be described as in exchange of correspondence.
[Facsimile Page 3]Part II of II.
Mikoyan objected to reference in our declaration to US agreement such as Rio Pact which he claims have no relation to UN. He also referred to fact President’s letter Oct 27 had said not only US would not invade but was confident other states would give similar assurances. This point does not appear in US declaration and is therefore another retreat from exchange of correspondence.
As to procedure, when we have agreed on text of two declarations these should be submitted to SC for approval. Soviets would not wish however proceed to SC before there is agreement between US and themselves. Soviets are thinking of draft resolutions to be adopted by SC approving two declarations and hoping US will also consider this point.
Stevenson replied US eager have Cuban affair settled and eliminate this source of friction between us. He noted we prepared to proceed by means of declaration. He hoped to receive SOV draft soonest.
Stevenson said it appears principal points outstanding between us are Castro’s five points. We have repeatedly noted that according to our interpretation “suitable safeguards” referred [Facsimile Page 4] to in exchange of correspondence dealt with those to prevent re-introduction of offensive weapons in Cuba and that according to President’s letter Oct 27 this was to be delegated to UN observers. There was no objection by Khrushchev to President’s letter on this point. Since such observation in Cuba has not been possible we have said frankly and honestly in our draft declaration that until such safeguards are provided we must use our own means. We would of course prefer UN observation. We think we have made substantial concessions in offering assurances against invasion without inspection. We don’t ask Soviets to agree to our unilateral means of inspection but simply point out to them we have no other choice.
[Typeset Page 1494]US has also gone further than exchange of correspondence envisages by saying not only that we would not invade Cuba ourselves but that we would not support such invasion.
We have discussed Castro’s points several times before and can simply repeat they are not covered by exchange of correspondence, we cannot discuss them and it is better to adhere to simply US-Sov terms of agreement. If all these new matters introduced into negotiations we doubt they could ever be concluded. We understand Sovs feel obligated to support Cuba’s demands but we also have numerous demands from other American Republics which we are not introducing into negotiations. Of course we look forward to time when eventually relationships among all American Republics, including US and Cuban relationships can be normalized.
As to Rio Pact, this is one of regional agreements envisaged in Chapter 8 of UN Charter. As to assurances other American Republics against invasion of Cuba, President merely expressed opinion they would be willing to give such assurances. Mikoyan interjected that statement to this effect should be in our draft declaration. Stevenson replied he would consider this as suggestion but in practice would have to wait to see what other American Republics prepared to do.
As to procedures, Stevenson believed best course is to proceed by agreed declarations in SC as proposed. If declarations cannot be fully agreed they could at least be presented separately to SYG to be submitted to SC and have Cuban affair concluded in this manner. Kuznetsov inquired whether this would invisage any SC action and Stevenson replied that we could not foresee at this time. Mikoyan noted best solution would be to present agreed documents.
[Facsimile Page 5]McCloy reiterated objective both sides is to finish promptly. If we haggle over wording and there is no agreement there will be uneasiness in US, Sov Union and around the world. We should try to finish this crisis and proceed to other problems in order to avoid other crises.
McCloy reiterated Stevenson’s arguments that US had gone beyond letters of agreement in raising quarantine before safeguards worked out, in including a reference to our willingness not to support invasion and in demobilizing and sending back to their bases US forces in Florida. He also emphasized US-SOV agreement would not involve settlement with Castro. As to subversion, other American Republics are threatened by Castro’s activity in this field. There are in Cuba camps training men for subversion in Latin America. If we try to deal with all these matters in our declarations we will never agree. When Castro eventually ceases to be a threat to the Western Hemisphere we are willing to normalize relations with him and help Cuba economically as we have in the past. We cannot waste our time talking of Castro’s conditions when US and SOVs have such important matters of common [Typeset Page 1495] concern to settle between themselves. (Incidentally McCloy mentioned Mikoyan had presented Castro’s points better than Castro himself could have done. Mikoyan replied that it is impossible to imagine what an eloquent man Castro is.)
McCloy noted that inspection of US and Puerto Rico would be comparable to inspection of Soviet ports to detect offensive weapons being despatched to Cuba. He reiterated Stevenson’s insistence on necessity of overflights in absence UN observers. However language our para might perhaps be improved. Presumably we would not continue overflights indefinitely as suspicion died down but would be foolhardy not to continue until confidence restored.
As to UN procedure McCloy saw no objection to presenting declarations in SC but saw grave danger getting into haggle with Cuba, complaining LA’s attacking Cuba, Soviet Union defending Cuba and so on. He pointed out US and Soviet Union now have record of compromise and conciliation on Cuban question and it would be pity to spoil it. In conclusion he mentioned reference U Thant letter in first para of declaration could be dropped since this letter merely reiterated what President had said.
[Facsimile Page 6]In reply Mikoyan reiterated several points previously made. He said Soviets would prepare draft declaration for SC but that its contents would be similar to that of protocol. McCloy replied this would be waste of time and hoped Castro’s points could be excluded from SOV declaration.
Mikoyan referred once more to inspection and said suggestions made by U Thant seemed reasonable. Groups of observers stationed at UN headquarters could be sent to certain bases in case of complaint. They would not inspect military installations in US and Puerto Rico but merely training camps. US reps again reiterated that reciprocal inspection of this kind, unless it included Soviet Union, was unacceptable. Mikoyan noted inspection Soviet Union was unacceptable except in connection with broader disarmament arrangements, safeguards against surprise attack and so on.
As to Rio Pact, US negotiators pointed out that this is firm US obligation which must be referred to since its omission might be interpreted as its abandonment, which would cause US serious difficulties with Congress and with other American Republics. Mtg concluded with repeated mutual assurances of desire to finish matter quickly and to study points made by both sides on this occasion. It was agreed to meet again Friday.
- U.S.-Soviet meeting re U.S. draft declaration. Top Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 737.56361/1–2862.↩