Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

33. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, November 30, 1978, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

OAKLEY: Let me try to clarify our current thinking for you. I realize that we owe you a response and we are aware that we are now a little tardy in this regard, as your diplomatic note of November 24 delivered in Paris² so helpfully reminded us.

CO: Our note? Yes.

OAKLEY: But let me try to provide you some clarification. During our last meeting here in New York, on October 17,³ we agreed that we would continue our preparations for the working group discussions. This we have done, and our preparations are now in fairly good shape.

However in the meantime, several questions have arisen, which have created a certain amount of concern in my government.

First of all, we were somewhat surprised to learn from other governments with representatives in Hanoi, that your government has been describing our talks in New York in a manner not entirely consistent with the facts of what transpired.

We have heard that your government has said that we have reached agreement to normalize relations, and that we would normalize relations before the end of the year. In addition, your note of November 24 also said things that do not correspond with the facts of the matter.

This poses certain questions. It is, of course, normal to have consultations with other governments since a number of nations are interested in the status of our normalization talks, and we ourselves have had such consultations. But to lead others into error, whether intentionally or inadvertently, gives rise to concern.

For example, in your note of November 24 and the conversations you have had with other governments, you appear to have taken as agreed the piece of paper Mr. Thach gave us on October 17.⁴ And yet I was not in a position to agree to such a piece of paper during that meeting. Mr. Thach recognized this, and said he hoped there could be another meeting soon at which agreement would be reached. And, of course, another meeting with Mr. Thach did not occur, so there was no agreement. We have heard this from other governments and it appears to be reflected in your note of November 24. That is one question.

But having said this, let me affirm to you once again our position on normalization. It remains unchanged. At this time, we are continuing to examine the practical questions involved in the establishment of relations.

However, the timing of further conversations between us on these issues has been affected by our need to have a clearer understanding of the future implications of present developments in the region.

CO: Would you please be specific?

OAKLEY: I should say that everything I am saying to you this morning has been approved by Secretary Vance. The Secretary continues to believe, as he told Ambassador Ha Van Lau, that our discussions have formed a good basis for proceeding toward normalization. But he has asked that we raise certain questions with you in order to understand the foundation of your policies. Our position, I repeat, has not changed but we would like to receive clarification on certain points.

First of all, the escalation in military conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia threatens stability in Southeast Asia and causes us concern. This was reflected in our recent letter to the Security Council drawing attention to this situation.⁵ In so doing, and in all of our actions in this regard, we have not wished to take sides nor have we assigned blame to one side or the other but simply expressed our concern that this situation endangers regional peace and stability.

This is also the case with the tensions which appear to be increasing between Vietnam and China. We have noted your reports of military clashes along this border, but we have not been able to confirm them. Again, we have never tried to blame anyone for this increase in tension because we know that the situation has long roots and is very complicated.

Perhaps you saw yesterday’s article in the New York Times by Henry Kamm.⁶ It said that Vietnam was stepping up its military actions inside Cambodia. This is not necessarily the U.S. Government’s viewpoint, but we are concerned over the situation. There is a danger that the conflict will escalate, particularly since there are no indications that any efforts are being made to defuse the situation.

I would also like to raise with you your recent signing of a treaty with the . . .

CO: The Russians?

OAKLEY: Yes. The Soviet-Vietnamese treaty raises questions about the future role of the USSR in the region and about your assurances of maintaining your independence and sovereignty and not allowing a Soviet military presence in Vietnam. We do not question Vietnam’s right to conclude such a treaty. That is fully in keeping with your status as an independent nation.

Nevertheless, this development inevitably poses certain questions regarding the assurances given by Mr. Phan Hien and Mr. Nguyen Co Thach regarding your country’s attachment to an independent foreign policy. In this connection, I would note that we even have some reports that the Soviets have told other Southeast Asian governments its naval vessels intend to use Vietnamese ports, even to include Cam Ranh Bay.

CO: (Laughter). That’s news to us.

OAKLEY: Yes, we also found these reports surprising. After all, we have consistently said that we have no information to confirm the existence of Soviet bases in your country. Therefore, we are concerned over such reports and over their implications.

As Mr. Holbrooke has told you on several occasions, we remain determined not to take sides in regional conflicts. But we remain gravely concerned over these cumulative developments because of the threat they could pose to regional peace and security.

