Office of the Historian

35. Memorandum of conversation, December 11, among President Allessandri, President Kennedy, and other officials1

Part III (of 5)
December 11, 1962, 4 p.m.
[Facsimile Page 1]

SUBJECT

  • The Cuban Problem

PARTICIPANTS

  • Chile

    • President Alessandri
    • Foreign Minister Martinez
    • Finance Minister Mackenna
    • Senator Angel Faivovich
    • Ambassador Walter Muller
    • Budget Director Sergio Molina
    • Sr. Alfonso Echeverria (Interpreter)

  • United States

    • President Kennedy
    • Ambassador Charles Cole
    • Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin
    • Mr. Teodoro Moscoso, Coordinator, Alliance for Progress
    • Mr. Herbert May, ARA
    • Mr. Ralph Dungan, White House
    • Mr. Fernando Van Reigersberg, LS
    • Mr. Neil Seidenman, LS

President Kennedy brought up the subject of Cuba, noting that while Castro has lost a great deal of prestige, the Castro regime would continue to present problems for some time to come, judging from Minister Guevara’s recent speech pledging support for “popular liberation movements”. The support of the OAS in the recent crisis showed that the problem was not a [Facsimile Page 2] struggle between the US and Cuba, but rather a hemispheric problem and a challenge to the sovereignty of all the American countries. We should not allow the image that the problem is a struggle just between Cuba and the US to be maintained; anything that can be done to demonstrate our determination to oppose collectively the purposes of communism will increase the security of our nations.

President Alessandri said that the Chilean position always has been clear and could be no cause of problems in US-GOC relations. Chile, of course, is greatly attached to legal principles, in both domestic and [Typeset Page 83] foreign matters. At the Santiago meeting of consultation of Foreign Ministers, the Rio Treaty was a subject of serious discussion, concerning its precise scope. Differences of view arose as to the legal scope of the Treaty. But the recent situation in Cuba, which led to President Kennedy’s action, was in flagrant violation of Article VI of the Treaty, which Chile could not countenance; appropriate instructions were issued immediately to the Chilean Embassies.

President Alessandri agreed that Castro’s prestige has suffered. He had spoken with Senator Allende (note: Chilean Socialist Senator, and potential Popular Front candidate), stressing that the present Cuban situation constituted a threat warranting application of the Rio Treaty, and that Chile would proceed in a manner consistent with her responsibilities.

Both Presidents agreed that the free press has exaggerated the importance of Castro and Castroism, in many instances. President Kennedy noted the anticipated demonstrations on his Mexican visit, which never materialized. He said the problem is not “Castro”, but rather difficult domestic problems which provide a breeding ground for the extreme left. In this connection, it would be a severe blow to see communism win an important election in a democratic country, when we have said that communism can remain in power only by building a wall.

President Alessandri said that exaggeration on the part of the press often creates fear, both inside and outside a country. As for Castro and the communists, a strong campaign against them is putting them on the defensive. He does not fear for the future. However, a democracy is at a disadvantage since its enemies take advantage of the right of free expression. Furthermore, it is always an easy matter for a dictatorship to use resources for propaganda, and therefore can organize anti-administration activities in the country concerned. The problem is to find ways to combat this propaganda. It is of the utmost importance that the press turn from a defeatist approach (on Chilean affairs).

  1. Cuban problem. Confidential. 2 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Chile, January–June, 1963.↩