Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

244. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 30, 1977, 10:40–11:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with Edvard Kardelj, Member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Vice President
• Warren Christopher, Acting Secretary of State
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Lawrence Eagleburger, US Ambassador to Yugoslavia
• William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
• Gregory F. Treverton, NSC Staff member [Notetaker]²
• Edvard Kardelj, Member of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
• Dimce Belovski, Yugoslav Ambassador to the United States
• Emil Ludviger, Member of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Trade
• Dragan Bernardic, Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs
• Svetozar Starcevic, Director of the Political Department, Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs
• Borislav Lazarevic, Chef de Cabinet for Mr. Kardelj
• Radivoje Petkovic, Minister-Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy
• Vladimir Matic, Political Counselor, Yugoslav Embassy
• Branka Jojic, Interpreter

Mr. Kardelj opened the meeting by thanking the President for his invitation and for taking the time for the meeting. He handed the President the original of a letter from President Tito, indicating that the President had already been informed of the letter’s contents. The President said he read the letter that morning. He was honored to have Kardelj in Washington. He said that he and his colleagues had been reviewing Kardelj’s book, and he congratulated him on his role as a statesman and author. Kardelj said he was not sure he deserved the compliments; he and others in Yugoslavia had done what they had to.

The President expressed gratitude for the reception given to the Vice President in Yugoslavia, saying that it and this visit confirmed the friendship of the two nations. He looked forward to President Tito’s visit this spring, and he thanked Kardelj for delivering the letter. He found President Tito’s report very helpful. He noted that the Yugoslavs were eager to have the US begin discussions with North Korea, and he reminded Kardelj that he had told President Tito of our commitment to the South Koreans not to begin those discussions without them. We want a peaceful solution and would like to explore with the Yugoslavs how progress might be made, while assuring the South Koreans of our commitment. He again thanked Kardelj for the report and said he would study it with great care.

Tito’s Trip

Kardelj said much of what President Tito wrote would be familiar to the President. He emphasized that the North Koreans want a peaceful solution. With regard to China there was not much new to report. President Tito had the impression that the Chinese were aware of their differences with the US. At the same time there was some coincidence of interests. They wanted better relations with Washington; of course, however, there were conditions, including Taiwan. Apart from that, one way or another, the Chinese wanted to cooperate. He said the welcome that the Chinese had given President Tito had greatly exceeded their expectations; it was much warmer than they had expected. That seemed a sympton of a deep change in Chinese policy, the beginning of an opening to the world. In that sense, the attention given to Tito was not meant for him alone.

President Tito had found it interesting that the Chinese had apparently decided to accelerate their economic development, especially in the industrial sector. They had introduced material incentives quite at odds with previous policy.

Kardelj thought the Chinese could be a very positive force in international affairs in the future. Of course, the Yugoslavs realized that China’s attitude toward them was a function of the Chinese attitude toward the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia wants good relations with China, not to become their advocate with the Soviets, but rather because of the positive, independent role in world affairs.

In his discussions in the Soviet Union, President Tito did not encounter serious difficulties. The two parties preserved their positions unchanged, and the well-known differences continue to exist. The Soviet Union dislikes both Yugoslavia’s non-alignment and its internal system, but it understands that those will not change, and it is prepared to develop its relations with Belgrade. Yugoslavia desires similar development; its location, both geographic and strategic, requires special efforts at good relations with the Soviet Union, despite differences with it. That is necessary for peace in Europe. Yugoslavia will maintain its own ideas about non-alignment and internal structure. Kardelj felt the Soviets now understood that, and thus relations had improved. Within this general framework, the Soviets seemed preoccupied with their relations with the US—with detente and disarmament.

The President thought that perhaps because of Tito’s discussions in Moscow, the Soviets had been more cooperative in recent weeks in SALT and other discussions, and he asked Kardelj to tell President Tito that relations had improved. US-Soviet discussions had been freer and more productive. There had been progress in SALT and on CTB; no final agreements had been concluded, but the US was encouraged by progress. The US had talked with the Soviets about building a constructive attitude at Belgrade. The President hoped that the terms of the Final Act and compliance with it would be discussed openly and freely, but without aggravating difference. We will be forceful but not in a way which will disturb detente. The Belgrade conference is important to us, and we appreciate the good influence of President Tito in bringing us together for common purposes.

