Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

35. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, December 19, 1978

Tranh Quang Co: I understand you have recently returned from your trip to Geneva and Southeast Asia. We realize that this was the reason you were not able to meet with us earlier. But with Christmas coming up, we were a bit anxious to see you.

Robert Oakley: Yes, I have recently returned from the UNHCR meeting in Geneva² where I had the opportunity to see Ambassador Sung,³ who headed your delegation. I have also had an opportunity to see the reports of Foreign Minister Trinh’s and Vice Foreign Minister Phan Hien’s press conferences in Tokyo.

Co: Since our last meeting I have received instructions from Hanoi to respond to the points you raised during our last meeting.⁴ Let me express myself in English. (Began reading from notes.)

Vietnam is astonished to see the U.S. linking the question of normalization of relations with the situation in Cambodia and with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, even though the two sides had agreed that normalization was an affair between the two countries and should not be subject to preconditions.

Normalization could have been concluded at the end of September or at the beginning of October, if the U.S. side had desired.

At that time, we asked whether your side did not deliberately try to delay. Now the U.S. is making a pretext of requesting clarification regarding recent developments which have no connection with normalization. It seems that your intention is to avoid moving forward, contrary to previous agreement.

This is utterly absurd. We strongly reject the U.S. request for explanations.

Concerning the questions raised by the U.S., it is necessary to say clearly that, first of all, regarding Cambodia, we reaffirm our longstanding policy is based on non-aggression and noninterference in the internal affairs of others.

We had wished that the Phnom Penh regime would have pursued normal relations, and would not have embarked on a policy of war toward Vietnam. We had hoped it would have followed policies of independence, neutrality, policies conducive to peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam believes that the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation is a positive factor, based on the aspirations of the Cambodian people.

Secondly, regarding the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, we have the feeling that by raising this matter as a subject for concern you sound much like China. It is obvious that Vietnam has exercised restraint toward Cambodia. Vietnam signed this treaty with the Soviet Union only in order to assist our peaceful reconstruction and for purposes of legitimate self-defense. Public opinion recognizes this. Before and after the signing of the treaty Vietnam sought to normalize relations with the United States.

Thirdly, with regard to the refugee issue and Vietnamese policy toward Southeast Asia, Vietnam decided to follow a policy aimed at improving relations on the basis of friendship, cooperation and non-interference aimed at promoting peace and stability in the region in order to advance the peaceful reconstruction of our country, following 30 years of war. This is a long-term policy. As for the refugees, Vietnam gets no benefit from the continuation of the refugee situation, which is a consequence of the war. It is a problem which will be overcome gradually and with some outside economic aid.

Because of what the U.S. agreed on normalization, the Head of the North American Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has waited in New York over two months to work out the draft of the agreement to normalize relations and to resolve concrete matters.

Now Hanoi asks whether the United States evisages that in a short time the working groups can begin meeting as agreed. If so, then Mr. Co will stay. If there is a delay and the U.S. can not meet soon, Mr. Co will return home. We hope for a reply soon.

Lastly, Vietnam affirms its good will toward the question of normalization, as shown from the beginning. Vietnam is ready to settle the affair promptly, as agreed, to the benefit of both sides.

Oakley: Let me respond. What you have said is interesting and conforms to what Mr. Trinh and Mr. Phan Hien have been saying in Tokyo.

Your question about when working groups might meet is a fair one. We should provide you with a response, although I should say that I am not optimistic. I am not in a position to give you a definite answer at this time. I would hope to have a response in approximately one week.

I prefer your question regarding working groups, which is factually correct, to the statement you have made, which is similar to what Minister Trinh said in Tokyo, regarding an agreement to normalize relations. This is not factually correct. An agreement to normalize relations was never reached.

We are not imposing preconditions or deliberately seeking to delay normalization. There has been no change in our position on this question. We are merely seeking clarification on several recent developments of concern to us. Seeking clarification is not establishing preconditions; it is a legitimate way to proceed when moving toward a normal relationship.

