Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

36. Memorandum of conversation, December 11, among President Allessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials¹

Part IV (of 5)

December 11, 1962, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• US Military Assistance Programs, and Chilean Relations with Bolivia

PARTICIPANTS

• Chile

  • President Alessandri
  • Foreign Minister Martinez
  • Finance Minister Mackenna
  • Senator Angel Faivovich
  • Ambassador Walter Muller
  • Budget Director Sergio Molina
  • Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)

• United States

  • President Kennedy
  • Ambassador Charles Cole
  • Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
  • Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator, Alliance for Progress
  • Mr. Herbert May, ARA
  • Mr. Ralph Dungan, White House
  • Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, LS
  • Mr. Neil Seidenman, LS

President Kennedy raised US MAP to Latin America in general, asking if President Alessandri wished to make any comments about the possibility that our military aid was stimulating an arms race, thus creating an additional financial burden on the recipient countries.

President Alessandri assured President Kennedy that he had no criticism whatsoever to make on this subject, and could only express his appreciation for US help in this field. He had to request US help, after certain disturbances. While he had repeatedly advocated disarmament in Latin America, other countries, while expressing agreement in principle, had responded in practice by increasing their armed forces. The US had reassured the Chilean armed forces by extending a helping hand, so there is no cause for reproach, but rather for gratitude.

President Alessandri then referred to Chilean relations with Bolivia. The present Bolivian Government originated in a popular movement, which disbanded the army after assuming power, and provided for local militia. When President Paz began having severe economic and unemployment problems, the local militia became centers of opposition to the administration. The Government then began to rebuild the regular army, and asked the U.S. for help, which the U.S. granted. Help also came from Argentina, which assured President Alessandri that its shipments were only defensive weapons.

Thus the Bolivian army began to grow in power, and from that point on any interpretation of events is largely a matter of conjecture. There may have been a desire to offset the army’s growing influence by regrouping the militia. But it was in this atmosphere that the Lauca River dispute arose.

President Alessandri said that while the Lauca had been the subject of attention by both governments for 20 years, good relations always had prevailed. But, as soon as the GOC opened the first sluice gate on the Lauca project on an experimental basis, Chile was accused of violating Bolivia’s sovereignty. It was against the resulting dispute that the Bolivian army and militia were regarded as constituting a possible threat to Chile’s security. After an exchange of notes, the Argentine Government agreed to stop arms shipments to Bolivia.

President Alessandri repeated that in no way was he criticizing U.S. military aid. It had been of great help to Chile, and the destroyers which he hoped to obtain from the U.S. would certainly be of great service. He did note later that, while concurring with military assistance to countries who request it, in view of present relations with Bolivia, any strengthening of Bolivia’s military potential would mean additional pressure and possible aggression against Chile.

1. U.S. military assistance programs; Chilean relations with Bolivia. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.