For example, a number of people have compared the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty and the Soviet-Indian Treaty of 1971.⁷ But let us remember that India began a war against Pakistan shortly after concluding this treaty, which apparently gave them confidence that China would not intervene. There are obvious differences, of course, in these two treaties. Vietnam and the Soviet Union are both socialist states, whereas India shares few common traditions with the USSR. But we hope the similarity does not extend to a major conflict following signature of the treaty.

CO: In other words, as with the rumors of the Soviet fleet.

OAKLEY: We are concerned about the impact of the treaty and the effect it might have on the region. No people have more reason to be weary of the burdens of war. As things are developing, there is a danger you risk being caught in a struggle between other powers.

We do not wish our dialogue on normalization to become caught up in this struggle for regional influence but we must have a clearer view of what lies ahead.

We are eager to see tensions and conflict in the area reduced and eventually eliminated. Thus our hope is that a visit to the area by Secretary General Waldheim would help reduce tensions. As a sovereign nation, such a visit is a matter for decision between you and him. But your government has apparently not been able to confirm your invitation, which could make others think that you might have a hidden reason for not having Mr. Waldheim visit at this time. This could be misinterpreted, particularly in light of what is reported to be happening in Cambodia. We would welcome any clarification your government might be able to provide in this regard.

Regarding our own policy in the region, Mr. Holbrooke has asked me to give you copies of two speeches he gave recently on this subject.⁸ He asked that you transmit them to Mr. Thach along with his very best wishes. Mr. Holbrooke greatly appreciated his recent talks with Mr. Thach and wishes to reiterate his high respect for him and for his commitment to the goal of normalization.

I would like to raise another question, which though perhaps of secondary importance, is still of concern to us and relates to the military equipment of U.S. origin in Vietnam. Recently we have received reports which we want to bring to your attention which indicate that there is a former American helicopter at the airport in Havana, Cuba with Vietnamese markings. In addition, we are aware of continuing efforts by a foreign businessman to sell U.S. arms abroad.

CO: Do you mean Mr. Eisenberg?

OAKLEY: (Nods). As you know, we have continued to reaffirm that you have acted very correctly in this matter and that we have no information you have allowed any of these arms to leave your country. Now we have a specific report. This may be a small point, but it is of concern to us.

CO: Could you go into detail regarding the helicopter?

OAKLEY: (Provides details.) There could of course be a legitimate explanation but we would appreciate clarification. Your correct behavior with regard to this military equipment has so far been a reassuring sign of your sincerity.

Now I would like to raise a third matter which is refugees. As you know, Vice Minister Phan Hien complained during our meeting in Paris in December 1977⁹ that the United States was inducing refugees to leave your country. But now we understand that Prime Minister Pham Van Dong expressed pleasure during his recent tour of Southeast Asia that refugees were being well received there.

The United States itself is of course a nation of immigrants, made up of all sorts of people who fled religious or political persecution. We have a firm commitment to free emigration and a humanitarian tradition of welcoming refugees to our country. In this connection, I would note that Vietnamese refugees have done particularly well after their arrival in the United States. You may have seen a November 27 article in U.S. News and World Report which said that 95 percent of the Vietnamese refugees have found work.

But, the present situation, with well over 10,000 persons per month leaving Vietnam, serves no one’s interest. Some organization must be brought to this situation, as you have done with individuals departing for France and Taiwan. This need not necessarily be done on the basis of formal agreements. Tacit arrangements could also serve to resolve this problem. This is the sort of problem which can be resolved, as was possible following World War II in Europe.

But the situation in Southeast Asia is reaching truly crisis proportions. Other governments in Southeast Asia are very disturbed over the manner in which this problem has become a nearly-unmanageable problem for them.

As you know, there will be a conference on this situation in December under the auspices of the UNHCR to discuss the Indochina refugee situation.¹⁰ We realize that you yourselves face problems and that you are now caring for 150,000 refugees in cooperation with Mr. Hartling. We understand that you are doing a good job and that your efforts on behalf of the Cambodian refugees greatly impressed Congressman Montgomery during his visit to your country. But it strikes some as strange that you are unwilling to cooperate with Mr. Hartling and the UNHCR regarding refugees leaving Vietnam. This is very disturbing to others, especially the countries which Prime Minister Pham Van Dong recently visited.

