Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XX, Eastern Europe

239. Letter From President Carter to Yugoslav President Tito¹

Washington, August 5, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

Vice President Mondale has told me about the warmth of your hospitality during his recent trip to Yugoslavia, and has given me a full report on his talks with you. Your insights are very helpful to me.

I understand that you will soon be travelling to Moscow, Pyongyang, and Peking—a trip which will be of great importance to everyone who seeks greater international understanding. I would welcome hearing from you after your trip, to gain your own assessment of the situation in the three countries you are visiting, and to learn of their leaders’ views on world problems.

This is a particularly important time in U.S.-Soviet relations. Despite the tenor of much public commentary in recent months, I am encouraged by the progress we have made in bilateral discussions with Soviet officials in a number of areas, including the limiting of military forces in the Indian Ocean and the ending of nuclear testing. I am committed to building on what has been done so far, in order to reduce the risks of war, place firm limits on the nuclear arms race, and create an enduring basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. I hope you will assure Soviet leaders of my commitment. We are prepared to move forward with the Soviet Union on a broad front, on the basis of mutual interest, reciprocal action, and a common commitment to strengthening peace.

Clearly, gaining a new SALT agreement is of great importance. Many difficulties remain; but I am prepared to work closely with Soviet leaders to reach an agreement that will truly provide greater security in the years ahead. The forthcoming conference to review the Helsinki agreement, which you are hosting this fall, is also of major importance. We want to make this a constructive meeting, in order to strengthen the basis for security and cooperation in Europe.

With regard to China, we are committed to moving forward on the basis of the Shanghai Communique. Secretary Vance will be in Peking shortly before you arrive, and will be exploring ways in which normalization of relations can proceed. I consider our approach to China to be central to our global policy. Both the United States and the People’s Republic share parallel interests: namely, to prevent third countries from establishing positions of dominance where we both have legitimate concerns. At the same time, our desire to improve relations with China is not intended to increase problems and difficulties for any other nation. Rather, I believe that normalization will enhance the prospects for an enduring peace and security in Asia and elsewhere, and will encourage Chinese participation in international arenas in a useful and constructive way.

I am particularly concerned with stability in Northeast Asia, and with the peaceful resolution of problems which divide South and North Korea. We have decided to carry out a phased withdrawal of American ground combat forces from the Republic of Korea in a manner which will not endanger stability on the peninsula. We remain firmly committed to the security of the Republic of Korea and we are taking steps to ensure that no one mistakenly believes there has been any reduction in our resolution to uphold that commitment. At the same time, we seek ways to lessen tension and establish a framework for a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula. To that end, we are prepared to meet with all of the parties most immediately concerned to explore how best to resolve outstanding issues. Such a meeting would, of course, have to include the governments of both North and South Korea.

I look forward to hearing from you, and know that I would benefit from your observations on these and other critical issues. I would also be deeply pleased if you could visit me in the United States early in 1978. This would give me a chance to meet and talk with you about world problems, and about ways we can continue to promote the close relations which exist between our two countries.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 21, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 5/77–5/79. No classification marking. The initial draft was prepared in the Department of State and sent to the White House by Tarnoff on July 29. Treverton and Hunter reworked the draft at Brzezinski’s request. (Ibid.) Brzezinski forwarded the letter for signature to the President on August 5, noting that he and Vance thought a letter to Tito “in advance of his trip to Moscow, Pyongyang, and Peking” would be “useful.” (Ibid.) The letter was transmitted to Belgrade in telegram 184567, August 6, with instructions to deliver it to Tito. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770282–0270) Eagleburger delivered the letter to Minic on August 9. (Telegram 5378 from Belgrade, August 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770286–0413)