Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

356. Notes from transcripts of JCS meetings, October 22¹

October 22, 1962

NOTES TAKEN FROM TRANSCRIPTS OF MEETINGS OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, OCTOBER–NOVEMBER 1962, DEALING WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS(Handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993.)

CJCS: Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA.

CSA: Chief of Staff, Army. General Earle G. Wheeler.

CSAF: Chief of Staff, Air Force. General Curtis E. LeMay.

CNO: Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr.

CMC: Commandant, Marine Corps. General David M. Shoup.

CONAD: Continental Air Defense

DIA: Defense Intelligence Agency

DJS: Director, Joint Staff

LANT: Atlantic

NORAD: North American Air Defense

OAS: Organization of American States

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile

TAC: Tactical Air Command

Monday 22 October

JCS meeting at 0900:

Briefing by Gen. Carroll (Director DIA): Of the six mobile MRBM sites, four are operations and the other two will be so within 3 to 5 days. Of the two fixed MRBM sites, one will be available for emergencies by 15 November and fully operational by 1 December. The other two will be in emergency operation by 1 December with a [illegible in the original] capability on 15 December.

JCS meeting with SecDef at 1330.

CJCS: Some decisions were made at [illegible in the original] (1/8th airborne alert for SAC, dispersal of B–47s and CONAD interceptors). [1½ lines not declassified] the time of the President’s speech.

SecDef: The President wants a message sent to USCINCEUR saying in effect, make sure the Jupiter warheads in Turkey and Italy are not released if missiles come under attack, and if they are in danger of being taken by our angry allies, destroy them.

SecDef: The President asked for our views on how we should respond if the Cubans launched a missile, authorized or not.

DepSecDef: We won’t know if it came from Cuba.

SecDef: Right: it could come from a submarine. I think we should tell the Soviets we will hold them responsible and fire missiles in retaliation. What we want is for the Soviets to send out a message like the one we just sent out to USCINCEUR. (See msg. [illegible in the original] 6666 to USCINCEUR)

CNO: disagreed; a public warning to the Soviets would bring stronger adverse allied reactions. JCS agree we should not say exactly what our retaliation would be.

JCS meeting at 1620:

VADM Sharp (Deputy CNO, Plans and Policy): The President doesn’t want us to take overt steps indicating that we are getting ready for invasion. Thus requisitioning ships is out. We wanted 111 ships: 30 in one day: 50 more in 10; 31 in 12 days.

Gen. McKee (Vice CSAF): DepSecDef said there would be no callup of C–119s and interceptors in view of what the President said.

CJCS: If we can’t lick the Cubans with what we already have, we are in terrible shape.

1. Briefing by General Carroll (Director DIA) on the MRBM sites in Cuba and U.S. responses to a missile attack. Secret. 3 pp. DOD, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of Joint History.