Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

243. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, September 29, 1977

SUBJECT

• Your Meeting with Yugoslav Presidency Member Edvard Kardelj, September 30, 10:30 a.m.

The memorandum from Warren Christopher² (in the accompanying briefing book) effectively presents the issues for this meeting.

The most critical question for Kardelj (addressed as Mr. KarDELL) is continuing uncertainty about our commitment to Yugoslavia’s independence and integrity. While efforts throughout the year have erased most of the deep concern over your comments in the final television debate³—though it came up again on Tito’s China visit—reasserting our concern and commitment is very important. Our new offer of an arms supply relationship will help considerably.⁴ You will be breaking the news to him (points summarized in the State memo). We are also resuming the processing of FMS cases and requests for export licenses.

Yugoslav concern is heightened by the role the Russians are playing. When Brezhnev came to Belgrade last year, he tried to bully Tito into moving closer to the Soviet orbit. Tito stoutly resisted, and circulated the memoranda of conversation to key party leaders to make the point. On Tito’s trip to Moscow, however, Brezhnev tried the opposite approach: surrounding him with warmth and affection. Yugoslavs who are intensely suspicious of the Soviet Union believe this is designed to be used as a weapon following Tito’s death: that the Tito “line” was friendship for Moscow, and his successors should be bound by it. In fact, [less than 1 line not declassified] indicates that Tito stonewalled Brezhnev on the latter’s requests for port facilities, overflight rights, and landing rights.

While, if time permits, it would be valuable to discuss broader aspects of international relations with Kardelj, he will be most interested in the bilateral aspects of our relations, in order to pin down U.S. concerns.

Of special significance for him also will be Yugoslavia’s leadership of the non-aligned movement. There is also their proposal and support for next year’s UN Disarmament Conference. And Yugoslavia is proud (and a bit uneasy) to be hosting the CSCE review conference, opening on October 4. (FYI: on the basis of Yugoslav heavy-handedness in dealing with representatives of Non-Governmental Organizations at the June preparatory conference, we have urged them to seek advice from the Finns and Swiss—who hosted CSCE in the first round. Otherwise, we fear ugly incidents. This matter will be raised with Kardelj in other meetings.)

Kardelj has a long (6 or 7 page) letter for you from Tito, covering his trip to Moscow, Peking, and Pyongyang, as you had suggested in your letter to him.⁵ Kardelj will reportedly say that Tito would like to come here in January or February.

The Yugoslavs are also concerned about the record of violence by emigre groups against their missions in this country, and have repeatedly accused us of not taking appropriate action. (Except for the TWA hijacking, no case has been solved, and at times the FBI has been uncooperative.) If this comes up in other meetings, Kardelj will be given strong assurances about our concern and commitment.

Kardelj’s latest book, Trends in the Development of the Political System of Self-Management Democracy, has just been published. State summarizes it as follows:

While not destined to be an international best seller (the Yugoslavs have announced their intention to publish it in “world languages”) or anywhere as controversial as Santiago Carrillo’s recent work,⁶ Kardelj’s “study” is noteworthy for a number of reasons. It is an extension of a major speech he made June 13th to the 30th Session of the Presidium of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), in which he coined the term “self-managing pluralism” to define the Yugoslav system. The speech and the resultant book were endorsed by the Presidium “as the basis for the activity of the LCY in preparation for the 11th Party Congress,” which is scheduled for spring of 1978. The study presents a sort of master plan for the future development of the Yugoslav political system as it approaches the level of democracy that they feel the economic system has already achieved. Kardelj’s “study” does not provide for a Tito-like role and thus his approach can be seen as an attempt to provide a stable and mature system that will not be shaken by the passing of Tito. However, although the upcoming Party Congress is widely regarded as being the main event which will establish, at least, the immediate succession to Tito, the official problem to be solved by the Congress and the main problem addressed by Kardelj is the achievement of a higher degree of political democracy.

Kardelj is typically philosophic in his comments and does not attempt to define the exact form of a future, trying “to indicate only some points of departure for determining our practical tasks concerning the harmonization of the political system with the system of production and social-economic relationships, and the further development of self-management-democratic forms.” He does address a number of topics of interest, i.e. human rights, Eurocommunism, and other political systems, both East and West, finding them all wanting in comparison to “self-managing pluralism.” There are not, however, the racy critical references to the Chinese or Soviet systems rumored to be present in early drafts of the book.

I have included a copy of President Tito’s speech this Tuesday in the briefing book.⁷

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: Presidency Member Edvard Kardelj, 9/28/77–10/5/77: Cables and Memos. Secret. Sent for action. Carter initialed the memorandum indicating he had seen it. Later in the day, Brzezinski sent another memorandum to Carter forwarding Department of State talking points on détente and the Oversees Private Investment Cooperation program with Yugoslavia. Carter initialed Brzezinski’s covering memorandum indicating he had seen it and wrote at the top “We may follow up on N/S Korea.” (Ibid.)
2. Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Christopher to the President, September 27. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: Presidency Member Edvard Kardelj, 9/28/77–10/5/77: Briefing Book)
3. See footnote 2, Document 235.
4. The phrase “arms supply relationship will help considerably” is underlined by an unknown hand, possibly Brzezinski. The Department of State talking points submitted by Christopher recommended that Carter inform Kardelj of the U.S. Government’s decision to expand the arms sales program moderately. See footnote 2 above.
5. See Document 239. An English translation of Tito’s letter, dated September 22, was attached at Tab B of Brzezinski’s second memorandum to Carter on September 29. (See footnote 1 above.) Tito informed Carter that in his discussions with Brezhnev, the Soviet leader stressed Soviet interest in disarmament and the SALT II negotiation process. Describing his meetings in Pyongyang, Tito recounted Kim Il Sung’s proposal that a peace treaty be negotiated between the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea and the United States or that tripartite negotiations among the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and the United States begin, but only after South Korean President Park Chung Hee was removed from power. Regarding Sino-Soviet relations, Tito described his impression following visits to Moscow and Beijing that neither country was prepared to make any concession which would alleviate the tensions and that the relationship was bound to continue on its present course. On October 6, Carter signed a letter to Tito thanking him for his insights and inviting him to Washington in 1978. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977)
6. Santiago Carillo, Secretary General of the Spanish Communist Party, together with French Communist leader Georges Marchais and Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer, launched the Eurocommunist movement on March 2, 1977, at a meeting in Madrid. His book, Eurocommunism and the State, was published in 1977 and repudiated Marxist-Leninist revolutionary dogma in favor of participation by Communist parties in the democratic electoral process.
7. An English translation of Tito’s September 27 speech to the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, VIP Visit File, Box 15, Yugoslavia: Presidency Member Edvard Kardelj, 9/28/77–10/5/77: Briefing Book.