The President stressed that the unity and strength of Yugoslavia, as well as its non-alignment, are very important to world peace; they are important to us as well. He said he was eager to have constant exchanges of views with the Yugoslavs, and he hoped that Kardelj would not hesitate to contact him when he could aid relations.

The President said that the US wanted to move toward peace, to diminish armaments levels in the world and the threat posed by nuclear weapons, to extinguish the flames of war. Yugoslav advice and cooperation would be important.

Kardelj said he was happy to hear the President’s views because he also felt that the big and small nations should participate equally in solving major global problems. Yugoslavia supports detente and recognizes that US-Soviet relations are decisive for world peace. But for efforts to succeed, other nations, including the non-aligned, must participate. Yugoslavia wants to contribute to developing less confrontation and more cooperation in the world.

In that context, Kardelj welcomed the President’s statement that the US not only sought arms limitation, but wanted to reduce arms. He reiterated that all countries should participate; at the same time, the balance of power is important to global strategy, and especially to Yugoslav independence. Still the effort should be made to move to lower levels of arms. Kardelj was unsure whether Yugoslavia’s influence on the Soviets, or President Tito’s own, had been important. But President did what he could to make steps toward US-Soviet understanding, an understanding valid for disarmament and for other fields. Perhaps the Soviets did react to President Tito’s comments in their discussions with the President.

Kardelj hoped there would be more Soviet-American efforts but stressed that in discussing problems, the US and the Soviet Union should talk with the non-aligned nations. All nations should take part if they have an interest—for instance, in southern Africa. There is distrust, and it is not easy for parties to accept cooperative efforts. Yet those efforts are still positive; the more that non-aligned and other nations take part, the more chance there is of reaching solutions. In particular, the superpowers ought to act to increase the strength of non-aligned nations. There are always tensions and the possibility of local wars. If the major blocs appear to be behind those tensions, then arms pour in, aggravating local tensions. Thus, the non-aligned nations should participate in the attempt to preserve peace. Kardelj indicated that President Tito wanted to know the President’s view on non-aligned nations and their role.

US Global Policies

The President indicated that he had to leave soon but wanted to make several points before he did. He first asked Kardelj for his assessment of the Middle East, the controversy between Ethiopia and Somalia, and other areas of tension. He said that Yugoslav views were important, and he wanted to hear them, particularly on the Middle East.

The President recognized that some policies of the United States would create problems for the Yugoslavs. He hoped that Kardelj would be able to resolve those difficulties in his conversations at the State Department. It is hard to change the policies, but he wanted to diminish the problems caused for the Yugoslavs by them.

He expressed the hope that US investments in Yugoslavia would grow. We would like to build plants and other facilities in Yugoslavia. However, there is a problem with US policy on investment guarantees. He and Congress prefer that those guarantees go to the poorest nations. Yugoslavia had done so well that it was difficult to justify extending guarantees to it. The US would do the best it could, but if guarantees could not be given, the President wanted the Yugoslavs to understand that there was no anti-Yugoslav motivation.

With regard to arms transfers, the President said that the US would like to supply some of Yugoslavia’s needs; the Secretaries of State and Defense would be prepared to discuss that subject further. The United States is attempting to work with arms suppliers to reduce overall transfers. One means of doing so is to induce consumers to reduce their purchases. But the US is prepared to sell some weaponry to Yugoslavia, and we will talk further with the Yugoslavs. However, those discussions are within the context of a general promise—applying to all countries—to the American people to cut overall transfers each year. We will work with the Yugoslavs.

