Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

357. Memorandum for the record, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

SUBJECT

• Daily White House Staff Meeting, 22 October 1962

1. Mr. Bundy presided. I forgot to check the DEFCONS, and will report them tomorrow.

2. The only subject which Bundy covered was the Cuba business. The points arose in approximately the following order:

a. The President’s speech tonight on television will probably be at 1900. Bundy said that everyone should submit comments on the draft directly to Sorensen.

b. Bundy announced that “for the duration” Kaysen would handle all the NSC staff matters other than the Cuba business. This reminds me of the way the State Department worked last summer and fall—i.e., Foy Kohler was Mr. Berlin and Mr. Berlin Task Force while his Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bill Tyler, handled all the workaday matters for Western Europe less Berlin. Bundy has some idea in the back of his mind about possibly breaking down the NSC Staff into one group which would closely follow the Cuba business and another group which would keep tabs on the rest of the world. In military terms, it rather made me think that he was conceiving sort of an Operations Division on the one hand, and a Plans and Policy Division on the other hand. Finally, he also has in the back of his mind the idea of a White House Duty Officer, presumably to be rotated by roster from among the NSC Staff.

c. Bundy said that as far as the White House is concerned, the political campaign will be over as of the time of the President’s television speech tonight; no more trips, no more speeches. The trip to Brazil will probably also go by the wayside.

d. Bundy said that Admiral Anderson is acting as “Joint Commander”, by which I imagine he means executive agent for the Joint Chiefs. Commander McCabe at this point interjected that “Griffin, Sharp, and Ricketts” (all Vice Admirals in OPNAV) would be Admiral Anderson’s alter egos.

e. Bundy and Clifton then got into a discussion of KY–9 versus KY–1 telephones. They apparently settled on making the KY–1 net the effective net, since the President, General Taylor, and other key points in the picture all have KY–1s. Bundy asked that one be put in his office.

f. Bundy then announced that two meetings would take place in the White House this morning. The first would consider what “policy track” we would follow in the UN. It appeared that our initial position in the UN would be very angry and very self-righteous. Arthur Schlesinger was the key White House staff officer on this and was supposed to go to New York today after this first meeting. The second meeting was to be one on Berlin contingency planning and how our approach to it should be synchronized and orchestrated with this Cuba business. As a matter of fact, Mr. Nitze’s office telephoned to invite me to attend his meeting at 1015 over in the Pentagon, which I did. I also rode back to the White House with Mr. Nitze and Dee Armstrong, and participated in the Fish Room discussion among Bundy, Nitze, Hillenbrand, Cy Weiss, Dave Klein, and Armstrong. At about 1145, Bundy, Nitze, and Hillenbrand went into the Cabinet Room to meet with the President.

Legere

1. Daily White House Staff Meeting on October 22 on Cuban crisis. Secret. 2 pp. National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, Oct.–Nov. 1962.