106. Memorandum from Brubeck to Dungan, January 241

[Facsimile Page 1]

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RALPH DUNGAN THE WHITE HOUSE

THROUGH

  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy

SUBJECT

  • Your Request for a copy of the Contingency Paper on Ecuador

In accordance with your request to Assistant Secretary Martin I am transmitting to you a copy of the Contingency Paper on Ecuador recently prepared by ARA and approved by Under Secretary McGhee. The paper was transmitted to Embassy Quito for comment. The Embassy has indicated its general approval. The paper has not been cleared outside the Department of State but will be discussed at the Latin American Policy Committee meeting on Ecuador on January 31.

/s/ Howard Fumas
for
William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary
[Facsimile Page 2]

Enclosure

Contingency Paper on Ecuador

Background

There is reason to believe that President Arosemena will not be able to complete his term of office scheduled to end on September 1, 1964. This paper is designed to review the contingencies which conceivably might occur in the latter eventuality and to set forth recommended U.S. positions thereon.

[text not declassified]

Arosemena’s success in maintaining himself in office as long as he has is due to a number of fortuitous circumstances as well as to his [Typeset Page 263] own physical resiliency and political ingenuity. To date at least, his opponents in the various non-communist political movements have been unable to act in unison or with sufficient vigor and despatch to oust him. In repeated instances when the President was physically unable to resist any move against him, the procrastination and indecisiveness of the opposition allowed him sufficient time to recover physically and regain control of the situation. Perhaps the most critical factor in the President’s staying power has been the frequently declared determination of the armed forces to uphold [Facsimile Page 3] constitutional procedures. The position taken by the armed forces has effectively limited Arosemena’s opponents to seeking constitutional means of ousting him. These efforts have revolved around the constitutional provision which states, inter alia, that the President shall cease to exercise the duties of his office when he is declared to be permanently incapacitated mentally or physically.

In view of the progressively more serious consequences of his alcoholism, both physical and political, it is believed likely that a change in government based on the constitutional provision relating to physical and mental incapacity is impending. The most likely contingencies in the above eventuality are presented below.

a) Accession of Vice President Varca to Presidency

The constitutional successor to Arosemena is Vice President Varca. Although for some time under a cloud because of alleged complicity in an arms purchase scandal, the Vice President recently was cleared of the charges by an overwhelming vote of the Ecuadorean Senate. Varca is a former Army Lt. Col., once served as Assistant Military Attaché in Washington, and has held the positions of Commanding General of the National Police, Minister of Defense, and Senator.

The Vice President’s forceful action during the recent Cuban crisis in assuring GOE support for the U.S. position at a time when President Arosemena was incapacitated by a drinking bout is a hopeful indication of what might be expected from his prospective administration.

Varca is known to have presidential ambitions and field reports indicate some military and political support for his accession to the presidency should Arosemena be unable to continue in office. The Vice President’s main strength lies in the priority of his claim to succeed to the presidency under the constitution. The constitutional question is particularly important in view of the above cited attitude of the armed forces. Nevertheless it is possible that the military and political leaderships might find Varca unacceptable and reach agreement on a compromise successor to Arosemena.

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Recommended U.S. Position

Unless there is determined and widespread popular opposition, the U.S. should support Vice President Varca’s accession to the presidency as the logical and constitutional successor to Arosemena.

b) Accession of Compromise Candidate to Presidency

There is still resistance among some political elements, particularly the rightists, to the possible accession of Vice President Varca to the [Facsimile Page 4] presidency. Varca, it is claimed, is still tainted by the allegations made against him in the arms purchase scandal and therefore is not a suitable candidate for the presidency. It is therefore conceivable that Varca might be induced to step aside for a compromise candidate. The chances for this contingency might be enhanced if the expected ouster of President Arosemena encountered difficulties and required concerted action by a number of political and military elements. Any effort at this time to identify possible compromise candidates by name would be highly speculative at best.

Recommended U.S. Position

Support adherence to constitutional procedures to the extent possible under existing circumstances and urge upon military and political leaders the importance of selecting a political moderate who will maintain Ecuador’s recently expressed concern in the OAS over the menace of international communism in this hemisphere and continue the efforts begun under the Alliance for Progress toward social reform and economic development.

c) Report by Arosemena to the Military

It is conceivable that faced with the likelihood of being ousted and believing that he has lost any hope of continued support from the Democratic Front, Arosemena may attempt to use the armed forces to stay in office in the face of widespread popular opinion that he resign or be ousted. It is known that Arosemena’s wholesale shuffling of the armed forces high command was designed to eliminate potential threats from that direction to his continuance in office. In large measure the President’s efforts have been successful, at least in so far as the top echelon of the armed forces is concerned. In the event the degree of his physical incapacity is doubtful, Arosemena may attempt to use the military to frustrate efforts to remove him from office. He could under such circumstances call upon the military to uphold the constitution and support him on the grounds that he obviously is not “permanently incapacitated”.