With regard to atomic power, the President stressed that the US is committed to nuclear energy but also to prohibiting transfers that could be used in nuclear explosions. There is no doubt that Yugoslavia is trustworthy and shares the same goals as the United States. Yet as the US develops laws, it may find that the rules governing sales of nuclear equipment are not as flexible as some might like. The President indicated that we would try to meet Yugoslav needs but that there might be difficulties from time to time. Again, the President hoped that problems could be discussed frankly and that any constraint would not be interpreted as a blow to our friendship for Yugoslavia. We will be as flexible as we can within the law, and the President suggested that Kardelj discuss these issues further with US Cabinet officers.

Middle East

The President asked for Kardelj’s assessment of the Middle East, saying that he wanted Kardelj brought up to date and was interested in his views.

Kardelj said he had read the US statement issued that day and thought it was a step toward peace.³ In the Yugoslavs view, the Palestinians are the central issue. From the start their status has been a major cause of war. At present the Palestinians seem radical to Israel, but it is hard to keep up with their position. Yugoslavia has close contacts with the Palestinians and thinks they are ready to change. However, it is difficult for them to move without first having a guarantee of some rights. Qaddumi⁴ was recently in Yugoslavia and, knowing that Kardelj was coming to the US, asked what the US meant by “homeland.”

Kardelj thought that the Palestinians were ready for peace; the Palestinian issue is a hard one, but the Palestinians seem ready to recognize Israel and the Israeli borders at the end of the first war. It is hard to see how relations between Israel and the Palestinians could be regulated, but if there were a long-term solution, then it should be possible to settle relations. The Palestinians would have access to the Mediterranean through Israel. Kardelj stressed that it would be important to have an independent Palestine; any other arrangement would be a hotbed in the Middle East, something that is up to the US to make Israel understand. Kardelj thought that with any Israeli concession the Palestinian position would soften.

Finally, Kardelj noted that all Arab states have recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. In his press conference, the President had mentioned the possibility of a flexible solution.⁵ Kardelj thought that might work but believed it important that the PLO be represented.

The President said that the US was willing to talk with the PLO, even with Arafat, but that first the PLO had to agree—as had all other states of the region—to negotiate on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 338. As long as the PLO refuses to do that it is impossible for the US to talk directly with it. The President said he knew the PLO trusted the Yugoslavs and suggested that the Yugoslavs might use their good offices to get the PLO to make a declaration that it agreed with the principles of those UN resolutions. If the PLO wanted to add language indicating that something more than a refugee problem was involved—indicating, perhaps, the need for a homeland—that would be okay with the United States. But so far the PLO has rejected even that course. The US had signed, and the President indicated he had confirmed, an agreement with Israel that PLO acceptance of 242 was a prerequisite for US dealings with that organization. The President said he would appreciate any Yugoslav help. He looked forward to reports of Kardelj’s talks with Cabinet officers.

The President presented Kardelj a book of satellite photographs, indicating that he thought one was of the Yugoslav coast. He said the photos were available to Yugoslavia any time they would be useful. Kardelj presented the President with a gift from President Tito for the President’s birthday. The President expressed his thanks to Kardelj and to President Tito. Kardelj said that any time the President could come to Yugoslavia, it would be a pleasure to welcome him.

[At 11:25 a.m., the President and the Vice President left; other participants remained and the meeting continued.⁶]

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 35, Memcons: President: 9/19–30/77. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Treverton. While the White House memorandum of conversation notes that the meeting took place in the Oval Office, a Department of State memorandum of the conversation drafted by Luers places the meeting in the Cabinet Room. (Ibid.)
2. All brackets are in the original.
3. In statements issued following Carter’s meeting with Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al Halim Khaddam, and with Jordanian President of the Royal Court Abddul Hamid Sharaf and Jordanian Foreign Minister Hassan Ibrahim, the White House stressed that it had “agreed on the importance of working to reconvene the Geneva conference by the end of the year.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1677–1678)
4. Farouk Kaddoumi also known as Abu al-Lutf, Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leader.
5. In a press conference on September 29, Carter stressed that if the PLO were to accept UN Resolution 242 and the right of Israel to exist, the United States would begin negotiations with the PLO on the Palestinian question. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1687–1688)
6. No memorandum of conversation for the remainder of the meeting was found.