Regarding the Treaty, we are not questioning the Treaty itself or your right to conclude such an agreement. We have simply requested clarification of its implications in a regional context. The Treaty does have military aspects, and, as we have told you before, we are concerned that this might lead to direct major power involvement in Southeast Asia, as well as escalating rather than diminishing existing tensions—tensions we had thought might decline and even disappear after 1975. We hope that time will prove that your explanation of the Treaty, and that of Mr. Trinh, is correct, and that it will not lead to great power involvement and that tensions will indeed diminish. We have not yet reached a judgement in this regard. It is still too soon to make such a judgement.

Regarding your statement on Cambodia, I note that Mr. Phan Hien stated in Tokyo that the current conflict had grown into a “genuine border war.” You will recall that during the period earlier this year and late last year when this was indeed the case we took care to avoid any public or private statement on the conflict. We are not in a position to make a judgement on the border problem which we know is a very complicated one arising from conflicting claims dating back many years. It was only after we received reliable reports, which were confirmed by Radio Hanoi, that Vietnam was actively engaged in an effort to overthrow the Phnom Penh Government—through the use of military force deep inside Cambodia, not just in the border areas—that we expressed our concern over this threat to regional peace and stability—a concern shared by other Asian states. We did so not in an attempt to affix responsibility for the conflict—we understand the difficulties you have had with Cambodia—but to express our concern over the implications of this expanded conflict. Our concern has increased as Vietnamese military involvement inside Cambodia has increased.

Regarding the Kampuchean Front for National Salavation, you have said this morning and Mr. Trinh has said in Tokyo that Vietnam supports this organization because it espouses a negotiated settlement of the conflict. However, the objective of the Front, as described by its radio and Radio Hanoi, is to bring about the overthrow of the current Phnom Penh Government, a goal which we see as precisely the opposite of a negotiated settlement and an objective most unlikely to encourage negotiations with Phnom Penh.

We do not approve of the practices and policies of the Phnom Penh government. We were the first to express publicly our strong criticism of this regime. As a result we were criticized, by other Southeast Asian countries, by China and by other nations. But we were seeking a peaceful solution to the problems posed by this government’s policies.

We are concerned over an apparent contradiction in your position. On the one hand, Mr. Trinh, Mr. Phan Hien and you say that Vietnam is dedicated to peace and non-interference in other countries. Yet you are supporting an organization dedicated to overthrowing the government in Phnom Penh, an objective which your radio says you share. This goes against Pham Van Dong’s assurances to other Southeast Asian countries that you would not support subversion in their countries. This is a philosophical problem.

There is also a practical problem. If one seeks a peaceful, negotiated solution to a conflict, one should not call for the overthrow of the government involved. This is not peace.

This conflict causes us great concern, as it does other nations in the region. They, like we, do not support the overthrow of the Phnom Penh government, even if they do not approve of its actions.

We are concerned that the result of your present policies will be a prolongation of the war, which risks bringing about direct great power involvement. We would like to find some practical means of facilitating a solution. That is why we have encouraged Secretary General Waldheim to visit the region. Again, we are not encouraging the Secretary General to make this visit in order to make accusations. But given the difficulty which exists in establishing a dialogue among the governments involved, we would hope that the Secretary General could provide a channel for discussion and perhaps a solution. Such a visit is obviously up to the governments in the area and it is for the governments involved to decide if and when the Secretary General should visit. But the way things are now proceeding is working against a peaceful solution and contradicts a policy of the peaceful settlement of differences, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, and non-subversion.

Concerning the refugee problem, your government through the statement you provided us today and through remarks of Ambassador Sung in Geneva, has taken the position that it bears no responsibility for the causes of the problem and has no ability to influence the situation, and that it is unable to control or regulate people leaving. Speaking very frankly, this is difficult to accept. The number of refugees in September was four or five thousand. Suddenly in October the number jumped to ten thousand, then in November to 20 thousand. Reliable sources indicate that many Vietnamese officials are actively engaged in facilitating the highly organized departure of refugees. No one disputes your charges that outside organizations, perhaps made up of overseas Chinese, are also involved in assisting these departures. But the active participation of officials of your government in facilitating departures and who are receiving large amounts of money from refugees who wish to depart, raises very serious questions about your government’s attitude and lack of responsiveness.

Why has the number shot up?

