Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

26. Memorandum From Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 22, 1978

SUBJECT

• Dick Holbrooke’s Conversation with the Vietnamese

His adrenalin obviously flowing, Dick Holbrooke called me immediately after his three-hour meeting with the Vietnamese today.² Here is his rundown of the conversation:

—The Vietnamese opened with a tour d’horizon of the situation in Asia, stressing how much they sought peace in the region and good relations with all countries, including China—though they were preparing for war with China. (C)

—Holbrooke responded with a similar survey, mentioning our concern of the Soviet presence in Vietnam, the refugee issue, human rights, and IFIs. (C)

—The discussion then got down to normalization, where the Vietnamese repeated that they saw three linked issues—normalization, MIAs, and aid. Holbrooke replied that by saying the issues were linked, the Vietnamese had indicated their position had not changed and what else was there to talk about. (C)

—The Vietnamese then recommended a tea break. (U)

—When discussion was resumed, the Vietnamese acknowledged that we had rejected their linkage of normalization, information on MIAs, and provision of the aid. They then asked Dick a series of questions about our policy: What is our policy on aid? on credits? on loans? When could diplomatic relations be established? How can they be established? When would the trade embargo be dropped? (C)

—Holbrooke told me he went out of his way to make sure they held no hope for aid. On the other questions, he said he would have to study them before responding. (C)

—The Vietnamese then said that they understand the ball was in their court, presumably implying that they would have to drop their demand for aid.

—The two then agreed to meet next Wednesday.³ (LOU)

Observations

I believe the Vietnamese are going to drop their demand for aid, and we are going to be in the unpleasant position of having little bargaining room left. We may find ourselves, by pushing these negotiations forward, normalizing relations with Vietnam before we do so with China⁴ and complicating our normalization process with China immeasurably. (C)

Holbrooke asked whether I wanted to attend his meeting next Wednesday, saying that he thought I would learn a great deal from it. I replied that while I might personally benefit from seeing how yet another Asian society negotiates, I would only participate if a discernible policy interest would be advanced. Obviously, this is something you should decide, but I see no benefit in having White House participation in these talks. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Oksenberg Subject File, Box 32, Chron, 9/78. Confidential. Sent for information.
2. A draft memorandum of conversation of the September 22 meeting between Holbrooke and Thach in New York is in Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, Box 17652, Transcript: 1977–1978 Nguyen C. Thach—Richard Holbrooke. Telegram 242862/Tosec 100122 to Vance in New York, September 23, summarized the discussion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780389–1056)
3. September 27.
4. Relations with the People’s Republic of China were normalized on January 1, 1979. For the text of President Carter’s message to Premier Hua Guofeng, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China.