The degree to which the military might support Arosemena under these circumstances, particularly in the face of widespread popular feeling to remove him from office, probably would be limited. Assum[Typeset Page 265]ing that the military high command did support the President and were themselves successful in retaining the support of the bulk of the armed forces, it seems highly doubtful that Arosemena could for very long maintain himself in office solely with the backing of the military. Nor is it likely that the latter would for very long, if at all, continue to support the President in the face of widespread popular feeling that his usefulness to the country had come to an end.

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Recommended U.S. Position

To make it forcefully clear to military leaders and to Arosemena that apart from the issue of constitutionality the best interests of the country are not served by attempting to thwart the will of the majority of the country’s democratic political elements.

d) Appeal by Arosemena to the Extreme Left

In the event that Arosemena believes that he has lost the support of both the Democratic Front and the military it is conceivable that he might resort to making a demagogic appeal for help to the extreme left. This contingency in particular could produce serious disorders. It is not certain that the extreme left would take any overt action in support of the President under such circumstances in view of the almost certain reaction of the military and democratic political groups. In any such eventuality it is believed that the military would be capable of controlling the situation and assuring that the extreme left did not come into power. Any such effort by Arosemena would be one of desperation and probably would ensure his immediate departure from the political scene.

Recommended U.S. Position

Oppose any effort to establish the extreme left as the political base for Arosemena’s continuance in office. Invite the Ecuadorean military to request emergency assistance from the United States deemed necessary to maintain order. Inform appropriate democratic military and political leaders that the ouster of Arosemena would not adversely effect United States-Ecuadorean relations.

e) Return of Former President Velasco

In the event that a more suitable successor to Arosemena cannot be agreed upon, it is conceivable that former President Velasco may be called upon to complete the balance of his term which began in September 1960. Velasco’s supporters maintain that he did not formally resign in November 1961 and therefore is still Ecuador’s constitutional president, a position which is debatable. There is reason to believe, however, that Velasco would prefer to wait until 1964 and run for a full four year term rather than complete the balance of the term he [Typeset Page 266] began in 1960. Velasco already has declared himself to be a candidate in 1964. Many seasonal Ecuadorean political observers believe that he still retains his remarkable hold on the Ecuadorean masses and has an excellent chance of becoming President for an unprecedented fifth term.

Recommended U.S. Position

Accept Velasco’s return to office, convince him of the genuine desire of the United States to assist Ecuador to achieve the social and economic [Facsimile Page 6] reforms which he himself has so eloquently espoused in the past, and attempt to use his popular appeal to the Ecuadorean masses as a vehicle for arousing a national sense of purpose for achieving genuine reforms. At the same time it should be made abundantly clear that any return to a neutralist position on the Cuban issue by Ecuador will have serious consequences on U.S.-Ecuadorean relations.

f) Military Coup

While unlikely, it is conceivable that events subsequent to the ouster of Arosemena, particularly the inability of the military and political leaderships to agree on a successor, could result in an attempt to establish a military junta in control of the government. While there are strong factors against such an eventuality it is always possible that the example set by Peru might appeal to Ecuador’s military leadership as a solution to the problem of naming a successor to Arosemena. Even if such a contingency did occur, it is not believed that it would be of long duration. The marked tendency of the Ecuadorean military in recent years to play a passive role in politics, to avoid interfering arbitrarily in civilian government, and to uphold the constitution make it likely that a military coup would be of a short duration, for limited purposes, and would provide for a return to civilian government within a short time.

Recommended U.S. Position

Extend recognition to the Junta as soon as several other OAS states have done so, assuming that the Junta’s basic orientation does not conflict with the goals of the Alliance for Progress and the recent stand taken by Ecuador in the OAS on the Cuban issue. Exert our influence for the earliest possible return to democratic, constitutional government.

  1. Transmits a copy of the Contingency Paper on Ecuador. Secret. 6 pp. DOS, CF, 722.00/1–2463.