Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

53. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, June 22, 1979

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Ha Van Lau
• Counselor Pham Duong
• Counselor Cu Dinh Ba
• Robert B. Oakley
• Deputy Assistant Secretary
• Ambassador Donald McHenry
• USUN Mission, New York
• Stephen R. Lyne
• Director, EA/VLC

MCHENRY: Thank you for receiving us this afternoon on such short notice. My colleagues came here from Washington.

HA VAN LAU: I am pleased to be able to welcome Ambassador McHenry, Secretary Oakley, and his colleague here this afternoon.

OAKLEY: Mr. Ambassador, Secretary Vance asked me to give you his personal greetings and to say that he is looking forward to seeing you soon. He enjoyed seeing you again last fall.

As you know, Secretary Vance is leaving this weekend with the President for the Tokyo Summit. He will then proceed to meet with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Bali and with the ANZUS Foreign Ministers in Canberra.²

One of the key issues in these meetings will be the situation in Indochina and its effect on the region as a whole. We wanted to have an opportunity to convey a message to your government which clearly sets out our views on these important problems before Secretary Vance left, to ensure that there is no misunderstanding and in the hope that it could eventually help convince your government to seek an approach which would lead to cooperation rather than confrontation.

In discussing the regional effects of the situation in Indochina, the first concern of the governments represented at Tokyo and Bali will be the massive exodus of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea. Our two governments have directly discussed this matter before; Mr. Holbrooke discussed it here with Mr. Thach last fall,³ and we discussed it with Ambassador Sung at the UNHCR meeting in Geneva in December.⁴ Our most recent high-level authoritative statements on the subject are those made by Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke last week;⁵ they expressed great concern over the tragedy of so much human suffering and called upon your government to adopt more humane policies.

We continue to support the principle of free emigration. Our hope is that an understanding can be reached between your government, your citizens, and the international community which would achieve an orderly flow of refugees and family reunions at levels commensurate with the ability of the international community to absorb them. The problem now is simply that there are so many refugees coming out that there is no place for them.

In frankness, all of the considerable information available to us indicates that the recent sharp increase in the refugee exodus from Vietnam represents a deliberate policy on the part of the Vietnamese government. This also applies to part of the refugees who have left Kampuchea for Thailand. The statements of your government concerning Vietnamese citizens of Chinese descent tend to reinforce this belief as do other statements your officials have made about over a half million people you believe will leave Vietnam.

We are aware of the agreement which has been reached between you and the UNHCR on family reunions.⁶ It is a good agreement. We stand ready to facilitate the movement of family reunification cases directly to the U.S. We do not believe that this agreement, however, changes your obligation to establish conditions which do not force your people to flee, knowing they risk drowning at sea or, at best, long years in a refugee camp, rather than remain in Vietnam, Kampuchea or Laos. Also, only about 2,000 persons qualified for this program in March, yet well over 60,000 persons fled Vietnam by sea and landed elsewhere in Southeast Asia; an additional 30–40,000 persons probably died.

You are aware of the proposal to hold an international conference on refugees. We support the idea of such a conference based on humanitarian concerns and objectives, believing that it will assist in energizing the international community to do its part in responding to the problems caused by the refugee exodus. We know that some want a conference solely for a political discussion. We believe that major political debate should be held in a forum appropriate for such a debate. We believe that such a conference can help the refugees themselves, your government, and other governments in the region. We hope that your government can see its way clear to attending such a conference, for the purpose of working with the international community to establish regularized procedures to handle the refugee problem, and to take actions which will lessen the burden on the refugees and on the other countries of the world.⁷

The refugee problem does not only arise in connection with the boat people from Vietnam, as you are aware.

These are tens of thousands of people fleeing from Kampuchea into Thailand. Their arrival there exacerbates the crisis Thailand is already facing because of the number of refugees to whom it has given temporary asylum. We believe that these refugees also complicate the already dangerous situation on the border between Thailand and Kampuchea. Your government must bear a considerable degree of responsibility for both these situations because of the presence of your troops inside Kampuchea.

We have already raised with your government our concern about the possibility of an inadvertent military confrontation between Thai and Vietnamese forces as a result of your military activities in Kampuchea along the border with Thailand. The refugee problem makes this situation even more difficult and complicated. Given our close relationship with Thailand, with which we have treaty commitments, the dangers which could arise from incidents involving Vietnamese and Thai forces are obviously of great concern to us.

Everything we have done since the beginning of this Administration has been designed to bring peace to Southeast Asia. We discussed last fall here with representatives of the SRV and also with Mr. Waldheim our fear that events would lead in turn to escalation, thus increasing the danger of great power involvement in the region. Unfortunately, this is what occurred. We are afraid that, given the situation between Thailand and Vietnam, it could happen again. We desire if at all possible to avoid the great dangers of escalation, an escalation which could rapidly spread, as well as increasing the degree of great power involvement in the area.

