Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

138. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, July 25, 1979

UN Conference on Indochinese Refugees

The Geneva Conference on Indochinese Refugees July 20–21 resulted in significant progress in coping with the humanitarian aspects of the refugee problem,² continuing the process initiated at the Economic Summit in Tokyo and at Bali. Total resources contributed and pledged met the goals set by the UNHCR for resettlement and funding. Resettlement commitments now exceed 260,000, more than double the pre-Tokyo level; and funding pledges for the UNHCR Indochina program have reached approximately $190 million, not including a Japanese pledge to fund half the UNHCR program in Southeast Asia.

The announced United States programs of increased resettlement of refugees and funding for the UNHCR, rescue at sea, support for Refugee Processing Centers (RPCs) and the proposal for an International Resettlement Fund were important in setting direction and pace; and the momentum of the meeting was aided dramatically by the Philippine announcement that it would provide an island for a Refugee Processing Center to hold up to 50,000. Canada was outstanding with a tripling of its resettlement rate to 3,000 per month, and France increased its intake by an additional 5,000.

On the other hand, some countries could have done much more than they did in terms of resettlement offers and financial pledges, e.g., the FRG. Argentina is the only Latin American country to indicate significant interest in resettlement and there was no significant African offer. Indonesia has not yet agreed to a large Refugee Processing Center.

Among the other delegations taking a prominent role, the British performed reasonably well, considering the balance of pressures on their government, and pledged to take 10,000 refugees from Hong Kong. The Chinese played a low-key role, were relatively non-obstructionist, and offered to accept 10,000 refugees from Southeast Asian camps for permanent resettlement, though not yet agreeing to provide an RPC. The USSR took the standard line, blaming Sino-U.S. collusion for the problem.

The Vietnamese performance was the most interesting and hard to judge. First, they (and the USSR) are clearly feeling concerted international moral/political pressure and announced their intention to reduce the outflow of refugees. How much of the outflow and for how long remain to be determined; and so does the vital question of how Vietnam will treat those who are no longer able to leave by sea. Despite this “moratorium,” we expect that a much-reduced but still sizeable number will leave in genuine, non-sanctioned, escapes. Second, the Vietnamese continued their efforts to place the entire responsibility for the refugee exodus upon the United States and China, also claiming inability to control it, even after having undertaken to stop “illegal departures for a reasonable period of time.” Their propaganda was moderately effective, and the idea of a moratorium was a great relief to the countries of Southeast Asia. Third, Vietnam reiterated its offer of a controlled program of departures in cooperation with the UNHCR. We are willing to participate in a family reunification program involving United States consular personnel on TDY in Vietnam serving as part of the UNHCR office to process prospective immigrants. We will watch very closely any specific Vietnamese proposals for an expanded program.

The ASEAN countries did not adopt a unified approach and took no major initiatives. They were generally pleased, however, with the outcome of the meeting, although Thailand was concerned that neither the land refugee problem nor the Kampuchean situation received adequate attention. Since Geneva, there has been no information one way or the other as to whether Malaysia or Thailand has moderated its policy of discouraging arrivals, although probably, in practice, their behavior will continue to be mixed, depending on local officials. Indonesia, though withholding its decision on a large RPC, has not maintained a strict cordon against refugee arrivals and did not indicate any prospective change in this practice.

As noted by Waldheim in his summation, the meeting was the scene of numerous bilateral and multilateral meetings off the floor. In his meetings with fifteen Foreign Ministers, with Waldheim and with High Commissioner Hartling, the Vice President stressed, as he did in his speech,³ that the time had come to deal not only with the human misery and political repercussions of the refugee exodus but also to see what could be done about the causes of the tragedy.⁴

Overall, substantial progress was made at Geneva in meeting the immediate humanitarian problems. Immediate follow-up actions must be taken to consolidate this progress, by ourselves as well as by the UNHCR and other concerned governments. We must pursue establishment of the proposed RPCs on an urgent basis, activating that offered by Marcos and seeking additional offers to put them into operation as soon as humanly possible. Actions are well underway to increase air and sea search and rescue operations; more will follow. We will have to watch Japan closely to make sure that it lives up to its commitment to fund half of the UNHCR’s costs in Southeast Asia and the ROK for its commitment in connection with infrastructure support for the RPCs. Secretary General Waldheim stated that he will report on the refugee situation and the implementation of the UNHCR’s action plan to the upcoming UN General Assembly.

We will want to use the General Assembly to maintain the international momentum for solving the refugee problem and to encourage various UN agencies to contribute to this process. Most important, we must maintain the international pressures upon Vietnam to take concrete measures to provide more humane treatment for its people. We wish to implement an international program of orderly departure from Vietnam, including family reunification for the United States, but we do not wish to let Vietnam use this or its “moratorium” to temporize and evade its responsibilities. In addition, we recognize that it is necessary to maintain pressure for a political solution in Kampuchea. While this received little attention at Geneva, as was also the case with land refugees, it is part of the over-all threat to the stability of Southeast Asia arising from the situation in Indochina. We will be consulting ASEAN and other governments on the desirability of a UN Security Council meeting as a means of maintaining the pressure on Vietnam.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Defense/Security, Molander, Box 80, Refugees (Indochinese), 7–10/79. Confidential.
2. See also Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 918–919.
3. See Department of State Bulletin, October 1979, pp. 1–3. Mondale headed the U.S. delegation.
4. No records of these meetings have been found.