Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

54. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Sullivan) to the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Holbrooke)¹

Washington, June 22, 1979

SUBJECT

• Chinese Policy toward Vietnam and Indochina

You’ve asked for some thoughts on what the PRC thinks it’s doing in Indochina. Harvey, Harry² and I talked or communicated in various ways with analysts at CIA, INR and DIA, as well as with Bill Beecher³ (who visited the border area recently at Chinese invitation), Mike Armacost, Embassy Beijing and miscellaneous others. Harvey, Harry and I chewed over the impressions we gathered and our own ideas and found that we agreed among ourselves, but disagreed at several points with the intelligence community view.

With only a few variations in emphasis, the intelligence community takes pretty much the same view of current PRC policy. They see it as almost purely reactive and without any underlying coherent strategy except to keep pressure on Vietnam.⁴ They believe the Chinese hope that by forcing the Vietnamese to continue to divert economic resources, the Vietnamese will ultimately “crack” under the strain and negotiate a modus vivendi.⁵ The pressure will include occasional feints on the Sino-Viet border, bellicose statements, low-level guerilla warfare in Laos (but without Chinese regulars), and support for an anti-Vietnamese resistance in Kampuchea.

According to this “conventional view”, the Chinese understand that the short-term result will be to force Hanoi into greater dependence on Moscow. But the Chinese concluded such dependence was inevitable in any case once Vietnam joined CEMA and signed its treaty with the USSR. Some analysts think this is Chinese rationalization; others, that Peking sincerely believes that forcing Hanoi closer to Moscow will lead the Vietnamese to replicate China’s own Russian experience and, sooner or later, seek greater independence. None of the analysts (except [name not declassified]) thinks China will be successful either in eliminating Soviet influence in Vietnam, or in lessening Vietnamese control of Indochina. A minority in INR believe that once the Chinese realize their policy is not working and that the Vietnamese, with Russian help, will be able to restore their own and Indochina’s economy, Peking will be tempted to attack again.⁶

Our View

The “conventional analysis” is too Indochina specific. The Chinese goal is indeed to lessen or eliminate Soviet influence, but in the region (including India and Pakistan, as well as Southeast Asia), not just in Vietnam. Viewed in this light, Chinese policy appears more rational—and more successful.

The Chinese attack was much more than a means of pressuring or punishing the Vietnamese, or disrupting their economy. It demonstrated that Vietnamese dominance is neither inevitable nor permanent, and that China remains a more important factor for Southeast Asia to take into account than Vietnam.

The Vietnamese-Soviet alliance tars both partners. Moscow is stained by Vietnamese policy, particularly on the refugee issue, and the Southeast Asians are far less willing to deal with Hanoi than they were a year ago. In addition, the Southeast Asian reaction to Soviet presence is far more adverse than before. A few years ago, both Singapore and Malaysia seemed prepared to allow Soviet naval units to use their facilities. Not any more.

The result is, the Chinese have an interesting straddle: Moscow might conclude in time that it loses more than it gains by the Vietnamese connection, as far as regional interests are concerned, and pull back. In this case the Vietnamese would be forced to deal with Peking (which would have an interesting demonstration effect on India and others). If Moscow does not pull back, it may find itself continuing to lose influence in Southeast Asia.

The Chinese will play other cards as well. We don’t completely rule out another strike but this looks less likely once you analyze the first invasion as primarily a political, rather than military or economic demonstration. Peking has made its point and, barring extreme provocation, need not make it again. It will keep the pot boiling in Kampuchea as long as possible, almost certainly will stir up trouble in Laos (but without use of Chinese regulars), and continue efforts to keep Vietnam isolated internationally, including from us.

Beyond this, we think China’s major gambit will be offered in the talks with the Soviet Union. We do not believe anything like rapprochement is in the wind (really substantial moves would be too risky for the Chinese leadership), but we believe the Chinese will move to warm the relationship somewhat.⁷ There is no better way of shaking Vietnamese resolve than the hint that Moscow, when the chips are down, may not be a completely reliable partner. It will be important that we keep our own cool should China decide to give the appearance of moving toward better relations with the USSR.⁸

This analysis may seem too optimistic. There are many uncertainties. Moscow in fact might commit itself wholeheartedly to Vietnam, however embarrassing to other interests, as it has to Cuba or Mongolia. And if a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay is in the offing, this would be a powerful lure. But we believe Chinese policy is more rational and more calculated than “conventional wisdom” would have it, and therefore that it has a better chance of success.

I also talked with Punch Coomaraswamy, an old friend from my Singapore days. He agreed that over the long term the Chinese strategy of keeping the pressure on and letting the contradictions grow will work. He reminded me of a statement Lee Kuan Yew made some years ago in a different context: that looking toward the year 2000, the countries of Southeast Asia will have no choice, if they are⁹ to survive, but to follow policies acceptable to China. The Chinese certainly believe this and according to Punch, most of the South Asians believe it too.¹⁰ The Chinese are doubtless also exploiting the likelihood that the Vietnamese, deep in the hearts, fear this maxim may well be true.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Far East, Sullivan Subject File, Box 69, Chron, 6–8/80. Secret. Holbrooke wrote at the top of the first page, “Read by CRV [Vance], Peacock, Talboys—very good memo. RH.”
2. Harvey Feldman, Special Coordinator for Taiwan, and Harry Thayer, Director of the Office for PRC and Mongolia Affairs in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
3. Journalist William Beecher.
4. Holbrooke underlined this sentence.
5. Holbrooke underlined “the Vietnamese will ultimately ‘crack’ under the strain and negotiate” in this sentence.
6. Holbrooke highlighted this paragraph by placing vertical lines in both the left- and right-hand margins.
7. Holbrooke underlined “we believe the Chinese will move to warm the relationship somewhat” in this sentence.
8. Holbrooke highlighted this paragraph by placing a vertical line in the right-hand margin.
9. Holbrooke replaced “in order” with “if they are.”
10. Holbrooke highlighted this sentence and the previous one. He also wrote a question mark in the left-hand margin adjacent to these sentences.