We would hope that a means could be found whereby departures from your country could be better organized. It is particularly important to resolve the reports that individuals are required to make a payment to officials of your government in order to depart.¹¹ This has a very bad effect on Vietnam’s international image.

CO: I would like to respond.

OAKLEY: I am raising these matters because they should be of concern to you, and because their continuation does not serve your interests or those of anyone else. We would hope that you would be able to attend the December meeting on refugees. For our part, we have pledged to redouble our efforts to find shelter for these refugees. Other countries are doing so as.¹² Nevertheless, if refugee departures could be better organized, it would serve the interests of everyone.

You may be aware of Attorney General Bell’s testimony before the Congress on the numbers of refugees we would be admitting. He was asked over and over again why Vietnamese are fleeing their country. What kind of situation would make them leave in such large numbers? What information did he have that people were being forced to pay bribes to leave? In this last area, we do not have proof regarding how much involvement there might be on the part of the central Vietnamese government, but the number of reports of local officials involved raises serious questions in the minds of many in this country.

CO: I have the impression that there are now several obstacles in the path of normalization.

OAKLEY: Our position on normalization is the same, but we seek clarification on the points I have mentioned.

CO: How do you think we can proceed in normalizing relations?

OAKLEY: We remain ready, but the matters I have raised have affected the timing and pace. As you know, we had hoped to begin discussions on the practical issues during November. This has been delayed by our need for clarification.

CO: I understand you are asking for clarification. Some of the questions you have raised concern normalization. But others are not related to normalization.

OAKLEY: Yes, I understand. But as Mr. Thach has said, it took many years for Vietnam to normalize relations with France and certain other countries and, as he agreed with Mr. Holbrooke, we need to avoid misunderstandings at the beginning of the process which might haunt us once normalization was possible. That is why I have come today to seek clarification. These issues which I have raised today may technically not be related to normalization, but they go to the foundation of our relationship nevertheless.

CO: What you have said I find reassuring. You have affirmed that your policy toward normalization has not changed. I will transmit what you have said to our Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But I can reaffirm for you today our position toward normalization. I can also reaffirm the essential basis of our foreign policy, which is still the same. It is based on our need to reconstruct our country following so many years of war, our desire for normal relations and cooperation with all nations including the United States. In Southeast Asia, our policy is to seek peace and stability. The ultimate goal of our policy is to safeguard our independence.

With all governments who share our goal, we are ready to cooperate and to have friendly relations. But we shall oppose those who seek to threaten our independence, either directly or indirectly. That is at the base of the questions you have raised. If you truly understand our policy, you will understand that our concern for independence answers the questions about our relations with China, Cambodia, the Soviet Union and others. I believe that Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia have a good understanding of our policy and goals.

OAKLEY: But they are more and more uneasy regarding the situation.

CO: That’s it. (C’est ca.)

OAKLEY: As I have said before, it is not a question of assigning blame.

CO: We are certain we have common goals with the countries of Southeast Asia: Peace, prosperity, stability, all based on independence. We can cooperate with those who share these goals. But with others, those who menace our independence and who do not share these goals, there are problems.

OAKLEY: Perhaps a visit by Secretary General Waldheim to your country would be an opportunity to demonstrate your commitment to peace and independence.

CO: Since 1975, it is clear that we have sought peace. It is not the time to discuss the past. With regard to Cambodia we have done everything possible to resolve the conflict. You have our three point declaration. And with China, we will try to resolve our differences, in keeping with our policy of independence. But in our position, with the attitude and policies of China and with all that has occurred, to pursue this goal of national independence we need options. That’s why we signed our treaty with the Soviets. This treaty is not aimed against any third country. We had to face a direct and urgent menace to our independence from a third country. That is why we concluded our treaty with the Soviets.

You have raised rumors about Soviet fleet visits.

If you raise questions like that, it will not be possible to make progress on normalization. I wonder if you are not raising this to delay our talks.

OAKLEY: We are raising these matters in order to seek clarification. After all, we have consistently been in the forefront in denying rumors about ship visits, bases, etc. in the past.