We are concerned also about a situation in which so many people feel they must flee at great danger. We are concerned over the seeming panic and fear which causes so many people to take such great risks.

The pattern of reasons given by refugees indicates that it is a sense of desperation rather than concern over the loss of certain economic advantages which prompts their departure.

We and others are not suggesting that Vietnam slam the door on people wishing to leave, but that your government exercise its authority—as a government—to work with the UNHCR to arrange orderly departures, as you have done and are now doing with individuals who have ties to Taiwan, Hong Kong and France. The UNHCR would be interested in participating in such procedures, but there has been no word from Ambassador Sung or others regarding such a practical approach.

We understand the economic difficulties which your society is undergoing and the extra burden posed by people in your new society. What we are suggesting is that you adopt a more orderly and humane manner of departure for those who want to depart.

We also hope that Mr. Phan Hien’s remarks in Tokyo—as well as other statements you have made—regarding Vietnam’s willingness to allow family reunification will soon show results. In the past, there has been a lot of talk that you were setting up “new mechanisms” to facilitate this process. Statements along these lines were made to Senator Kennedy, whose delegation last summer was able to arrange the departure of some 20 people.⁵ However, this is the only time the “new machinery” has functioned. Since then there has been nothing. As our embassy in Bangkok recently made clear to Mr. Vu Hoang⁶—whom we believe is doing a good job—we are prepared to issue immigrant visas to more than 5,000 Vietnamese whose relatives are in the United States. The UNHCR and the International Red Cross have also made this point to your government but there has been no response.

We are prepared to give the dossiers on these people to your embassy in Bangkok or elsewhere. Then all that would have to be done would be for your government to agree to issue exit permits. The French Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City, or the UNHCR or another organization, would be able to provide them with some sort of travel documents to allow them to proceed to Bangkok where immigrant visas for the United States could be issued.

This would be a small but concrete step which would indicate your government’s willingness to resolve the humanitarian problem of people wishing to leave Vietnam.

We understand, as Ambassador Sung noted in Geneva, that Vietnam is now in the process of caring for over 400,000 persons who formerly lived in Cambodia. We respect your efforts and what you are doing for them. The United States will provide funds through the UNHCR which are being used to help these refugees inside Vietnam as it has provided funds to assist refugees outside your country. This is a humane problem, not a political problem. Our hope is that, because it is in your interest as well as in the interests of other governments, an orderly process for the departure of refugees from your country can be found, to reduce and make more manageable this humanitarian problem.

Let me add one more point which you did not raise, but which Mr. Trinh mentioned in Tokyo. I would just call your attention to the Joint Communique which the United States and the People’s Republic of China have issued to announce their decision to normalize relations.⁷ As President Carter has noted, normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China should not be viewed as aimed at any third party. It also does not reflect any intention by the United States to support one side or another in current regional disputes in Southeast Asia. As Assistant Secretary Holbrooke has repeatedly told you and your colleagues, we favor a peaceful, stable system of independent states in the region and we will not take sides in current regional disputes.

United States policies toward Vietnam and China stand on their own merits. The establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China will have no effect—one way or the other—on our policy toward normalizing relations with Vietnam. In this connection, I would like to say that we appreciated the point which Mr. Phan Hien made in Tokyo to the effect that he was certain that the United States would not allow China to affect our policies toward normalizing relations with Vietnam. Please tell him that he is absolutely correct.

Co: (In Vietnamese) First of all I think that we must return to the real fact of our presence here today. Concerning working groups and normalization, can we understand that there is no definite decision on timing?

Oakley: That is correct. I would hope to have an answer for you, perhaps next week. But I do not have a response today.

Co: So I can understand our question has not yet received an official reply?

Oakley: Yes.

Co: I shall stay here to wait for a reply.

Oakley: As you wish.

Co: The question of travel is not that important for us.

Oakley: The last time we were here we had the impression you would be leaving to return to Hanoi. Of course, whether you chose to wait here or in Hanoi is not for us to say.

Co: That is true. After our last meeting I intended to go home. But Hanoi wanted to know clearly from your side whether working groups could meet in a short time or whether you were going to delay. And for me personally, I want my first stay in New York to bring about productive results so that I will have a good first impression.

