Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, American Republics; Cuba 1961–1962; Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Volumes X/XI/XII, Microfiche Supplement

231. Telegram 446 to Caracas, November 21¹

November 21, 1963, 8:22 p.m.

Embtels 572 and 573.

1. We believe Betancourt’s plan for briefing LA chiefs on arms cache is excellent way surface evidence Cuban origin. We expect U.S. will be included in briefing to maintain hemispheric front. Would also be helpful have Canadian and West European chiefs present or briefed separately.

2. As indicated in message sent to you through other channels, we continue think that announcement of arms cache evidence provides excellent basis for reporting to OAS and making appeal for developing appropriate means for multilateral cooperation in surveillance under Resolution II of 8th MFM.

3. On reporting to OAS we gratified Betancourt has not closed door. We think it would be serious mistake, however, use forthcoming MFM forum to present evidence or raise question because of terms under which meeting convoked and disruptive effects likely to be produced by introduction Cuban subversion issue in specific terms. On other hand COAS is clearly indicated organ to receive report as result assignment given it by 8th MFM (Resolution II, paragraph 1). Furthermore, we think GOV would do OAS major disservice if it were to present evidence to diplomatic corps OAS countries and not follow-up with presentation to COAS because it might be misinterpreted as GOV lack of interest in role which OAS can play in meeting problem of Castro-Communist subversion in this hemisphere.

4. We disappointed Betancourt cool to idea of call for some form of multilateral cooperation in surveillance since intelligence reports indicate need for such action. Given his coolness and delicacy preelectoral situation, we of course do not rpt not intend push this further with him at this time. However, we would want to take advantage of any indication from him of reconsideration in order to pursue subject.

5. For your background only following is outline of tentative operation plan to interdict air and sea shipments of arms and men for purposes of Castro-Communist subversion which we had wanted you discuss with Betancourt in event he had reacted favorably to making appeal:

a. Whenever intelligence received of shipments of arms and men to any of countries in area, this information would be immediately relayed to the governments concerned including flag country of vessel or aircraft and, in cases of transshipment, countries of departure and destination.

b. To degree intelligence justifies such action, governments concerned (US and LA) would immediately alert internal security forces and contribute units to establish cooperative air and offshore surface surveillance. These land, sea and air units would work together in search for the ship or aircraft to identify, intercept it and prevent arms and men from reaching their destination. Direct means of communication between such units would be worked out to facilitate surveillance coordination.

c. With respect to sea shipment: (1) governments concerned including US would agree in advance to give reciprocal rights to intercept and search their respective flag vessels in international waters which conform to description of suspect vessel. If intercepted ship is found to be carrying arms and men it would be escorted to the nearest port of the participating powers and turned over to local consul of country whose flag the vessel flies; (2) governments concerned would agree in advance to allow units of countries participating in the cooperative surveillance effort to enter their territorial waters to intercept and search vessels of any flag suspected of carrying arms or men. If found to be carrying such arms or men, ship would be taken to nearest port of territorial country and turned over to local authorities.

d. With respect to air shipments, suspected aircraft would be shadowed to destination to assure search and apprehension upon landing or to prevent clandestine airdrops to Castro-Communist elements. Governments concerned would agree in advance to permit aircraft other cooperating governments to enter their national airspace for this purpose.

e. Governments concerned would agree in advance to give each other reciprocal use of port and airport facilities for units used in cooperative surveillance.

f. Implementing details of foregoing plan would be worked out through appropriate inter-governmental channels. In situation in Venezuela course of action along following lines, in three consecutive stages, would be considered on request: First stage: provision joint survey and mobile training team to provide training, assistance and advice in matters related surveillance and intercept operations and coordination of all Venezuelan military and para-military forces and US forces involved in the operation; limited number RC–121 aircraft for all-weather reconnaissance and intercept control; Second stage: provision mobile radar package; Third stage: provision fighter-interceptor aircraft to destroy intruder aircraft. Foregoing in addition to US air and sea forces to supplement Venezuelan surveillance capabilities.

In connection Betancourt’s reaction to sea-air surveillance we note GOV agreement JOC MTT (COMUSMILGRUVEN 1919557ZEA). Would appreciate your assessment of further types of training and equipment they might want taking into consideration assistance outlined in part 1 of First Stage and Second Stage of paragraph (f) of operational plan. Second part of First Stage and Third Stage refer to US forces and equipment operating from Venezuelan bases. Under present circumstances we recognize Venezuela would not request it and we of course would not be prepared to execute these stages without an explicit, written and disclosable request by GOV.

Action requested: Please follow-up OAS aspects with Betancourt along lines paragraph 3. You should strongly urge that as minimum he submit evidence to COAS. You should be ready take advantage any indication he is reconsidering position on multilateral cooperative air-sea surveillance in order to explore this further with him to determine in what ways he would be willing to have us assist him. In this circumstance you may draw on all or part operational plan as illustrative of possible arrangement. We have discussed handling arms cache and surveillance problem with Tejera along general lines you have discussed with Betancourt and this message. Briceño ill and could not participate.

Ball

1. President Betancourt’s briefing of LA chiefs on Cuban arms cache. Top Secret. 6 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, October–November 1963.