We cannot stress too much our concern over the humanitarian issues facing Southeast Asia, their political consequences for your country as well as for other countries, and the danger of expanded conflict. We hope that your government will take every precaution against any possible expansion of the conflict, will seek a political solution to the conflict in Kampuchea, and will consider very seriously how you can truly cooperate with the rest of the world to find a common solution to the refugee problem.

As Mr. Holbrooke stressed in his first talks with Phan Hien in May of 1977,⁸ the U.S. desires normal relations with Vietnam in the context of lasting peace and stability in Indochina and of all Southeast Asia. Indications last fall that your policies were beginning to run counter to that objective caused us to seek clarification of what you intended and your subsequent actions obliged us to suspend further movement toward normalization.⁹

It is our hope that there can be a return to peace and stability in Indochina and in all Southeast Asia. This would relieve the suffering of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea, and would permit all governments in the region to rededicate themselves to the key tasks of economic and social development. It would also reduce understandable fear among many nations that the presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea is intended to impose a non-representative government upon an independent state and that your government has designs on other states. It would reverse the trend toward worsening relations between your government and the other states in Southeast Asia and would also create conditions under which we could resume our movement toward establishing normal relations.

Secretary Vance has also asked me to convey his appreciation for your personal assistance in facilitating the return of Mr. Garwood¹⁰ to the United States from Vietnam. As you know, the Administration, the Congress, and the American people remain intensely interested in any cooperation you can provide us on the matter of MIAs. It is an issue of considerable importance. The cooperation that we received earlier was extremely important and I told Vu Hoang in Jakarta that we needed to resume this cooperation.¹¹

Secretary Vance wanted to be sure that you had a good understanding of the position of our government before he left on his trip to Asia.

I would like to express to you our appreciation for your agreeing to receive the Congressional delegation led by Congressman Wolff.¹² We believe that visits of Congresswoman Holtzman and Congressman Evans¹³ earlier this year help to improve the understanding between our two countries.

If I might, Mr. Ambassador, I would ask you to help us to resolve the case of a ship in your custody, the Algernon. According to details provided to us by your Embassy in Paris, the ship apparently ran into difficulty some 80 miles off your coast and was brought into Vung Tau by a Soviet ship. Your government, through our contacts in Paris, has told us that it is aware that the ship is there, and promised us a speedy resolution of the situation. Unfortunately, we have not yet received any further details about the ship nor has the ICRC been able to establish contact with the crew. (The interpreter took careful notes and Ha Van Lau nodded).

HA VAN LAU: First of all I want to thank Mr. McHenry and Mr. Oakley for coming here today. I also thank you for the greetings from Secretary Vance. I ask you to convey my greetings to the Secretary.

As for the message you just raised, I consider it to be a verbal message from Secretary Vance who asks me to convey it to my government. So I will do my duty.

OAKLEY: Both the President and Secretary Vance wanted to be sure that your government was aware of our position before they leave.

HA VAN LAU: I understand that they are leaving tomorrow. Do you want a response before the Secretary leaves?

OAKLEY: No. We just wanted to be sure you had our views before we left.

HA VAN LAU: You can be sure I will convey this message. One question remains in my mind. I do not know why this message had to be delivered before the Secretary leaves.

OAKLEY: We wanted to deliver it because some of the discussions during the trip will concern your government. We feel it only proper and correct to convey our position on these issues that concern you in advance. I know that you have no response from Hanoi in response to our earlier request. We believe it important, however, to do this, to tell you our views. We thank you for receiving us.

HA VAN LAU: Although I have no instructions from my government I can express my personal views. We also have the views of our government on these problems of refugees, normalization, Kampuchea, and other concrete matters.

About one question you raised; you referred to a foundation for cooperation and not confrontation. But your actions and your speech do not conform to that. That is my first impression. For example, Tran Quang Co, when he was here staying for the meetings of the working groups was here for cooperation not for confrontation. We wanted a process of cooperation. As we have stated on many occasions we believe normalization of relations between our two countries would contribute to peace and stability in Southeast Asia. We have done many things to show our good will. If that is not yet achieved, it is not our responsibility.

As for other problems, such as refugees, I want to stress that we have never had a policy of forcing out people. That allegation has already been made in public by you. It is unfounded.

OAKLEY: Let me be precise. We have never said that the Vietnamese government forced people to flee. But the conditions created by your government are such that people voluntarily choose to flee, often paying large amounts of money to get a boat knowing that half of them will die.

Our problem is with the conditions which cause them to make this choice, not that they are put on ships at the point of a bayonet.