Oakley: I understand your feeling of frustration. In 1974, I spent many months in Geneva waiting for the Middle East Peace Talks to convene. The talks never took place.

Co: So I am waiting. I hope you will be able to give me a reply in a week.

Now I would like to return to the question concerning Cambodia. Concerning the first part of my statement, this constituted a reply.

Oakley: Fine.

Co: But let me add one point and some additional remarks. That is regarding your judgement of the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation. You said you were worried that this organization threatened to overthrow the regime. And that our support for the front led you to the conclusion that we were supporting subversion.

Our policy toward other countries in the region is clear and is based on peace, friendship, cooperation and noninterference. The goals and objectives of the Front are their affair, not ours. We cannot influence the Front even if we wanted to. This is the same as the situation in Iran. Do you think that any country can influence those people not to overthrow the Shah? Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can do that. This is the business of the Iranian people. The program of the Front reflects the wishes and aspirations of the people.

Oakley: But for Vietnam to say that it has no influence over the Front, just as it says it cannot at all control the refugee situation, ignores realities. Where does the Front receive its training? Where does it get it arms? Whose troops are fighting alongside it? We remain concerned over the contradiction between the principles you espouse and the reality of your actions. As difficult as it may be to talk to the Phnom Penh government, we would hope that some way could be found to achieve a peaceful solution.

As you may know, the Organization of American States has been able to establish itself as mediator between the two sides in Nicaragua. There is a similar situation there with the two sides being armed and supported from outside the country, and strong feelings running against the government. Nevertheless, agreement was reached in the region that a mediated settlement would be best. And this is having some success. Instead of Costa Rica or Cuba at war with Nicaragua, peace appears to be emerging. This may result in a change in the government in Nicaragua. This is acceptable to us, even though we have long supported the current government. What is important is that a peaceful means be found to settle the dispute.

Co: I want to cite another example so you can better understand. After the Front was established by the Cambodian people, the first and strongest reaction was from Cambodian exiles in Western countries. Now we think that one organization can be considered as the center for coordinating with all Cambodian exiles all over the world . . .

Oakley: Yes, I know how active Ambassador Sung is.

Co: This is the “Voice of Free Kampuchea.” You can ask your French friends. This organization has no sympathy for the Vietnamese or Cambodian communists. Nevertheless, this organization says that there is no other way than by the Front to save the Cambodian people. This is the best way for them to survive.

Oakley: We were among the first to criticize the bad state of affairs in Cambodia. We fully understand the fact that Cambodians in exile and still in Cambodia are unhappy, even angry at the current government.

But the aspect which causes us great concern is Vietnam’s direct military and political involvement in this situation. We are not attacking you publicly on this. We are however calling your attention to our deep concern over this serious problem in the hope that a genuinely peaceful solution can be found. As the situation now stands, the conflict will continue, increasing the economic strains on Vietnam, tensions in the area and the risk of great power involvement. We are not angry but are sad. We feel that the current situation will not produce a peaceful settlement. That’s all, nothing more.

Co: I think that your judgement about the Front is surprising. I think that the United States reacted a little late to the situation in Cambodia. But President Carter did say that Cambodia was the worst violator of human rights in the world today.⁸ Nevertheless, the United States did nothing to help change the situation. That is why the Cambodian people must find a way to rescue themselves. You don’t want to understand this, so it seems that your motive must be one based on political support.

Oakley: One point: The Front itself says that Vietnamese troops are assisting it inside Cambodia. This is not an accusation made by the United States.

Co: We remain optimistic regarding the possibility of peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Oakley: Perhaps time will justify your optimism. I hope so.

Co: We are optimistic because we believe that peace and stability are in harmony with the aspirations of other Southeast Asian nations, as well as the U.S.

Regarding refugees, I have already given our views. But I want to add one point. This concerns your allegation of participation of officials to some extent in organizing departures of refugees.

We fully reject this allegation because it is totally fabricated. It is very clearly reported in the U.S. press and elsewhere that in most cases money goes to Hoa agents still in Vietnam and that this money is paid to middle men.

Oakley: Paid to whom?

