Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

242. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs(Brzezinski) to President Carter ¹

Washington, September 20, 1977

SUBJECT

• U.S. Arms Transfers to Yugoslavia

In conversations with both the Vice President and CNO Holloway, Yugoslav officials indicated their interest in expanding their arms purchases from the United States. (U.S. sales totaled $689.5 million in the period 1950–63, but dropped to under $500,000 per year in the mid-1960s.) Specifically, the Yugoslavs expressed interest in the MK–44 torpedo and raised again the question of the Harpoon missile which we had previously declined to sell.

At my request, an interagency study addressed the general issue of our military sales relationship with Yugoslavia (Tab A).² There is consensus that the relationship should be expanded moderately, with emphasis on political impact (agency comments are at Tab B).³ I believe that course of action will serve our basic objectives: (1) underscoring both to the Yugoslavs and to the Soviets our interest in an independent Yugoslavia; (2) marginally reducing Yugoslavia’s dependence on the Soviets for weaponry, thus enlarging its room for maneuver; and (3) building a relationship with the military, certain to be a key shaper of post-Tito events.

The Yugoslav transfer of old U.S. M-47 tanks to Ethiopia this summer stands as a caution. Belgrade’s explanation of it as an administrative mistake is disingenuous, but I believe the risk of such a re-transfer in the future can be minimized. Our team just returned from Belgrade where it reiterated the non-transfer provisions that apply to U.S.-supplied equipment, reviewed Yugoslav inventories and received fresh assurances from the Yugoslavs that re-transfer would not recur.

We can expect, and must demand, that Belgrade live up to its non-transfer commitments. At the same time, however, if we modestly expand our arms sales, the objectives in doing so are long-term. To have value, the military relationship must be sustained even though the Yugoslavs will continue to take actions we dislike—actions in Third World groupings, permission for Soviet military passage through Yugoslavia. In the past, the sales relationship has been turned off and on with each Yugoslav action that Washington disliked or approved. The result has been to confuse the Yugoslavs and drain any benefit from the existing military relationship.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve a moderate expansion in the U.S. arms transfer relationship with Yugoslavia.⁴

Substantively, that would imply:

—informing the Yugoslavs of your decision but also making clear its limits. You could mention the decision to Kardelj when he visits on September 30, and Harold Brown could reinforce it when he goes to Yugoslavia at about the same time.⁵

—first candidates for sales would be ship defense systems identified by the U.S. Navy (not including Harpoon). The TOW missile, previously offered to them, might be re-offered.

—no credit is sought, or would be granted, so only the normal procedures for notifying Congress would be involved. No offensive systems would be transferred, and the relationship would be consistent with PD–13. Of course, increases in sales to Yugoslavia would add to global U.S. totals, but the Yugoslav total will be modest even in an expanded relationship.

Procedurally:

—State would chair an interagency group to develop procedures for responding to Yugoslav requests. That group would include Defense and intelligence representatives to make sure that transfers did not entail risks of technology leaks.

—Ambassador Eagleburger might be designated the focal point for helping the Yugoslavs better understand U.S. arms transfer procedures.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Treverton forwarded this memorandum to Brzezinski on September 17 noting that it had been delayed partly to await the outcome of the mission to Yugoslavia to discuss the M–47 tank re-transfer and “partly because Defense liked the study so much it nearly expired winding its way ever upward in the Pentagon.” (Ibid.)
2. At Tab A, attached but not printed, is the interagency memorandum on military sales to Yugoslavia. See footnote 3, Document 240.
3. At Tab B are the comments from the Department of State, the Department of Defense, ACDA, and the CIA. See Documents 240 and 241.
4. Carter wrote “OK JC” at the top of the memorandum indicating his approval. Brzezinski notified the Department of State, the Department of Defense, ACDA, the JCS, and the CIA of the President’s decision on September 22. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 56, Yugoslavia: 1977)
5. See Documents 244 and 245.