HA VAN LAU: These conditions you talk about come from the loudspeaker of China. They are not reality. Those allegations we deny as slanders. Our internal policy is our own. Perhaps it is not clear to you, or perhaps you do not want to understand it. To allege that we force people to the new economic zones, and then because they do not want to go they flee, is a distortion. The new economic zones is our government’s policy to attempt to distribute resources and to develop resources throughout the country.

Under earlier regimes these lands were not used; people were concentrated in Ho Chi Minh City, Qui Nhon, and Danang. Now that the former regimes have been overthrown, we have begun to distribute manpower throughout the country. Each citizen must contribute to this policy. Already the policy has brought good results. But there is a small minority who formerly lived on the blackmarket were non-productive traders do not want to sweat or labor or to endure hardship with those who have lived through thirty years of war and hardship.

OAKLEY: We understand that you are purifying your society. Nevertheless, the effect of doing so so rapidly and the shortage of resources is causing people to do desperate things.

HA VAN LAU: If they don’t work, they starve; they must produce.

OAKLEY: That is why Ambassador Young has suggested the idea of refugee camps perhaps on some of your outlying islands.

HA VAN LAU: We do not need such camps. We do not need such concentration camps as you established in Vietnam.

MCHENRY: We are not proposing concentration camps; we are attempting to bring regularity out of chaos.

HA VAN LAU: While we gradually attempted to reconstruct our country, there were forces at work to sabotage our reconstruction as you know.

As for Kampuchea our troops in Kampuchea are not there to push Khmer into Thailand. Now the Thai government is forcing them back. Who bears the responsibility for this?

OAKLEY: We have complained to the Thai Government too.

MCHENRY: We need to sit down and to discuss the questions so that the difficulties and loss of life are reduced. We need to take into account whatever programs you have so as to build up your country. The international community and you need to work to reduce the loss of life and to reduce suffering, not to create chaos in all the surrounding countries. That is what most people are trying to get at. That is why we discuss an international conference.

We hope that your government and our government can deal realistically in a constructive atmosphere. One thing is for sure; there is a massive dislocation and we have to deal with two factors. We have to take care of those being dislocated. We have to see if we can reduce the suffering and see that the situation does not continue to develop. You have discussed the idea of a conference with the Secretary General. Have you received a response from your government?

HA VAN LAU: The Foreign Ministry has issued a statement in which we agreed to an international conference under the conditions listed.

OAKLEY: But these conditions are related only to 2,000 people, while 60,000, maybe 100,000, left by sea. Your agreement with the High Commissioner deals with only a small part of the problem.

HA VAN LAU: The Secretary General is thinking about the conference.

MCHENRY: Yes, he is trying to find a way of dealing realistically with the problems, free of political invective.

HA VAN LAU: It is not because we have concern about political discussion. It is a problem for the High Commissioner. It is a clear question of a humanitarian character. It also creates problems and difficulties with our neighboring countries and creates difficulties for us inside our country. Why should we create difficulties for ourselves?

The words of Secretary Vance’s message convey the idea that he is putting the responsibility on us. Why should we create difficulties for ourselves? We are not the source of all events.

OAKLEY: Maybe not, but people are leaving your country, the efforts to date, last fall and earlier for example have not been successful in dealing with the problem. As a result relations between you and your neighbors are getting worse.

MCHENRY: I am glad to hear that you have no policy of expelling ethnic Chinese. That worries me because of the dimensions of the problem for all Southeast Asian countries and for your own country. I am delighted to hear this is your policy. I am sure that the Secretary will be glad to hear it.

Mr. Ambassador, I am sorry, but I have to go now to dedicate the lunar space model . . . .

1. Source: Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1977–1979, Lot 82D129, Vietnam, 1979. Secret. The meeting took place at the SRV UN Mission in New York.
2. After the June 25–29 Economic Summit in Tokyo, Vance accompanied Carter on a state visit to South Korea June 30–July 1, then visited Bali July 1–3 and Canberra July 3–5.
3. See Documents 26 and 27.
4. See footnote 2, Document 35.
5. Reference is to Vance’s remarks during his June 13 press conference; see Department of State Bulletin, August 1979, pp. 23–24. Holbrooke testified before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs on June 13. For his testimony, see Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, pp. 34–37.
6. The Memorandum of Understanding Between the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was signed on May 30. See American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1977–1980, pp. 1109–1110.
7. A meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia took place at the United Nations in Geneva July 20–21. Description of the conference is in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 918–919. See also Document 138.
8. See Documents 11–13.
9. See Documents 33 and 35.
10. Robert Garwood, an American prisoner of war.
11. Presumably Oakley met with Vu Hoang at the May 15–16 Jakarta Conference on Indochinese Refugees.
12. The congressional delegation visited Hanoi August 10–12. (Telegram 29213 from Bangkok, August 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790366–0348)
13. See footnote 6, Document 48.