Co: Now, you see in our situation we are preoccupied with defending our western, southwestern and northern borders. We still have a coastline of 3000 kms, so how can we control the people who want to leave? But we do not think this is a fundamental problem. The main thing is to improve the living standards and to reconstruct our country.

Oakley: Indeed.

Co: Especially to raise the standard of living. We also must explain to the people in the south that their happiness is linked to that of the entire country. We don’t believe that administrative measures can solve the entire problem. It is similar to the situation you have with Mexico where millions of people have left for the United States. And Mexico has not undergone a war.

Oakley: Yes, but with Mexico the people come to the U.S. to find work and run no risk. This is not the case with Vietnam where large ships leave from Danang, Vung Tau, Haiphong with no destination and run real risks at sea.

We also believe that the best long term solution lies in the integration of the economies and societies of your country. We understand how difficult problems between different regions, religions and ethnic groups can be. All of us here have been in Vietnam and saw how difficult these problems were, even in the south alone, under the former government.

Co: Yes, and our country has only been unified for three years.

Oakley: It still might be possible to have an orderly approach. We hope so and will wait and see. Time will tell.

Co: One last point. As you mentioned, I did not raise the matter of your normalizing relations with China. This is because we consider this to be a normal thing . . . With the condition that it is not directed against any third country.

Anyhow, we believe that the present policy of China is a big nation expansionist policy. This runs counter to the aspirations of people for peace, democracy and progress in the world. That is why we must wait to see whether China’s relations with the U.S. serves that policy or not.

I would also like to refer to an article in U.S. News and World Report which was an interview by Mr. Holbrooke.⁹ In his interview, Mr. Holbrooke referred to the four principles of U.S. policy toward East Asia. The second principle which he mentioned was that the U.S. would not take sides in conflicts in the region. He gave examples of conflicts between Vietnam and Cambodia, Vietnam and China and China and the Soviet Union. I wonder whether the United States will at all times adhere to this principle. This is not only our worry. The American press is also worried. The New York Times reports Administration officials are saying that such statements prove that the U.S. has a pro-Chinese bias. That’s why we must wait and see, especially after the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China.

To be frank with you, I recently read a commentary by AFP of Hanoi. I think the correspondent who wrote it followed normalization between the U.S. and Vietnam. Portions of the article say that the Vietnamese position is very clear and that they are not making preconditions. Vietnam is ready to normalize. But he says that it now seems that the U.S. is posing preconditions, such as the situation in Cambodia.

We hope this is not true. But what causes these journalists to think this way? It gives a misconception of our good will.

Oakley: Well, for one thing, this is the same thing that Radio Hanoi has been saying, and AFP might be listening.

We are not imposing preconditions but are asking for certain clarifications. We will have to see what emerges.

One small thing. Do you have any information on the helicopter we mentioned was in Havana?

Co: Not yet. We had thought you had indicated this was a very small problem as compared with Cambodia.

Oakley: Yes, that is true in terms of its importance to normalization. But an answer sometime would be useful.

Lyne: We are continuing to receive reports that efforts are being made to purchase fromer U.S. military equipment from you. And we have valued your reassurances on this point.

Co: So, I shall express your concern again to Hanoi.

Oakley: This is not a precondition.

Co: We will try our best.

1. Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Old Vietnam Political Records, 1968–1991, Lot 94D430, New York Meetings, 1978–1979. Secret; Nodis.
2. The December 11–12 conference in Geneva sponsored by the UNHCR was attended by 37 nations and 5 NGOs. Newsom headed the U.S. delegation.
3. Vo Van Sung, Vietnamese Ambassador to France.
4. See Document 33.
5. Kennedy sent a staff delegation to Vietnam August 7–9. Telegram 22785 from Bangkok, August 10, summarized talks between the American delegation and Vietnamese officials. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780327–0368) Telegram 23092 from Bangkok, August 13, provided observations made by Kennedy’s staff while in Vietnam. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780331–0529)
6. Telegram 36091 from Bangkok, December 8, described the December 6 meeting with Vu Hoang in which refugee issues were discussed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780509–0466)
7. For the text of the joint communiqué, December 15, see Public Papers: Carter, 1978, Book II, pp. 2264–2266.
8. See footnote 2, Document 22.
9. Not further identified.