230. Memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, April 301
SUBJECT
- Venezuela—General Lansdale’s Report
I refer to your request that I brief the attached report by General Lansdale. The report, which the General wrote after a visit to CINCARIB and a nine-day visit to Venezuela, examines the Communist insurgency menace in that country. It concludes that while Venezuela is a tinder box and not a fire, there are enough sparks to make the situation dangerous; more should and can be done to counter the Communist threat.
The report is very interesting and conveys a good, colorful feel for the Venezuelan situation. It contains some suggestions for action which seem to me to be worthy of further study. The following are some of the highlights of the report:
[Typeset Page 554]A. The Elements
1. The Threat—One of the two most vulnerable areas is Caracas. While the poor people living in the surrounding hills are the raw material for the rabble rousers, the explosive elements in the Caracas picture are the university students, who have immunity behind the Central University walls, and the legal Communist Party with its membership in Congress. University and high school students carry out countless acts of terrorism in Caracas—e.g. killings, bombings, disarming of police, telephone threats.
Where the threat in Caracas is politically significant, the threat in West Venezuela (the oil fields) is economically significant. The oil well operation at Maracaibo and the long pipeline leading to the refineries 125 miles away are very vulnerable to sabotage; there were a number of attacks in 1962. These attacks could really be catastrophic. For example, if some one set up mortars and bazookas and stopped the main power plant at La Salina (this is a feasible attack) the GOV would lose $2 million per day in oil revenues.
[Facsimile Page 2]2. Communist Forces (FALN)—Estimates vary, but there are very roughly 300 to 500 men in the Communist paramilitary forces; probably about ½ of these are in Caracas. While this is a small force (which tends to grow when the students are on vacation), it should be noted (1) that Castro’s forces were small and (2) that it may be a relatively large force in view of the fractured missions of the GOV forces—i.e. nobody short of Betancourt is really charged with meeting the Communist threat.
The FALN appears to be a unified force (e.g. courier systems), and is quite effective in psychological warfare (reporting phony terrorist acts to stir up fruitless GOV activity) as well as in the more violent forms of terrorism. Its composition is indicated by the following breakdown of 177 FALN prisoners—44 students, 15 professional men, 23 laborers, 43 farmers, and 52 unknown.
3. Venezuelan Military—There are 9,000 men in the National Guard (FAC), which is a voluntary outfit; 14,000 men in the Army, which is composed of 2 year, largely illiterate draftees; 1,400 men in the obsolete and poorly repaired Air Force; and 2,900 men in the Navy which is supported by 2,700 politically suspect Marines. The General saw mostly the FAC and the Army.
The FAC is the best fighting force in Venezuela and has received counter-guerrilla training. However, it is primarily a stationery force which operates in battalion size throughout the country (e.g. guarding critical installations, highway patrols, game wardens); it does not have a real counter-guerrilla role. The Army, which is a second rate outfit, has the primary anti-guerrilla role in the countryside. They seem to be [Typeset Page 555] trying hard, but the FAC could perform the active counter-guerrilla role much more effectively.
4. Special Group (CI)—It is called the Unified Command in Venezuela and is made up of the Ministers of Defense, Interior, Justice, and Agriculture, the Commanders of the Armed Forces, and the Chief of Police; it also has an advisory Intelligence Committee. It is nominally a standing group but usually meets only in emergencies; reportedly it works efficiently and effectively in meeting emergencies.
[Facsimile Page 3]5. Police—The police are ineffective (daily accounts of police being robbed, and of police being unable to stop thieves, terrorists, etc.) and it is illogical to depend on the police as the main protection against urban terrorists. Police functions are split up to a ridiculous extent; there are municipal, political, technical, traffic, and security police, all responsible to different organizations. When a car was blown up in the assassination attempt on Betancourt, different police had bits and pieces of the car and of the mechanism used in the explosion; all the bits and pieces were never brought together in one place for study.
6. Special Forces Mobile Training Teams (MTT)—This American team has done a fine job and the Venezuelans love them. The Venezuelans also seem interested in having a Special Air Warfare MTT; this would be a good thing.
7. Psychology of Terrorism—Americans on the scene receive threats constantly but their outlook remains cheery, almost abnormally so. The Country Team should keep record of these threats and press the GOV to take some action.
8. Repealing Parkinson’s Law—The reporting requirements from Washington are becoming excessive. It is a good Country Team and Washington should let it run the show. Washington can spot check by brief visits. Washington can also help by sending in appropriate mobile training teams on a temporary basis. For example, a Public Safety MTT, bilingual in Spanish, would be very useful.
9. Talks with Minister of Defense and Ambassador Stewart—General Lansdale’s talks with the Minister of Defense covered such subjects as the need for U.S. help; the moral reluctance of Venezuelans to take life; the virtues of using martial law under certain conditions; and troop information and education.
Ambassador Stewart pointed out to the General that the prestige and influence of the U.S. Military Group could be increased if military equipment deliveries were expedited.
[Facsimile Page 4]B. Conclusions
1. Venezuela is not a fire but there are plenty of sparks.
2. The capabilities of the Communist paramilitary forces are growing.
[Typeset Page 556]3. The GOV assignment of forces against the guerrillas is not as effective as it could be.
4. There is need for serious U.S. effort to help Venezuelans understand their responsibilities as citizens.
5. Venezuela has many positive elements in the struggle to build a strong democracy—a growing middle class, a heavy infusion of hard-working U.S. citizens, tremendous natural resources.
6. The U.S. Country Team is impressive and is capable of undertaking a successful pilot project in which more independence of action would be given to the field.
7. Venezuelans look to the U.S. for support. 1963 is a critical year because of the Presidential electoral campaign and Communist blockage of budget support in Congress.
C. Suggestions
1. Students—Central University in Caracas is the Communist jugular vein. Get a group (20 to 100) of tough and resourceful American students to enroll at and be active in the University.
2. Peace Funds—The Venezuelan people need to get into the act. Start a 3 month campaign to raise funds which can be used as rewards to capture FALN leaders and saboteurs.
3. Psywar—Make an asset out of 2 year draftees in the Army. Give them an understanding of patriotism and their civic responsibilities. An MTT of psywar pros would be useful.
4. Veterans—Instead of “running scared” of the military, Venezuelan leaders should make use of the military virtues in strengthening democracy. Encourage veterans to form organizations with patriotic platforms; use veterans to cadre colonies in the hinterland.
- Highlights of General Lansdale’s report on Communist insurgency in Venezuela. Secret. 4 pp. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Venezuela, March–May 1963.↩