CO: When I met Montgomery in Hanoi, the first question he asked me on the road in from the airport was whether there were Soviet bases in Vietnam. He said he did not believe there were, but that he wanted to ask the question. I asked him where¹³ this rumor had come from, and he said that he had heard it from the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

OAKLEY: I told Montgomery before he left for Hanoi there was no information to confirm Soviet bases in your country. And we are not accusing you of having such bases. I am merely bringing to your attention what others tell us in order to seek clarification.

CO: I agree that we must discuss these matters in a spirit of frankness.

OAKLEY: I wish to affirm that we are not accusing you of having such bases.

CO: I think that for reasons of internal politics you wish to have clarification.

OAKLEY: We do not wish to see the region become polarized and we hope you will take care not to be drawn into a larger struggle. If means could be found to begin de-escalating the tensions, this would be reassuring for us. Speaking personally, we and the French¹⁴ went through a situation¹⁵ where it was difficult for us to be objective because we were so deeply involved, and we have been criticized because of our lack of comprehension.

CO: When I read Mr. Holbrooke’s remarks¹⁶ in Boston regarding the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty, I agreed with his statement that it is important that outside superpowers should not interfere in Southeast Asia. But by the same token, outside powers should also not threaten the independence of countries in Southeast Asia or attempt to interfere in internal affairs. If this happens, then there is instability. For example, Chinese policy since 1970 has not been conducive to peace and stability in the region. The reason for recent moves in Vietnamese policy is that China has not been playing by the rules of the game. If there has been a change in the situation, this has been because of a superpower outside the region. The cause of danger comes not from our treaty with the Soviets but from the Chinese.

But nevertheless, I believe that these matters should be clarified, and I will transmit what you have raised.

OAKLEY: You are a member of the international community and, speaking personally, I see advantage for you to seek broad support from the international community, not just support from the Soviet Union. You need international moral and material support. I hope you will think about this and seek United Nations support, and not act exclusively on a bilateral basis which can only complicate the situation. There is too much emotion tied into Soviet-Chinese relations.

CO: During our long struggle for independence, we learned many lessons. That is why we search for international support. As for Waldheim, it is not that we do not want him to visit. To the contrary. When our Foreign Minister was here, he invited him. We have taken the first step, but when we invited him he was too busy to accept then. He said no, not this year but later. That is why we could not arrange a visit for this year.

OAKLEY: But that can be a subject for misinterpretation. Again, I would refer you to the article which recently appeared in the New York Times for an indication of popular opinion regarding your conflict with Cambodia. Where possible, you should take steps to avoid this kind of misunderstanding.

CO: Returning to Mr. Thach’s statements in Hanoi regarding the prospects for normalization, perhaps these represented our hopes in this regard. But you should not use these statements or other rumors to pose obstacles to normalization.

OAKLEY: But your note of November 24 also says essentially the same thing as Mr. Thach was saying in Hanoi. There is the same confusion of facts and hopes.

CO: I am certain that our note was textually accurate. Mr. Holbrooke and Mr. Thach agreed that agreement would be reached on what could be agreed to. The only differences related to reaching agreement on words to express this. The concrete things were to be worked out later.

OAKLEY: But there was no agreement on principle; nothing was finalized. Both sides hoped to have an agreement.

CO: You are using this as a pretext to block normalization. Both sides agreed that working groups would work toward an agreed text on establishing relations and the details of setting up embassies and lifting the trade embargo.

OAKLEY: That is correct. But there was no accord on principles, only agreement that our desires were the same. Mr. Thach expressed surprise that the U.S. would not first agree in principle as other governments had done. But this is our position, so no agreement has been reached. There is a desire on our part to work this out. I don’t want to exaggerate this problem and you should not attach too great an importance to it just because I raised it first.

CO: And regarding the other questions you raised?

OAKLEY: We would also appreciate clarification. Again, we are not accusing you. For example, with regard to reports of bases, your actions so far have been impressive in terms of substantiating your assurances to us.

CO: And regarding arms sales?

OAKLEY: Again, this may not be important, but we would appreciate some clarification.

CO: You know we need money, but we are not breaking our assurances to you.

OAKLEY: Well, there probably is not much money to be made from that equipment now. And in any event, we know that you are using it on a daily basis.

CO: Let me share with you several personal impressions of contemporary history. During the history of our contacts, it seems that we have always been the ones to take the first step toward closer relations. In 1941, during the second world war, we made contact with your military, and again in 1945. But you did not continue the relationship.

