11. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State1
12924. From Assistant Secretary Holbrooke. Dept pass White House. Subj: US/VN Relations: First Meeting With Vietnamese.
1. Meeting lasted three and one-half hours, at Vietnamese Embassy. Following are highlights and our initial comments on meeting. Full report will follow.2
2. As previously agreed, Holbrooke opened with prepared remarks which conveyed our proposal to establish relations and exchange Embassies. Phan Hien then asked series of questions that focused on our sincerity in wanting normal relations and whether or not we would provide aid. He also asked what President Carter had in mind in regard to joint exploitation of oil resources in area.
3. In response, Holbrooke assured Vietnamese of President’s sincerity re normal relations and cited congressional and other prohibitions on aid. He stressed present state of US public opinion on issue and fact that there were certain things that the President could not do in any case without congressional approval. At this point he also told Hien that we would no longer object to UN membership for SRV, and that trade embargo would be lifted when diplomatic relations were established and Embassies set up in both capitals.
4. During tea break which followed, Hien said that “we must find imaginative ways to solve problem of aid.” Hien suggested that we could make secret agreement or understanding on aid as part of overall package deal which included UN membership, trade embargo, diplomatic relations, and MIA’s. Holbrooke replied that “secret deals” are out of the question and that this administration considers congressional involvement not only unavoidable but desirable.
5. Hien returned to this theme after tea break. He also noted that UN issue was now resolved, but asked why we were withholding lifting of trade embargo until after establishment of Embassies. He suggested that trade embargo be lifted immediately. He said that since Woodcock Commission had visited Hanoi, SRV had made additional efforts to meet US concerns on MIA issue, and that the SRV would now increase their efforts further. (In tea break conversations, Frank [Page 46] Sieverts continued discussions on this matter, which will be subject of a separate telegram.)3 Hien said that SRV could do even more, but this was related to our efforts on aid. He said his country wanted diplomatic relations, but that it would be very difficult for the American flag to fly in Hanoi over an Embassy until we had given some aid to Vietnam. He did not at this session refer to an aid obligation or to reparations or to the Paris Accords, or to any specific amounts but he repeatedly returned to the importance of this issue to his country. Holbrooke stressed again that President Carter wished to put the past behind us and move forward, and that this could best be done by a few simple steps that could be taken now.
6. Hien never directly accepted or rejected any of our proposals. He suggested meeting tomorrow4 for his more considered statement (he characterized his comments today as “preliminary”). It seems unlikely that he will have new instructions by tomorrow, although it is not impossible. If he does not, then we propose to proceed as follows on several important issues:
A. Trade Embargo. We see no need to indicate we will lift the embargo immediately. Our present position gives us some leverage and is a reasonable one. Trade and diplomatic relations should go together.
B. Aid. On question of aid, we said today that while we understand their desire for reconstruction aid and their view of responsibility for providing it, a large number of Americans and members of Congress do not share this view which is based on past history. Their view is, rather, reflected clearly in current legislative prohibitions on aid, and the President’s position is also clear. Holbrooke added, “President has indicated willingness to look to future re relationships with Vietnam, including economic relationships, and we believe focussing on mutual efforts in this direction will be beneficial for both sides.” We noted private humanitarian assistance as well as US contributions to international organizations aiding Vietnam. We noted that President Carter has instructed USG to interpose no further objections to such multi-lateral aid.5 We noted that “as relations develop, there is always the possibility that changing attitudes will lead to changes in present legislative and policy restrictions so as to permit modest amounts of other types of assistance, in keeping with US humanitarian traditions.” It seems clear that Hien is asking for some sort of commitment (in private if that is the best he can get) that we would go to Congress for some as yet undefined amount of aid. Unless otherwise advised, we will [Page 47] simply repeat tomorrow, in as forceful a way as possible, what we said today.
C. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. This is a tricky tactical question. It seems unlikely that Hien will accept our proposal tomorrow, but he will certainly not reject it. If he does not agree, we propose that we leave our offer on the table, and indicate that we are ready to return to Paris whenever his government wishes to begin discussions leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations. If he offers to establish relations without agreeing on Embassies, we will indicate that it has been consistent US practice that establishment of relations includes early exchange of Embassies.
D. Public Statements. We recommend that we explain to the Vietnamese that we must make public the general nature of our position, while avoiding details. We should make public fact that we have removed US veto of SRV membership in UN. We must be prepared if we follow this course to state publicly that we are satisfied that procedures now in train will lead to resolution of MIA question. In regard to all of foregoing, we urge special attention to congressional consultation.
9. We await further instructions as appropriate on above.
- Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, Box 17652, VN Talks—Telegrams, Reports. Secret; Flash; Nodis.↩
- In telegram 13027 from Paris, May 4, the Embassy provided the full report of the meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770003–0158)↩
- See Document 12.↩
- See Document 13.↩
- Not further identified.↩