27. Memorandum From Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

SUBJECT

  • Dick Holbrooke’s Meeting with the Vietnamese at the UNGA, September 27, 19782

In a word, the Vietnamese have dropped their demand for reparation or a promise of assistance and are prepared to establish diplomatic relations with us without precondition. In fact, they are panting to lock up the deal. (S)

Given our previous position, the main choices that confront us involve the pace at which we move ahead and whether—as we move ahead—we decide that we wish clarification as to Vietnam’s intent vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Cambodia. (S)

You asked that I attend the meeting in part to keep an eye on Holbrooke. Holbrooke performed reasonably well, though I think he did more to seek to ingratiate himself with the Vietnamese than I would have done by going out of his way to point out the many nice things we have done for the Vietnamese in the past months. Since I personally believe we owe the Vietnamese nothing, I see no reason for our indicating to them that we have sought to facilitate the extension of humanitarian aid to Vietnam and to provide indirect assistance through international financial institutions. But I am talking here about matters of Dick’s personal style and political convictions which did not adversely affect the course of the negotiations and perhaps even helped them somewhat. (S)

One could sense Vietnam’s weakness during the discussions. Their economic difficulties, their conflict with Cambodia and their tensions with China place them in a very disadvantageous position. But we should not be lulled into thinking that the Vietnamese harbor anything but hostile feelings toward us. Until yesterday’s meeting, I never thought I would meet any people who would surpass the Chinese in [Page 94] the art of false flattery, but the Vietnamese make the Chinese look like pikers. (S)

The question is, where do we go on Vietnam policy from here? Thus far, I would stress to you, our Vietnam policy has been set through the Secretary’s Evening Items and the President’s marginalia. I suggest that the time has now come for a serious Vance to the President memorandum outlining the options we now face with respect to Vietnam, with an assessment of how each of those options would impact on our relations with China, the Soviet Union, the ASEAN countries, Japan, and the emergence of a humanitarian and independent Cambodian regime. (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A3 to the President authorizing you to obtain from State an options paper on Vietnam policy4 which has been coordinated with DOD, CIA, and where pertinent, Treasury and Commerce.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 85, Vietnam, 1/77–12/78. Secret. Sent for action. Brzezinski wrote at the top of the first page, “DA [David Aaron], Ask State for eval[uation] or paper. ZB.” A handwritten notation at the top of the memorandum reads, “OBE.” Inderfurth also initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
  2. No other record of this meeting has been found.
  3. Not attached.
  4. Inderfurth underlined “an options paper on Vietnam policy.” Underneath the recommendation, he wrote, “This is certainly needed. RI.” Under Inderfurth’s note, David Aaron wrote, “I agree. DA. But we also need an assessment of cumulative impact on China. I will meet with MO [Oksenberg] next week. The memo Mike proposes may be OBE? DA.”