OAKLEY: If I might make a personal remark, I believe that was an error due to the death of President Roosevelt. We then became too concerned over France.

CO: And in 1946, President Ho Chi Minh even incorporated several paragraphs from the United States Declaration of Independence into our own Declaration of Independence. And in 1954, we also attempted to improve relations with the United States. In 1973, just after the terrible B–52 bombings we welcomed Henry Kissinger to Hanoi. However, we always suspected that previous administrations, which were engaged in war, did not have the will to change their attitudes toward us. That’s why we expected other things from you. We welcomed President Carter’s statement on normalization with pleasure, as we did his commission headed by Mr. Woodcock.¹⁷ And then we agreed to meet in Paris and we have had our meetings in New York and, I believe our position on normalization has evolved.

OAKLEY: I agree, and for our part we have welcomed you into the United Nations.

CO: But it seems to me that we have always been the ones to take the next step. And we have done this not without objections and contrary opinions from some, including some of our friends, who have warned us that we were playing the American’s game. They argued that the Americans give priority to the China card and to relations with others. They warned us not to expect anything.

OAKLEY: That is what we want to avoid—that our policy toward Vietnam would become caught up in our policy toward third countries. Nevertheless, perceptions in the United States are inevitably affected by such events as the SRV-Soviet treaty. That is why we are asking for clarification. There is increasing concern that the situation is inevitably progressing toward a disastrous turn of events. This is what we want to prevent, we want to avoid war.

CO: We can let the facts speak for themselves. Everyone should try to avoid the errors of the past. However, today I cannot hide a certain disappointment.

OAKLEY: When I was in Lebanon I witnessed the consequence of outside interference. Outside forces were manipulating the conflict¹⁸ for their own benefit. But it was the people of the country who had to pay the price. We would like to see a situation like that avoided in Southeast Asia. In other words, a war being waged for the interests of outsiders who are able to avoid the direct costs. For them, it is not painful. And it is a difficult problem. How can this be avoided, in Asia or elsewhere?

CO: We do not want to go back to the past in our relations with the United States. We look to the present and to the future. We would like to move forward into a new era which is completely different. But I must confess to a certain disappointment (“deception”). I have the impression that you are being held back by the past. I think that your memories of the past are hampering your policy on normalization.

OAKLEY: The problem does not lie with our memories of the past, but in our serious concern for the future.

CO: I will transmit your thoughts and the account of our friendly conversations of today. We will contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Once we have a response . . .

OAKLEY: Yes, that is what we want.

CO: And might we have a response also?

OAKLEY: To your note of the 24th? Yes, we will give you a response.

NOTE: As the meeting broke up, Co indicated that he would not be staying in New York much longer and would be returning to Hanoi soon. It was agreed that the Vietnamese response would come through New York or Paris and our response to their note of the 24th would be conveyed through Paris. Co wished us a Happy New Year as we left.

1. Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, Box 17652, New York Meetings, 1978–1979. Secret; Nodis.
2. The note recalled the September 22 and 27 meetings between Thach and Holbrooke in New York (see Documents 26 and 27). After the meetings, the Vietnamese gave the U.S. representatives a draft accord on the normalization of relations. The November 24 note indicated that the SRV was ready to begin working group sessions on the modalities of normalization. (Telegram 38699 from Paris, November 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1911)
3. No record of this meeting has been found.
4. Not found.
5. The letter was dated November 1. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978, p. 281.
6. See Henry Kamm, “Vietnam Expanding Drive in Cambodia,” New York Times, November 29, 1978, p. A5.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, Document 116.
8. Not further identified.
9. See footnote 3, Document 19.
10. The conference was held in Geneva December 11–12.
11. See Document 133.
12. See Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Acts to Admit More Indochinese, Cubans, Lebanese,” Washington Post, November 29, 1978, p. A1.
13. An unknown hand replaced “whether” with “where.” See Document 21.
14. An unknown hand inserted “both.”
15. An unknown hand inserted “in Southeast Asia.”
16. See Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Accuses Vietnam on Refugees,” Washington Post, November 17, 1978, p. A–1.
17. See Document 8.
18. An unknown hand replaced “conflict” with “country.”